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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Laura Strait 
Doctor of Philosophy 
School of Journalism and Communication 
September 2020 
Title: Occupying a Third Place: Pro-Life Feminism, Legible Politics, and the Edge 
of Women's Liberation 
This dissertation reads pro-life feminism as a break from traditional public 
perceptions of feminist thought. Through a variety of methodological analyses, it 
engages three case studies to answer (1) How does pro-life feminism persist as a 
movement and idea? And (2) What does the existence of pro-life feminists mean for 
the discursive boundaries of pro-choice feminism? This project included archival 
research on major feminist, anti-feminist, and pro-life feminist organizations, as well 
as long-form interviews with founding members of the pro-life feminist organizations. 
First, a critical discourse analysis of the 2017 Women’s March on Washington in 
regard to the removal of pro-life feminist group New Wave Feminists’ publicized 
removal as march organizers reveals discursive boundaries of contemporary feminist 
activism. Next, an evaluation of pro-life feminism’s coopting of “feminist 
foremothers,” Susan B. Anthony in particular, concludes that pro-life feminists utilize 
iv 
the mechanisms of producing history through commemoration to sustain a shared 
internal history that diverges from professional historical accounts of the suffragette. 
Finally, a cross-platform analysis of pro-life feminism’s online social life points to 
the future of fringe social organization through social media and the writable web. 
The study concludes with a discussion on the social space between public and private 
spheres (as theorized by Arendt, Habermas, Benhabib, and Butler) as the locus for 
pro-life feminism to persist while simultaneously undermining and constituting the 
philosophical boundaries of “mainstream” feminism. 
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I: INTRODUCTION 
In March of 2016, a photograph of a determined teenage girl protesting 
reforms to Texas abortion clinic regulations graced the front page of The New York 
Times’ print version (Liptak, 2016). The protests followed a Supreme Court decision 
striking down strict building code and employment status regulations Texas 
lawmakers had imposed on clinics that performed abortions. The anti-abortion 
protesters sought to retain these regulations, which do not ban abortions outright, but 
reduce the number of clinics at which abortions can be performed. We cannot see the 
banner she is holding, as the picture is cropped just below her clenched fists. Instead, 
the girl is flanked by two pro-life protest signs: the one on the right features a 
newborn posed in a grayscaled allusion to an ultrasound with stark white block-text 
reading “Life Counts,” a familiar and iconic pro-life image. The sign to the left of 
the girl’s face, however, was far less familiar and devoid of the morose imagery we 
have come to expect from pro-life iconography. The sign advertised a website and, 
in extra-large black and bubblegum pink font, read: “I Am A Pro-Life Feminist.” 
Incidentally, this photograph made visible a growing movement beyond the 
typical political narrative of pro-life versus pro-choice. The organization, the “New 
Wave Feminists” (NWF), are just one of many politically active pro-life feminist 
groups that emerged around the debate on Roe v. Wade, and have since battled pro-
choice measures in the political arena. The mere existence of the group points to an 
unnamable space within US political life that cannot fit into the confines 
of constitutionalism, and exists halfway between the public sphere of legislation 
and the private sphere of the home and family. As a movement, pro-life feminism is 
public in the inherent legality of its premise but, since Roe v. Wade, has found little 
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logical public space to occupy. The evolution of web 2.0 has in recent years provided 
an outlet and organizing ground for numerous groups that are not easily categorized, 
and pro-life feminist groups avidly took advantage of the technology. At the moment 
of writing, for instance, the founder of the NWF, Destiny Herndon-De La Rosa, 
 
is crowdfunding a mobile app for pro-life feminists to locate pro-life women’s 
health clinics nearby (Corkins, 2017). 
 
Where the emergence of the pro-life movement can be traced to the 
legalization of abortion, self-proclaimed feminists who disagree with abortion predate 
Roe v. Wade. Like many political issues that aren’t legible until challenged, the issue 
of abortion as something juridically contestable arose around this and similar historic 
cases, consequently creating the pro-life feminist as a legible figure. While debates 
on the issue of abortion precede the decision on legalization, it wasn’t until 
 
this monumental legal turn that the conditions necessary for a pro-life movement 
to coalesce would evolve. This dissertation takes many approaches to answering 
questions about pro-life feminism as a phenomenon; through conjunctural analysis, 
those approaches are woven together to produce a unique understanding of the 
conditions that make such a counterintuitive identity group possible. 
 
Now more than ever, popular conservative movements demand close 
analysis, particularly with regard to the formulation of popular memory and 
historical representation. By analyzing punctuated moments throughout the history of 
pro-life feminism, seeks to contextualize pro-life feminism’s newfound visibility in 
the current political moment. To this aim, I examine this movement’s own internal 
and public-facing communications, as well as news coverage framing the identity of 
the pro-life feminists. 
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Some pro-life feminist critiques echo those of certain pro-choice feminists 
who argued against many ERA reforms that helped to bring women into the general 
workforce. As will be detailed in the literature below, some scholars viewed women’s 
mass inclusion in the workforce as the beginning of a capitalist coopting of the 
women’s movement—undermining its integrity and diverting its cause. Moreover, 
pro-life feminists view this moment as a bargaining off of true progress under the 
guise of sexual liberation and the freedom to leave the domestic sphere. Feminists of 
color and labor activists, for instance, warned against and later lamented incremental 
trade-offs they would sacrifice for sweeping constitutional changes which would 
typically give rights to middle-class white women before anyone else. Notably, many 
critiques leveraged by the pro-life feminists today take up the general issues 
prominent in the pro-choice vs. pro-life debate over its failure to address the racial 
and class divides intrinsic to the issue. Groups like the New Wave Feminists 
frequently bring up race-related arguments against abortion, such as Planned 
Parenthood’s increased funding for sterilization and problematic long-term 
contraceptives in poorer communities and communities of color (Smith, 2005). 
 
Many divergences of the pro-life feminist ilk can be identified in these 
mainstream political divides, such as labor issues vs. reproductive rights vs. identity 
politics. This project’s goal is not to merely pinpoint the ways in which the pro-life 
feminists fit into extant historical narratives and turning points of the mainstream 
movement, but to understand how they persist and constitute/are constituted by 
mainstream feminism. This will involve looking to major events within both the pro-
life and pro-choice movements and reading their histories next to both the mainstream 
feminist movement as well as anti-feminist and pro-life politics. These distinctions 
become a bit tricky once the arbitration of what qualifies as “feminist” falls on the 
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author, but for the sake of this project the definition will apply to those women in 
particular who are (A) not explicitly anti-feminist, and (B) are concerned with the 
health, welfare, and agency of women.1 
This dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: (1) How does this 
seemingly paradoxical and marginal political group sustain an identity and history in 
the face of competing popular memories of feminism and the women’s movement? 
And (2) What does the persistence and recent resurgence of this group say about the 
state and definition of the feminist movement today? That is, what claims (if any) 
can be made about the discursive boundaries maintained by today’s mainstream 
feminist movement when it is confronted with a “feminist case against abortion”? 
(Foster, 2013). To this end, the project employs archival and textual analyses to 
examine the history of pro-life feminists in their own words, and through their media, 
in the mainstream media, and as represented by academic feminist historians. 
Additionally, it interrogates the concepts of memory and popular history when 
challenged, in this case regarding the political stances of feminist foremothers. 
Finally, this project engages new digital methodology to read contemporary online 
instances of community among pro-life feminists and that bond’s role in sustaining 
and growing an otherwise niche sociality. 
Pro-Life Feminism 
1 Thomas takes this designation a step further by qualifying pro-life feminism as ‘cultural
feminism,’ where “women’s different nature and strength in motherhood have been 
devalued instead of celebrated and embraced” (2012, p. 10) 
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Like the pro-choice and reproductive justice movements, the pro-life feminist 
movement is comprised of numerous organized groups. The most prominent and 
long-standing group, Feminists for Life of America (Heretofore FFL), maintains a 
generalized role as organizer and historian for the broader movement. This project 
will examine a range of texts produced by this organization as well as others 
published by religious or otherwise pro-life media producers. To follow the pro-life 
feminist histories (Sweet, 1985; Kennedy, 1997; Naranjo-Huebl, 2006), pro-abortion 
feminisms emerged after first wave feminism. In their pro-life “herstories” rendering, 
major feminist figures ranging from Mary Wollstonecraft to Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
were anti-abortion. FFL and its prodigies base this claim on a particular reading of 
material evidence, namely that these foremothers viewed motherhood as the source 
of women’s moral superiority, and expressed their anti-abortion preferences by 
denying advertisement space in the suffragist newsletter, Revolution, to patent 
medicines known for being covert abortifacients (Kennedy, 1997). This historical 
narrative runs contrary to mainstream feminist assertions that these foremothers 
would have been pro-choice (Thomas, 2012). 
 
As to the selfhood of a fetus, FFL claims that abortion was often a sticking 
point for early feminists and even served as an allegory for the denied personhood 
experienced by women themselves. Philosophically, early feminists argued against 
the patriarchal treatment of pregnancy as a “disability” that would inhibit women 
from participation in public and political life. This line of reasoning continues to 
appear in contemporary pro-life feminist rhetoric, as I will discuss below. 
Nevertheless, by regularly citing early feminists as foundational to their ongoing 
philosophies, pro-life feminists have from the beginning claimed an equal stake in 
the feminist movement that excludes them based on their anti-abortion position. 
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In the mid 20th century, social and political groups were less-easily 
aggregated as they are today, and women’s movements often circulated around 
publicity events, such as legislative measures regarding women’s labor and health 
issues. This was the case in 1966 when the National Organization of Women 
(NOW) was established in part as a response to a public degradation of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Legislators’ refusal to take women’s labor issues seriously awoke a 
sleeping giant that would ultimately lead to major overhauls in women’s rights and 
protections: “By creating a feminist civil rights organization, NOW members did 
more than assert their independence from male-dominated liberal politics; they 
publicly acknowledged that liberal political culture was inadequate to address the 
reality of women’s lives” (Rosen, 2013). The establishment of NOW theoretically 
produced a discursive public space and political framework for women to occupy, 
driving previously private matters into the public sphere. 
 
This narrative, much like that of the Seneca Falls origin story for “first wave” 
feminism, is of course problematized by the history of intersectional struggles 
communities of color: first fighting for the rights to vote that most men and white 
women had now enjoyed for decades, and second, battling for legal parity and civil 
rights protections for both their racial and gender communities. This is analogous to 
the decades of activist work preceding the origin of the NWSA, particularly the 
efforts of men and women of color fighting for women’s suffrage alongside efforts for 
abolition—the latter providing much organizational structure as well as knowledge 
and experience in activism and public support for the former. These are the 
complexities of public political culture that become collapsed when speaking of the 
history of feminism and women’s rights. Scholars like Nancy Hewitt (2010) or Louise 
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Michele Newman (1999) have produced excellent works detailing the often-untold 
histories of civic racial histories and the ways in which those narratives become folded 
into metanarratives about feminism, and obscured behind mythology supported by white 
supremacist outlooks and a structural avoidance of counternarratives. 
 
Accounts of the accomplishments of NOW are well-documented (Echols, 
1989; Tong 1989; Barakso, 2004), though less so is the history of the Women’s 
Equity Action League (WEAL), which split from NOW upon the latter group’s 
insistence on abortion rights as a political platform. Notably, many women left NOW 
for WEAL on the basis of political plausibility and not personal philosophies; 
 
they thought that such a controversial issue might spell the end of the women’s 
movement’s momentum. Other groups of individuals consisted of conservative 
feminists looking to maintain the direction of the women’s movement within the 
scope of labor and civil rights. While WEAL and NOW would continue to work 
together to push through the ERA, their division forebode the ensuing rift in women’s 
movements surrounding the issue of abortion. 
 
How then, did a labor policy-minded group of pro-woman attorneys like 
WEAL eventually morph into the present iteration of anti-abortionism, which is in 
many ways mobilized around the single issue of reproductive rights? In other 
words, how did the political divider of abortion shift from an issue of political 
expediency to one of religious dogma? Many scholars look to the emergence 
 
of modern evangelicalism in the 1970’s as a turning point for the political world’s 
obsession with maternal life and its definitions. For instance, Carol Mason’s 
 
(2002) Killing for Life: The Apocalyptic Narrative of Pro-Life Politics traces the 
evolution of militant pro-life history, locating a shift from “right-to-life” rhetoric, to 
the notion that America would be punished if abortions were not banned, in an 
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attempt to regain a sense of morality following the war. In her text, she builds a 
claim that Barry Goldwater’s Conscience of a Conservative along with “New 
Warrior” rhetoric created for the post-Vietnam US a new psychological enemy to 
fight in the issue of abortion (p. 13). She also employs Jeffords (1989) work on 
masculinity and Vietnam to argue that abortion restrictions were very much part of 
an attempt to regain a sense of manhood following the war. 
This newfound apocalypticism sat well with conservative women in the 
1970’s looking to stifle the women’s liberation movement. From that moment on, 
conservative women’s actions would be synonymous with pro-life politics. In many 
instances, conservative women outright rejected the umbrella term of “feminism,” 
and therein sought to push back women’s liberation efforts instead of shifting their 
moral bases. However, a percentage of conservative women have sought to maintain 
their pro-woman foundation while rejecting liberal feminist ideals such as abortion. 
According to scholars on the topic (Gallagher, 1987; Oaks, 2009), the pro-life 
feminist movement’s institutional foundation officially began when NOW’s Ohio 
chapter exiled members Pat Goltz and Catherine Callaghan for their pro-life 
politics surrounding Roe v. Wade, defined as “heresy” by chapter leaders (though the 
national board declined the motion to bar the two from the organization). With a 
staunch belief in the need to maintain a pro-life voice in the larger conversation of 
feminism, Goltz and Callaghan formed the still-prominent group Feminists For Life 
of America (FFL), and have since provided resources and inspiration for many 
splinter groups of a similar persuasion. Not only that, but the FFL has a long history 
of political participation on key legislative issues regarding reproductive rights. 
By including support from progressive pro-lifers, anti-abortion advocates are 
able to circumvent critiques of the pro-life stance being regressive or misogynist 
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(McClain, 1994). This approach proved effective in 1993’s Bray vs. Alexandria’s 
Women’s Health Clinic, where a number of abortion clinics sued to stop 
demonstrations at Washington D.C. clinics on the basis that protestors were 
depriving women of “equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws” (42 U.S.C. 1985(3)) by inhibiting their right to abortion 
and their right to interstate travel. 
 
Following the District Court’s ruling that Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion 
protestors (Operation Rescue) did violate 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), the Supreme Court 
reviewed the case and ultimately overturned it (3v4).2 Submitting an amicus curiae to 
the court in support of Operation Rescue, the FFL weighed in on the defense that anti-
abortion protesters are not necessarily targeting women, but the act of abortion itself. 
According to the brief submitted by the FFLA, the women who would have 
influenced the section of the civil rights protection act being invoked (Ku Klux Klan 
Act) would not have considered anti-abortionism to be anti-woman: “Opposition to 
abortion was premised not upon animus against women, but upon the conviction that 
abortion constituted the oppression of women as well as the killing of children” (Bray 
vs. Alexandria Women’s Clinic, 1993). 
 
Although one cannot know for sure, the evidence put forward by the FFL in 
1993 may have influenced the historic decisions of the Supreme Court at the time. The 
Opinion of the Court delivered by Antonin Scalia points to arguments that are at 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The section of the act in question is rather vague and has been used to apply to personal 
freedom cases like this many times, typically held by lower district courts and later 
overturned by the Supreme Court. 
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least supported by those set forth by the FFL: “Whatever one thinks of abortion, it 
cannot be denied that there are common and respectable reasons for opposing it, 
other than hatred of, or condescension toward (or indeed any view at all concerning), 
women as a class-as is evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of 
the issue, just as men and women are on both sides of petitioners' unlawful 
demonstrations.” After coining the rhetorical device “Women deserve better than 
abortion,” the FFL frames pro-life feminism as a social justice issue, and continually 
challenges the idea that anti-abortionism is anti-woman. 
 
This rhetoric continues to function as the basis of pro-life feminist logic 
continuing into the 21st century. The contemporary group in question, the “New 
Wave Feminists,” offer a charismatic prescription for a world without abortions 
much in line with the FFL’s argument: 
 
Look, we don't work to make abortion illegal. We work to make it 
unthinkable and unnecessary. And we do that by getting to the root of 
the need for it. No woman ever wants to have an abortion. Both sides 
unanimously agree on that. So let's work towards a culture that 
supports a woman so well that she never has to have one. Let's work 
towards a culture that tells her "You Can," "You Are Strong Enough," 
and "If You Need Some Help - We Are Here," because that is what the 
sisterhood is all about. (www.newwavefeminists.com, “About”) 
 
Though this group seems self-aware of major critiques of the pro-life movement writ 
large, it regularly circumvents typical arguments about religious dogma by 
maintaining a rhetoric of liberation and dissent. In keeping with the FFL, the New 
Wave Feminists avoid any and all religious affiliations, and in doing so refuse to be 
barred from the public sphere by virtue of an unwelcome theism. Understanding the 
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current resurgence of “progressive anti-abortionism” is a step in building a 
contemporary history of the movement in its entirety. The New Wave Feminists 
represent one of many instances of pro-life feminists finding support, resources, and 
momentum on the internet and through social media. One task of this project is 
tracing a rhetorical lineage between this group and others, as well as the early 
suffragists that preceded them. The methodological implications of this endeavor will 
be detailed below. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The complex nature of analysis necessary to read pro-life feminism as 
phenomena requires a relational approach that traces the constantly shifting layers 
and intersections of socio-political contexts leading to the identity’s potential for 
existence. Hall’s (Gramscian) conjunctural framework of analysis allows the 
researcher to map out the sporadic iterations of progressive and feminist pro-lifeism 
as a phenomenon always already tied up in a complex of socio-political ontologies 
and struggles over meaning (1978). In particular, conjunctural analysis is uniquely apt 
to read social movements in a holistic and dynamic manner, especially those which 
are presently ongoing. Each “moment” that this project analyzes requires a unique 
conceptualization of the conditions of possibility and “can only be defined by the 
accumulation/condensation of contradictions” (Hall, 1980). Perhaps most 
importantly, conjunctural analyses are in and of themselves political endeavors, 
framing and crystalizing a ‘problem space’ that ‘makes visible/hearable’ the socio-
political undercurrents of a conjecture and opening that space up as a site of struggle 
or resistance. 
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In his latest conjunctural project, Grossberg (2019) describes the process as an 
articulation of discrete analytical layers and highlights three imperatives: “the first 
treats the conjuncture as a complex context viewed politically as a war of positions.” 
The next “maps the multiple ‘problematics’ that cut across those various positions to 
construct a certain kind of ‘problem space,’” and the final practice and relational 
construction “attempts to question whether and in what ways that problem space is 
given its own sense of unity through what Gramsci called ‘an organic crisis’ (p. 43). 
A conjunctural analysis allows for this project to span over history in multiple 
directions at the same time keeping in mind the major conceptual categories that 
undergird the inquiry’s definitional goals. These categories each constitute their own 
matrices of relational possibilities foregrounding understandings of feminist ideology, 
popular memory, representation and perception, and overall social organization. 
 
To this end, a foundation of relevant historical contexts will provide one of the 
material layers of this inquiry. One part of this project’s goal to historicize the pro-life 
feminist movement will be founded on materials produced by sources outside of the 
typical scholarly purview. Many of the texts from which I have drawn pro-life 
feminist histories and philosophies are produced by the Feminists for Life 
organization, or some affiliate/subsidiary thereof. Additionally, a number of texts are 
produced by Christian and conservative publishers. In multiple academic disciplines, 
alterity in history is often regarded with deference, such as the growing canonized 
inclusion of oral history. With this in mind, the project will proceed with an 
understanding of the inherent epistemic violence in naming, historiographic 
construction, and “knowledge production” more generally. 
 
During the height of popularity of postmodernism and Cultural Studies, 
theorists pushed for the “deprofessionalization” of history. This called for a 
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heightened preoccupation with “non-academic” forms of historical narratives, such as 
oral history and popular memory. This notion of popular memory, as defined by the 
Popular Memory Group (1982) refers to both public representations and private 
memory as constructions of the past. The difference between popular memory and 
professional history, then, is the producer. Where professional history is recorded and 
defined by historians in academia, popular memory is produced in the minds of 
people and in public representations often portrayed through public and civic 
institutions: 
 
The various sites and institutions do not act in concert. To make them sing, if 
not in harmony at least with only minor dissonances, involves hard labor and 
active intervention. Sometimes this has been achieved by direct control 
(censorship for example) and by a violent recasting or obliteration of whole 
fields of public history. More commonly today, in the capitalist West, the 
intersections of formal political debates and the public media are probably 
the crucial site. (p. 209) 
 
We can apply this understanding of popular memory to the shaping of popular 
perceptions of feminism. Within this framework, the passing of the ERA or Roe v. 
Wade historically legitimizes the movements that rallied for these causes, while those 
groups against the motions lose visibility and recognition in the public eye. This 
phenomenon is then exacerbated by the US’s forgetful historical outlook and 
forward-thinking proclivity (Blight, 1989, 2009). Both the Popular Memory Group, as 
well as Gordon, Buhle, and Dye (1976) consider women and women’s movements to 
be precarious in terms of writing themselves into professional history, which 
produces an even larger role for popular memory through political action. 
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Following the above efforts, a composite of three media-centric case studies 
surrounding pro-life feminism today provide a nuanced illustration of the life, 
persistence, and future of the movement as of now. Each chapter will provide a 
deeper glimpse into the identities, communities, and memories that support and foster 
a continually challenged political position. This multitude of articulations, when read 
atop of the conjuncture of pro-life feminism, will ideally elucidate the “major turning 
points when interconnected forces at play at multiple levels and spatial scales [...] 
create new conditions with worldwide implications and reverberations” (Hart, 2020 
p. 242). First, it will be useful to situate this analysis among extant scholarship on 
abortion rights, women and conservatism, and alternative historiographical accounts 
of the women’s movement. 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Abortion as a political topic has long been fraught with historical 
misconceptions and changing definitions in order to serve various political climates. 
Before the mid 19th century, abortion law in the U.S. revolved around the Quickening 
Doctrine, as doctors could not make certain a woman was pregnant until she 
confirmed that she felt the fetus move. As medicine as a practice became 
institutionalized with the establishment of the American Medical Association (AMA), 
physicians (spearheaded by Horatio Robinson Storer) forged a campaign to 
criminalize abortion spanning the second half of the nineteenth century. 
 
Mohr (1979) argues that doctors in the AMA were more interested 
 
in criminalizing abortions because it would help to remove their midwife competitors, 
and that the prosecution of those outside of the medical profession (the AMA had also 
recently ousted homeopaths) would lend to a professionalization to the field of 
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medicine which was not yet privileged or elite. Additionally, he makes the argument 
that doctors, typically white, protestant, and upper class, would often “beat the old 
nativist drums on behalf of anti-abortion policies” (p. 167), frequently pointing out 
that immigrant Catholics were having far fewer abortions than the Protestant, 
“native-born” upper class. Finally, he points to numerous records implying that 
doctors in the mid-nineteenth century were wary of abortion’s implications for 
women’s social roles outside of the home. 
 
In the early 1970s, a small number of pro-life physicians made claims that 
abortion produced more health problems for the mother than childbirth could. These 
claims were largely rooted in mental health arguments by psychiatrists, but the 
particulars of physical vs. mental concerns were obfuscated when pro-life activists 
took up the arguments for the promotion of their cause. Haugeberg’s (2017) 
exhaustive examination of the contemporary pro-life movement in Women Against 
Abortion: Inside the Largest Moral Reform Movement of the Twentieth Century 
fact-checks these and other claims of pro-life groups and their publications to 
showcase the way in which marginal (and sometimes incorrect) opinions can 
become widely accepted truths. 
 
This was the case in the 1980s when pro-life content writers began widely 
circulating anecdotes about “postabortion syndrome,” where some women were said 
to express a sense of loss or grief after receiving an abortion. Regardless of the lack 
of scientific evidence and even the flat-out refutation of the claims by the AMA and 
APA, Haugeberg and others argue that the stories were so evocative that even pro-
choice women had begun to fear the psychological impacts of abortion. These “regret 
narratives” became a core tenet in pro-life arguments, and notably brought concern 
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for the pregnant women back into the debate (p. 41). 3 This is evident in present-day 
pro-life movements, which have since then become predominantly female, where 
the notion of redemption through admission of guilt and suffering has become a 
central issue/focus. 
 
 
Scholarship on Pro-life Feminism 
 
The pro-life feminist history in particular has scarcely garnered scholarly 
interest, and only as of the last decade. Though not the earliest, the most widely cited 
piece is Laury Oaks’s (2009) “What Are Pro-Life Feminists Doing on Campus?” In 
this article she traces the history of the Feminists for Life of America (FFL) in order 
to examine their relationship to college campuses both as a site for recruitment and as 
a regular gathering place for like-minded feminists. Oaks built her analysis on 
previous experience with the rhetorical history of pro-life feminism while studying 
the “pro-women, pro-life” (PWPL) movement based in Ireland (Oaks, 2000), which, 
unlike studies on the U.S.-based FFL, is a highly documented social movement due to 
its weightier social and political impact, as Ireland remains one of the strictest 
European countries when it comes to abortion rights. Pro-life feminism received some 
 
 
 
3 The longstanding critique of pro-lifeism as anti-woman can be traced back to the late 19th 
century and the AMA’s stance on abortion: “[the Storer committee’s report] seems to have 
thrown out of consideration the life of the mother, making that of the unborn child appear 
of far more consequence, even should the mother have a dozen dependent on her for their 
daily bread...the Committee will fail to convince the public that abortion in the early 
months is a crime, and a large proportion for the medical profession will tacitly support the 
popular view of the subject” (Mohr, 1952). 
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attention in the area of women’s and gender studies in the mid 1990’s (Jaggar, 1994; 
McClain, 1994), where the notion is evaluated more as a theoretical “blind-spot” in 
feminism than a movement in and of itself. Since Oaks’s 2009 work raised pro-life 
feminist awareness in the academy, all studies on the topic have been located in the 
field of sociology, and more particularly within social movement (SMO) literature. 
Herein, pro-life feminism is approached as somewhat of an anomalous force to use as 
a case study for the development of sociological theories of the behavior of social 
movements. For instance, works like Rose (2011) and Trumpy (2014) both discuss 
the pro-life feminist movement in terms of their “issue frames,” or how they 
outwardly represent their political goals, in order to better refine theoretical models on 
issue framing in SMO literature. Kretschmer (2014) works in a similar vein by 
reading pro-life feminism against extant theories on the morphology of social 
movement boundaries, but deserves special mention for her methodology. She draws 
close details on the history of the movement from organizational archives and the 
Tully-Crenshaw Feminist Oral History Project, but also performs interviews with 
early members of the FFL. 
 
The following section addresses the areas of literature adjacent to the topic 
of pro-life feminism. Due to the scarcity of research on the movement or group 
 
itself, there are considerable gaps in the literature. The areas that build the boundaries 
within which pro-life feminism as a topic emerges include research on conservative 
and anti-feminist women, and categorizing historiographies of the feminist 
movement. The latter refers to texts that have been written over time to parse out 
dissents, sub-sects, and disruptions within the broader feminist cause. This project is a 
continuation of such a genre; but instead of thinking about defining histories of 
dissent and disagreement through lenses of race, class, or age, it thinks through the 
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possibility of a pro-life feminism as equally revealing of feminism’s 
discursive boundaries. 
 
 
Conservative Women in the United States 
 
While there is relatively little scholarly work focused on pro-life feminists in 
particular, the growing field of conservatism studies has etched out a place for work 
on conservative women and history. This field is perhaps nearest in scope to the 
interests of this project — where conservative culture and philosophies are analyzed 
in the tradition of the humanities and occasionally the social sciences. As we shall 
see, literature in and around conservative women often falls within the purview of 
nationalism, publics, and their respective private spheres. Even when it passed in 
1972, many women opposed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) (Blee and Deutsch, 
2012). Their justifications for opposing the ERA changed over the half century 
struggle to enact it, but more often than not, their fear of the ERA tied back to the 
idealized American homestead. Since the passing of the ERA and Roe v. Wade, 
conservative women’s movements have become synonymous with pro-life politics. 
Though some have sought reforms for the ERA, the majority of conservative feminist 
politics now centers on Christianity and its prescriptive relationship with women’s 
health and welfare. This section focuses on the philosophical foundations of 
conservative women’s groups earlier in the century, as well as the era of conservative 
women’s movements following the passing of the ERA. 
 
As Kathleen Blee and Sandra McGee Deutsch note in their collected 
volume on conservative women, Women on the Right (2012), interest in women’s 
role in conservative politics was scarce until the 1970’s. In organizing the work on 
conservative women, two major analytical frameworks repeatedly arise. These 
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frameworks, referred to here as “Woman As Nation” and “Public v. Private,” are 
highly useful analytics for thinking through complex sociological moments in which 
women play crucial symbolic and material roles in matters of nationalism, identity, 
and politics. In Feminist political philosophy, the public/private discussion is 
integral to the conversation on women’s roles and their effect on the political realm, 
and in many disciplines, the “Woman As Nation” framework contributes a gravity 
and universality to women’s roles in various nationalistic contexts. 
 
“Woman as Nation” refers to literature which aims to find nationalist or 
interventionist justification for the regulation of women and their bodies in a given 
social context. In this formulation, women become a floating signifier for not only 
nationhood, but purity, freedom, morality, liberty, and a nation’s core values. On top 
of that, mothering, heteronormativity, and familial values (all of which “produce” the 
nation) are pragmatically targeted under this framework. The “Woman as Nation” 
construct is therefore used by nationalists (intra-state groups) as a domain to protect 
and defend, while interventionists (extra-state powers) target women in campaigns 
for intervention. For instance, Patrizia Albanese (2006) compares different historical 
and contemporary European states and their resistance to or regulation of mothering 
practices: In post-Soviet Russia, progressive liberal policies were rolled back to 
emphasize the role of the woman in the home and not in the workplace — which 
would hypothetically lead to lower male unemployment and child delinquency, as 
well as a higher birth rate in the reforming state. Conversely, in contemporary Italy, 
the population’s aversion to fascist domestic intervention has contributed to lower 
national birth rates. 
 
In the public/private framework, women’s roles, or lack thereof, in history 
are framed by their oppressive relegation to the private, domestic sphere — therein 
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banning them from public, political, activities. For instance, historian Afsenah 
Najmabadi (1998) writes on Iranian modernity and the imperative of educating 
women, to the degree of mastering household finances, which doubly confined 
women to domesticity (the private) while implementing a caste separation between 
housewives and servants. Similarly, Middle-Eastern studies scholar Lisa Pollard 
(2005) writes on colonial Egypt and the focus on Egyptian domesticity as reactionary 
to Victorian ideology, while still forcing women into the interior. Ruth Schwartz 
Cowan (1983) parses the role of technology and capitalism in containing the woman 
in the home within a realm of unpaid, undocumented labor under the guise of progress 
and innovation in technology at the outset and progression of US industrialization. 
Mary Poovey (1988) also contemplates the institutionalized division of genders as 
they shift in different social and economic contexts, highlighting the arbitrary nature 
of the distinction in spite of its proliferation throughout history. By tracing the 
contours of shifting gender definitions in mid-Victorian England, she repeatedly 
points to “border cases” that disrupt straightforward conceptions about gender and 
domestic life in the middle class. 
 
Feminist scholars have also analyzed moments when the public/private 
distinction was blurred. This can occur in a multitude of ways. In the literature on 
conservative feminism, the typical invocation is the use of private subjects in public 
discourse. For example, Kate Hallgren’s “Maternalism Goes to War” looks at 
conservative women at the beginning of the 20th century who promoted conscription for 
their sons by making public their strong relationship with them — a relationship that 
had been kept private and unpublicized (2012). In Amy Swerdlow’s Women Strike for 
Peace (1993), the same maternal gravitas is employed to protest the Cold War and its 
perpetrators when tens of thousands of middle-class mothers went on 
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strike across the country, effectively circumventing red scare tactics to silence anti-
war sentiment. Conversely, conservative women have historically participated in 
public discourse on the defense of private matters — in the US (as well as globally) 
this traditionally comes up in matters of state involvement with mothering. Long 
before Nixon quashed a comprehensive childcare act for the same reason, nationalist 
women like the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) argued against state 
welfare for its likeness to socialist regimes, and its potential to break up the 
traditional family structure by loosening women’s dependence on their husbands 
(Delegard, K. 2012). 
 
Often, these analytics are applied together in a recursive move that reifies 
both frameworks. For instance, Partha Chatterjee (1993) famously complicates the 
reactionist characterization of feminizing the private sphere by detailing the Bengali 
response to Western modernity by protecting the spiritual advantage of the East 
within the chaste internal sphere separate from the public and political world that men 
inhabited. In his and many other depictions, the justification for relegating women to 
the private sphere is to protect the inner-most ingrained aspects of national identity — 
that of the family, and of mothering. In effect, the strength of either of these thought 
projects is reliant on the other: “Woman as Nation” embodies national identity, 
spirituality, morality, and any number of other signs needed in various nationalist 
contexts, while the public/private division confines all of these important values to be 
protected in the home. These two ideas in concert underline the unique relevance of a 
group like the pro-life feminists, who in many ways subscribe to “woman as nation” 
rhetoric in the form of morality and maternalism, but persistently function in between 
the public and private domains. A further discussion on the implications of the 
public/private debate will be detailed later in this introduction. 
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Histories of the Feminist Movement 
 
As with many moments in community and social movement formation, 
infighting and dissent are inherent to the process and play a key role in the identity 
formation of the dominant side’s narrative. The case of the feminist movement is no 
different, if somewhat less publicized than say, the American Revolution. Echoing the 
opening to Ruth Rosen’s (2000) influential The World Split Open: How the Modern 
Women’s Movement Changed America: “Bursts of artillery fire, mass strikes, 
massacred protesters, bomb explosions — these are our images of revolution. But 
some revolutions are harder to recognize: no cataclysms mark their beginnings or 
ends, no casualties are left lying in pools of blood” (p. xi), we see that historical 
accounts of the women’s movement are not numerous in many bookstores. Then it 
should be no surprise that the history of dissent within the women’s movement is 
even less visible. In the following pages, I will review work that details dissent, 
infighting, or simply historical incongruence within the women’s liberation 
movement. This exercise will ideally aid in pinpointing philosophical divergences 
which may be analogous to or illuminating of the pro-life feminists splintering from 
the mainstream feminist movement. I do so with conscious concern of developing 
false equivalences between various overlapping groups of women, thereby 
categorizing experiences that obfuscate the intersectional historical contexts 
complicated by myriad experiences of women of different ages, races, and social 
classes. 
 
A number of historiographic accounts have been published in the last decade in 
response to the slowed momentum of the women’s movement and its gradual migration 
into the academy. Often these accounts look to clear binary issues that split the 
movement: particularly age and race. These accounts differ from the thorough 
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depictions of the evolution of the movement from mainstream perspectives (e.g., 
Rosen, 2000; Echols, 1989; Davis, 1999; Brownmiller, 2000; Woods, 2000), in that 
they aim to argue an alternative causality for the movement’s current formulation. 
In reviewing this literature, it seems that there are two to three major frames or 
 
lenses employed to narrativize the history of the feminist movement: (1) the “waves” 
or eras of feminist politics where, like a paradigmatic shift, any given epoch 
inherently conflicts with the one that precedes or follows it. In this conceptualization, 
the lack of coherence is viewed as a failure of sorts, where the force or momentum 
driving a monolithic (albeit broad) movement is slowed and depreciated due to 
infighting. It is in this range of critiques that blame consumerism’s feminist 
appropriations for the movement’s decline; (2) generational gaps as culturally 
incommensurable: this framework could be mistaken for or embedded within the 
previous one, but differs slightly in that scholars look to the anesthetizing power of 
progress to dull young women to the importance of feminist work. In this framework, 
the assumption is that the women’s movement slows or risks obsolescence if the 
contemporary instantiation does not read the previous generation’s work as a 
prescription or justification for moving forward. 
 
The final (3) historiographic frame, which is perhaps most related to this 
project’s goal, and most relevant in politics and feminist movements today, is the 
exclusion and exploitation of lower-class women and women of color in the goals, 
scope, and historical narratives of mainstream feminist histories. The frameworks 
employed in this task are vast and varied, as they attempt to account for all racialized 
groups (read: non-white) throughout the entirety of the feminist movement. This 
project risks furthering that marginalization by relegating these histories to only one 
section in this review, when the breadth of literature in this area is immense. Keeping 
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this in mind, the following review aims to paint broad strokes of each “category” in 
an attempt to position this study on the philosophical divide in mainstream feminist 
politics on the issue of abortion. 
 
In the early 1970’s, writing women’s history faced similar limitations in the 
scope of analysis as it pertains to groups outside of the popular narrative; according 
to Gordon, Buhle, and Dye (1976), women’s history to that point was limited to three 
major frames. The most prominent and problematic frame in the eyes of the authors 
was the tendency for historians to focus on feminist organizations as the main site of 
record: “although the abundance of source material on the women’s rights movement 
helps explain why historians have devoted so much attention to it, this fact alone does 
not fully explain why scholars have paid so little attention to women who were not 
involved in organized feminism” (p. 76). They critiqued historians’ widespread focus 
on politically organized women’s groups as limiting the writing of women into 
history “only when women are behaving in ways usually regarded as masculine — 
that is, politically and collectively,” and argued that the obsession with social 
movements buys into a prescribed teleology about American progressivism. Since 
then, women’s and feminist histories have bloomed into a major field of study in the 
academic realm — addressing not only organizational feminist movements, but the 
ruptures and constraints therein. 
 
Many histories recording the women’s liberation movement trace the same 
series of events but make claims to different outcomes. As noted above, the extant 
histories of the pro-life feminist movement might fall into such a teleological conflict. 
Christine Stansell’s The Feminist Promise (2011) reads the women’s movement since 
1792 through a liberal feminist lens, where the institutional and legislative headway 
of the second wave are considered largely successful progressions in women’s 
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history. However, Hester Eisenstein’s Feminism Seduced (2015), makes the often-
invoked neoliberal critique on second wave feminism’s sacrifice to consumer 
capitalism. In her book she aims to pinpoint the moment at which the women’s 
movement “got it wrong,” by tracing its evolution through globalized trade and labor 
practices. Perhaps nearest to this project, Ellen Messer-Davidow (2002) traces the 
effectual split in the women’s movement from the street to the university. By 
breaking down various intellectual iterations of feminist studies, Disciplining 
Feminism traces the sterilization of the feminist movement within the academy as it 
moved from radical activism to moderate institutionalism. This undergirds the idea 
that feminism, as a mainstream endeavor, had moved into the university following 
the passing of Roe v. Wade in 1973. Messer-Davidow expands on this notion and in 
doing so concludes that both sides of the split suffered for this departure. In her 
words, feminism became “disciplined” in the academy through institutionalization, 
confining feminist work to canonical boundaries within the comfort zone of students 
and administration alike. 
 
Alternatively, Deborah Siegel and Jennifer Baumgardner’s Sisterhood, 
Interrupted: From Radical Women to Girls Gone Wild (2007) seeks to locate the rift 
between the liberal feminist “mothers” and their ostensibly post-feminist daughters, only 
to find the construct to be an echo of infighting from the second wave. Their work can be 
considered a further response to texts like Stansell’s, where their critique of generational 
polemics aims to dismantle the narratological history of feminism and replace it with a 
phenomenological conflict. Lynn Spigel (1995) applies this presumed generational 
disconnect to an interrogation on 50’s television sitcoms and popular memory of and 
around young women and perceptions of feminism. 
By studying her female women’s studies undergraduate classes, Spigel muses on the 
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use of popular memory, here in the form of curated syndicated sitcoms, to interrogate 
the contemporary disdain for the feminist movement in younger generations. 
 
Where ages or waves split the paths of the women’s movement for some, 
perhaps the most glaring and presently relevant division is that of race and the 
whiteness of liberal feminism’s written history. Breines’s (2006) The trouble between 
us: An uneasy history of white and black women in the feminist movement is one of 
many critiques by feminists of color that takes on the most prominent critique of the 
women’s movement today, notating each step along women’s liberation that 
opportunities for equity were sidestepped under the guise of political expediency 
(Ware, 1970; La Rue, 1970; Caraway, 1991; Joseph & Lewis, 1981). hooks’s Aint I a 
Woman (1981), and later Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (2000), precedes 
Breines’s work with a more explicit critique on the feminist movement and its 
avoidance of women of color. She skillfully argues that white feminists have always 
excluded black women, often due to stereotyping that carried over from the era of 
slavery. While hooks’s work is not necessarily of the same format as the other 
histories listed above, it presciently addressed concerns and critiques that would later 
become fodder for the work in the scope of this project. Additionally, her project as 
well as this one was to write recent history — the complexities of which are detailed 
above in Methodology. Finally, collections like Hewitt’s No Permanent Waves: 
Recasting Histories of US Feminism address race, class, and sexual and gender 
normativity from a variety of subaltern perspectives, primarily from the black, 
indigenous, and people of color communities. 
 
The aim of these various historiographies is to write a “thicker history” of an 
already well-documented movement. They tend to work (not uncritically) within a 
teleological framework that highlights successes and failures, but do not always 
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produce a conclusive narrative of the latter. The impetus to write the “where we went 
wrong” story often underlines the critiques of anti-feminists, or in this case, pro-life 
feminists. That is, those writing historical accounts of the feminist movement are 
often doing so from a critical standpoint, and are therefore aiming to shine a light on 
flaws in the movement. Similar to the third category of historical work listed above, 
this project looks to read a timeline that has coexisted with mainstream feminist 
iterations of the movement’s history. This is not to compare the participation of pro-
life feminists to historical contributions by and the exploitation of women of color in 
the women’s liberation movement, but to analytically compare the persistent 
presence of a part of the larger feminist whole as opposed to the first category, where 
the same homogenous group is divided by political subtleties. 
 
 
Background 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 The following section is a narratological review of histories written about the pro-life 
movement’s emergence and life in U.S. society and politics. It is a compilation of 
secondary materials, interviews with founders of pro-life feminist organizations, and 
archival research from the Arthur and Elizabeth Schlesinger Library on the History of 
Women in America. The library, housed by Harvard University, contains one of the U.S.’s 
largest collection of articles of women’s history and in a way validates the pro-life 
feminist movement as a relevant topic in history. Even though the inclusion of primarily 
the Feminists for Life is located within the pro-life movement’s finding aids, its archival 
presence alongside NOW and major historical pro-life groups like The National Right to 
Life Committee confirms a rhetorical space for a crossover identity like pro-life 
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Origin of Pro-life Progressives 
 
Until very recently, two versions of the history of the pro-life feminist 
movement existed: the scant reference to it as a fringe pockmark on the broader 
history of contemporary US feminism, and that described by self-identifying pro-life 
feminists. Little mainstream or scholarly attention was paid to non-extremist anti-
abortion groups. In 2016, Daniel K. Williams published an exhaustive study of all-
that-was pro-life preceding the case of Roe v. Wade. According to him, nearly all 
histories anachronistically written about the abortion debate place the emergence of 
pro-life politics around the 1972 court case. He argues instead that progressive pro-
life politics began in the 1930s during the New Deal, when Catholic Democrats in 
North America were finding their institutional footing. Because of their basis in 
American liberalism, these Catholics looked at the right-to-life as one of the 
inalienable rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Much like the pro-life feminist 
rhetoric of today, the early U.S. Catholics considered abortion to be an exit strategy 
for mothers who were forced to choose between poverty and motherhood, and that the 
otherwise far-reaching welfare state of the New Deal stopped short when it came to 
mothering. 
 
Williams builds the argument that the near century-long persistence of pro-life 
politics over all other conservative political efforts (prohibition, school prayer, etc.) is its 
diverse, bi-partisan base, rooted in liberal, Constitutional rights. He traces the ups and 
downs of the various angles Catholics argued from, and the corresponding 
 
 
 
 
feminism. This section, then, is a winding history of how that liminal space was created 
 
and later pushed to the margins as an inexplicable entity. 
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abortion-rights critiques. For example, economic drain in the 1960s by state welfare 
programs led both liberal and middle-class conservative voters to approve of abortion 
liberalization in order to cull the dependent lower-class. In a backlash to the Civil 
Rights movement, these voters (incorrectly) often stereotyped welfare recipients as 
black single mothers having children as a means to earn government support 
checks—a strategy employed to this day to exacerbate racial divides in attempt to 
strengthen a middle class defined by structures of white supremacy. Conversely, in 
the 1970s when psychoanalysis reigned supreme, abortion-rights activists, particularly 
the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL) (inaccurately) 
claimed that unwanted children were more likely to be abused and grow up to become 
a danger to society (113). In the face of pragmatic pro-abortion arguments and the 
ease with which politicians on both sides of the aisle were willing to accept such 
arguments, pro-lifers would make humanist appeals, warning against the social 
engineering approach to population control: “If you start talking and thinking about a 
child as a ‘wanted child’ you cannot help but put the idea into people’s heads that 
children exist and have a right to exist only because someone wants them. And, alas, 
the opposite conclusion is there waiting for us; if it’s an ‘unwanted child’ it has no 
rights.” “After comparing the ‘unwanted child’ to the ‘unwanted’ black, ‘unwanted’ 
Jew, or ‘unwanted’ woman, she concluded, ‘The powerful (including parents) cannot 
be allowed to want and unwant people at will” (Callahan, 1971 in Williams, 2016). 
 
Catholic pro-life activism thrived after World War II, and took the shape of 
general anti-violence campaigns which concomitantly protested the war and nuclear 
proliferation. Haugeberg (2017) traces the radicalization of Juli Loesch, a founder of 
the 2,500 member “Prolifers for Survival,” who had been a social justice worker 
from a young age and began her pro-life bent after college. Loesch dropped out of the 
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historically radical Antioch College for not being politically active enough, and 
instead worked with farm labor activists in California, becoming a close family 
friend of the Chavez’s. Therefore, the direct-action approach that Catholic women 
were taking, like chaining themselves to medical equipment in abortion clinics, 
appealed to Loesch. Haugeberg adeptly follows Loesch’s story to examine how 
extremist groups like Operation Rescue came to be — these Catholic activists were 
veterans of the Civil Rights movement and were able to teach direct action 
techniques of protest to a growing body of Protestant pro-life activists. To many of 
these self-proclaimed feminist Catholics, protesting abortion was part and parcel to 
social justice activism; as Williams points out, for Catholic Democrats, abortion was 
an issue of civil and constitutional rights. The Protestant counterpart to this story 
believed abortion to be an act of pure evil, and approached the activist work from a 
much more moralistic standpoint. Loesch’s move from ambivalently pro-choice labor 
activist to communications director for the evangelical Operation Rescue, illustrates 
the complexity of collective action when it concerns politically amorphous issues like 
abortion. 
 
The progressive and feminist pro-life movements were very much developed in 
the context of the post-civil rights moment. Accounts claim that the Loesch’s Prolifers for 
Survival was born of a hurried phone call with organizers of the 1980 civil and eco-rights 
movement “Mobilization for Survival” (MfS), as Loesche was unprepared when 
prompted for an organizational affiliation: “So Juli hung up, cooled down a few degrees, 
and then thought, ‘Oh, Lord. Now I’ve got to organize a group’” (Crossed, 2015). The 
MfS was established in order to: “abolish nuclear weapons and power; stop military 
intervention; reverse the arms race; meet human needs.” It served as an organizing body 
for a number of grassroots peace movements and faced major 
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internal conflict with the petition from Prolifers for Survival to join. A number of 
other peace movement groups reportedly protested and threatened to withdraw from 
the coalition if anti-abortion groups were brought onboard. Though Loesche 
ultimately withdrew the petition, Prolifers for Survival lived on as one of the earliest 
organizational bridges between the pro-life and peace movements. 
 
It was in the Prolifers for Survival that Loesch met Rachel MacNair, who soon 
after went on to become an influential president for the Feminists for Life of America 
(FFL). MacNair, a vegan Quaker who has spent over 4 decades working in various 
peace and pro-life movements, brought a basic level of organizational logic to the 
FFL at the time of her 10 year tenure. In an interview she recalls the meager 
beginnings of the organization after she was thrust into a leadership position: 
 
when I became president it was a pretty rag-tag group. I was handed a set of 
members. We had fewer than a thousand, members, and I was handed them 
on index cards. So one of my first tasks was to get them all set up on a 
computer list. So we could properly get…and then you know, getting a 
newsletter out quarterly, and um, you know just, putting reply envelopes into 
the newsletter with a little pitch for funding, and I mean…some of the most 
basic, basic things! 
 
She had been otherwise unfamiliar with the work of the FFL before her involvement 
with Loesche at the National Right to Life Rally of 1984. It was her commitment to 
peace movements and her experience with activism that instead drew the FFL to her. 
 
Both Loesche and MacNair hail from long backgrounds of activism in the peace 
movements, eventually being drawn to progressive pro-life movements under the rubric 
of the “Consistent Life Ethic,” a pacifist approach to political activism that opposes 
killing of any kind (including that of the unborn fetus or the elderly in the 
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form of euthanasia) and is often aligned with nuclear disarmament and anti-war 
movements. While the two women eventually diverged politically in the pro-life 
battle — Loesche moving to the more conservative and radical Operation Rescue, 
and MacNair continuing consistent life ethic work in both peace and pro-life arenas 
— both influential figures in the pro-life movement developed within and later drew 
from their earlier work in the peace movement culture of the 1970s. Loesche’s 
transition to more radical means of pro-life protest reflects a broader shift in social 
arrangements surrounding abortion rights, feminism, and politics in general. Where 
pro-life advocates were once otherwise politically progressive, at least in traditional 
understandings of the term, evolving gender norms and new political alliances would 
ultimately force the position into a bipartisan platform issue that would never reverse 
course. 
 
 
Pro-Life Moves Right (and stays there) 
 
There exist a range of theories as to when and how the pro-life movement moved 
to the right. Williams (ibid.) traces the struggles the movement began to face in the early 
and mid 1960s when the topic of abortion and abortion politics broke through to the 
surface of acceptable public discourse. He frames abortion policy in the 1960s as a 
religious conflict between the right and left, respectively between protestants and 
Catholics. At this point, the majority of Catholics are Democrats, and most politicians on 
both sides of the aisle would have been considered to be “pro-choice.” Many issues 
factored into abortion rights finding favor in both the public and political spheres. The 
affinity for social planning of the 1960’s made abortion an attractive solution for a surge 
in non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants (p. 63). Politicians throughout the US began to move 
toward liberalization following a 1965 investigative 
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special on illegal abortions by the most trusted man in America, Walter Cronkite, 
who spoke out against abortion regulations’ role in pandemic illegal abortion 
practices. Since 1959, “therapeutic abortions,” or abortions in the case of rape, incest, 
or harm to the mother, were legal in most states, and by 1967 this notion of “harm” 
extended to psychiatric measures as well. With medical professionals and politicians 
alike supporting the liberalization of abortion rights, the aforementioned progressive 
pro-life movement had little sway and influence, even the National Right to Life 
Committee was $25,000 in debt by 1978 (Ziegler, 2013). 
 
 
Conservative Women Draw Divide 
 
As abortion rights expanded into the early 1970’s, and Roe v. Wade was at the 
cusp of being decided, feminist groups sought to ride the momentum and reanimate 
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). The general political support for the ERA 
spurred the organization of a number of new grassroots anti-feminist groups. 
Spearheaded by Phyllis Schlafly, a well-known conservative politico and activist, 
groups like STOP ERA and the Eagle Forum turned women and men against the 
women’s movement by arguing that specific measures of the ERA would dismantle 
the family structure, and remove women from their rightful place in the home with the 
protections and dependencies that entails. In a heightened effort to turn voters against 
the ERA, pamphlets began to promote the idea that “abortion-on-demand” was 
inextricable to the ERA and the platforms of its feminist supporters. Beyond that, 
Schlafly and other anti-ERA groups worked to appeal to women and argue that the 
women’s movement was intolerant of any woman with pro-life leanings, fostering a 
sense of alienation for pro-life feminists at the time, and helping to draw a permanent 
line between the women of the US based on a single-issue policy. The pro-choice 
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rhetoric framing the ERA and abortion politics evolved as well, beginning as an 
accusation of a religious minority pushing a dogmatic agenda on the rest of the 
country. By 1975, both NOW and NARAL had codified anti-abortionism as decidedly 
anti-feminist, and therefore backwards or misogynist (ibid). In addition to the divide 
driven by abortion politics, conservative women throughout the country grew to 
resent the notion that their lifestyles were being scrutinized as backward, and feared 
their status within the home and society was under threat of extinction. They moved 
to work against “women’s lib” under the flag of “pro-family” intentions. 
 
This was a major strike in the dissolution of pro-life feminism and set the 
political stage for abortion politics to become a mostly partisan issue. While the more 
progressive pro-life groups struggled to find a place in this widening divide, a 
burgeoning conservative movement was simultaneously devising a strategy to 
reshape the republican party to look more like the one we know today. In 1976, less 
than 40% of Republicans were anti-abortion, as the Protestant-majority party favored 
family planning and personal freedoms (Williams, 2015). It had been decades since 
 
a Republican-majority, and conservative members of the GOP were posturing 
to overhaul the party to give the most conservative members the loudest voice. 
 
 
The Religious Right 
 
At the same time, a massive new voting block had been growing in the 
 
Southern and Western parts of the country (the “Sunbelt”) following a combination 
of white backlash to the civil rights movements and increased affluence in those 
communities, enabling a migration from cities to suburbs and spurring resentment 
toward the Democratic party’s focus on urban-centered social welfare and civil rights 
programs (McKeegan, 1992). Political strategists and wealthy conservatives seized 
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the opportunity to turn the Republican party toward social issues that spoke to the rising 
evangelical population, such as prayer in school or abortion. Two such conservatives 
who are often mentioned by name are Paul Weyrich, savvy politico and co-founder of 
the Heritage Foundation, and Richard Viguerie, a computer-mailing mogul. These two, 
along with a few other key figures, are said to have founded the “New Right,” with 
Weyrich’s connections and political know-how combined with Viguerie’s financial 
backing and direct-mailing expertise, the two created a political machine credited with 
resuscitating the Republican party (Critchelow, 2005).5 
 
Finally, the evangelical movement contemporaneously blossomed in the 
newly populous US South and West, producing the new “Religious Right” which 
worked in sync with New Right politicians to push for a hyper-conservative 
Republican agenda. Mason (2002) posits that this New Right spiritualism was born 
of the “New War” zeitgeist that followed the failures of the Vietnam War. This 
mindset assumes that a “self-imposed restraint” of American soldiers led to their 
defeat, spurring a Barry Goldwater-fueled push for a “new warrior” — one 
unconfined in the face of ideological and spiritual beliefs: 
 
New War culture is thus a ‘cult of the warrior’ that tries to make 
extremism reasonable and bring it into the mainstream. Manifestations 
of New War culture include conspiracy-minded militia groups 
 
 
 
5 The New Right’s direct-mail techniques were infamous for utilizing the US Postal Service to 
reach millions of “rank-and-file” conservatives for individual donations amassing millions 
to bankroll the party. “Because politicians are heavily dependent on the mail for a sense of 
their constituents’ views, the right’s capacity to generate mail helped it wield an influence 
disproportionate to its real numbers” (McKeegan, 1992 p. 5) 
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organized to oppose the New World Order; macho pulp stories, [...] 
men’s movement events such as the rallies of the Promise Keepers; 
and televised paramilitary games such as Combat Missions and 
Boot Camp. (p. 11) 
 
In Killing for Life: The Apocalyptic Narrative of Pro-Life Politics, Mason 
makes the argument that the evangelical (and subsequently violent) turn of pro-life 
politics is part and parcel of this rightist push for the “remasculinization” of America, 
producing the extremist abortion warriors who ostensibly stop at nothing to fight for 
their cause. While a boon to the Republican voting bloc, this turn struck another 
blow to the pro-life feminist movement. Much like Julie Loesch’s move to extremist 
group Operation Rescue, pro-life feminists at this time were couched in the politics 
and tactics of the peace movement. 
 
This philosophical evolution in the GOP subsequently shifted the abortion 
question from the liberalist Catholic-Democrat position defined earlier as the “right-
to-life” approach to a stricter more “genuine” conservatism than organizations like 
the National Right to Life Committee were presently pursuing. Mason posits that the 
conservative evangelical New Right reframed debates over social issues within the 
dogma of divine right, meaning that the driving philosophical force behind the 
movement was rooted in assumptions about divine “laws of nature.” In this 
framework, hyper-evangelical apocalypticism overrides the liberal subject, and 
egalitarianism is considered merely a social construct. Protection of the unborn is no 
longer a right to selfhood guaranteed by the constitution, but a battle between the 
forces of good and evil, where “every life is providential because it plays a unique 
role in the Great Plan of the almighty” (p. 18). 
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Other theories insist that the NRLC’s right-to-life philosophy played a larger 
role in the evangelical turn of the Republican platform. Lewis (2017) adeptly argues 
that rights-based politics spread to the right through a series of political moves 
surrounding the issue of abortion. Prior to the late 1970s, the Southern Baptist 
Convention (SBC), the largest contingent of the umbrella group of the Baptist Joint 
Committee, favored the limited abortion rights approach, and publicly supported 
Roe v. Wade, particularly for its clarity on supporting the separation of church and 
state. This centrism continued into the late 70s until a conservative coup similar to 
that of the GOP fought for and won leadership of the SBC, arguing instead for 
“government accommodation” of religious liberties. 
 
The ensuing split from the Baptist Joint Committee coincided with an 
uncharacteristic alliance with Northern evangelicals and Catholics - the latter being a 
longtime opponent to Southern Baptists on social and cultural issues. Prior to the 
conservative move, Southern Baptist groups widely supported the Establishment 
clause of the First Amendment, fearing a Catholic hold on the federal government. 
After the conservative takeover, emphasis in the Baptist platform shifted to the Free 
Exercise Clause, which framed First Amendment rights to protecting and 
accommodating religious practices (ibid). Lewis argues that the rights-based logic of 
the Catholic church combined with the growing push for religious liberty over the 
separation of church and state of the SBC meant for a rights-focused argument 
against abortion seated within the framework of religious freedom: “these two rights 
based streams — right to life (abortion) and religious liberty — have formed the basis 
for conservatives to learn about individual rights and claim them” (5). 
 
The pro-life movement’s migration to conservative politics has an evidentially 
complicated origin story. To summarize, some of the factors include: (1) the 
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reemergence of the ERA and the consequential anti-feminist women’s political 
uprising; (2) the population boom of the sunbelt and subsequent split of the Baptist 
Joint Committee; (3) a post-Vietnam apocalyptic identity crisis; and (4) the ultra-
conservative shift of the Republican party to the “New Right,” along with its 
efficacious direct-mail technology. This series of events is just one element in the 
alienation of progressive pro-lifers trapped between the bipartisan political system 
of the U.S. 
 
 
Pro-Choice & Pro-Life Working together 
 
While pro-choice and pro-life feminist groups maintained different 
fundamental reasons for pursuing specific legislation around women’s rights, the 
improvement of the condition of women’s lives remained a steadfast goal on both 
sides of the abortion issue. For pro-life progressives, civil rights advancements for 
women and mothers were a necessary battle in the war against abortion. The 
similarities between the two sides stopped at issues of abortion, and the divide 
subsequently widened during the culture wars of the sexual revolution. It was at this 
point that the Feminists for Life of America (FFL) came to be. 
 
Before partisan lines were so sharply drawn between progressives on either 
side of the abortion debate, a number of pro-life organizations worked with and 
for ostensibly feminist causes. In Ziegler’s (2013) work on the pro-life movement, 
she traces pre- and post- Roe stances of pro-life political groups. For example, the 
National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) advocated for the destigmatization of 
unwed mothers, and the removal of the illegitimacy notation on birth certificates. 
 
In August, 1974 the American Citizens Concerned for Life (ACCL) diverged from the 
NRLC to work across the political divide with pro-choice groups on issues of sexual 
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discrimination and procuring government-funded contraception. This group sought to 
appeal to both sides of the abortion debate to reach common ends that would, in their 
minds, eventually reduce or ideally make abortion unnecessary. 
 
Most of the ACCL’s short-lived work in D.C. focused particularly on 
welfare services for young and unwed mothers. They later joined the collective of 
women’s groups, Coalition to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers 
(CEDAPW), headed by (future Justice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg and ACLU Women’s 
rights attorney Susan Deller Ross. The progressive feminist coalition joined NOW, 
the ACLU, and ACCL, among others, to push for the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA) as backlash from the Supreme Court’s 1976 overturn of Gilbert v. General 
Electric (Pedriana 2009; Weldon, 2011). The case overturned a decision by district 
courts which claimed that G.E.’s policy not to cover disability in the case of 
pregnancy violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court decided 
that the language in the policy did not constitute sexual discrimination. CEDAPW’s 
diverse coalition developed bipartisan support for the PDA following the court’s 
decision, and the act moved easily through congress in 1978. 
 
Decades later, pro-life feminists joined pro-choice groups to push through the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The act was introduced in 1984 by the 
Women’s Legal Defense Fund and was vetoed repeatedly until Clinton’s administration 
in 1993. FMLA ensures 12 weeks of (unpaid) workplace security in the case of major 
illness in the family or the birth or adoption of a child, and it wasn’t until a Democratic 
majority in the Senate that it could be pushed through. The Feminists for Life of America 
(FFL) joined many pro-choice organizations along with pro-life representatives to pass 
the act. Both Democrat Lindy Boggs and Republican Henry Hyde appealed to pro-life 
members of congress to support the FMLA on the 
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basis of its potential to lower abortion rates. When I interviewed Rachel MacNair, 
then president of the FFL, she fondly remembered an interaction with Boggs at a 
political rally on the issue of support for the FMLA: “I went up to her and I said 
‘[Representative] Patricia Schroeder says that you’re an IF vote on…a MAYBE vote 
on Family and Medical Leave…’ and she says ‘oh for heaven’s sake I would no 
more vote against that than a black person would vote against civil rights legislation, 
that’s just ridiculous’.” 
 
These stories illustrate the complicated space that pro-life feminists have long 
occupied, particularly in regard to matters of the state. While the pro-life feminist 
movement of the past was regularly recorded trying to participate in and influence 
feminist calls to action, the pro-life feminists of today are either explicitly excluded 
from such calls, as was the case in the 2017 Women’s March, or choose to work 
inward on projects deemed sufficiently pro-life and sufficiently feminist, such as the 
Guiding Star project which aims to unseat Planned Parenthood by providing 
accessible women’s healthcare sans abortion procedures. 
 
 
Chapter Summaries 
 
This collection of case studies constitutes a multi-pronged approach to 
understanding the role of pro-life feminism in the broader women’s movement, 
mechanisms by which the public remembers the women’s movement, and the pro-life 
feminists’ current and future group identities. Each chapter utilizes a unique 
methodology and theoretical foregrounding. This is not necessarily a strategic choice, 
but an organic evolution of each topic’s different heuristic needs. Chapter One, for 
instance, began as a textual analysis looking to compare the media coverage of the 
International Women’s Year Conference in 1977 to the Women’s March on 
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Washington of 2017. As data were collected, it became clear that the important 
questions about these events would not be answered in this way. Instead, the chapter 
uses the former event as an ideological precedent to the latter, where the media 
coverage of the Women’s March, according to this discourse analysis, elucidates the 
identarian boundaries drawn then, and in early events of the women’s movement like 
the IWY Conference. The findings indicate that, like in the IWY Conference, the 
notion of pro-life feminism is incompatible with the discursive sphere of 
contemporary (and past) feminism. Consequently, the debate of hypotheticals around 
feminism and abortion politics takes place in the conservative arena, often 
perpetuating misinformation and becoming fodder for ‘whataboutism.’ 
 
Chapter Two of this dissertation asks how and why feminism is collectively and 
popularly remembered as a strictly pro-choice identity, echoing the conclusions of the 
previous chapter. To this end, I examine the pro-life feminists’ controversial claim to 
many of the feminist foremothers, where early popular figures associated with women’s 
suffrage presumed to be pro-life based on various readings of speeches and writings 
produced by them. In particular, I ask why and how Susan B. Anthony, for whom the 
pro-life feminists have one of the weakest arguments for pro-life leanings, is most 
frequently invoked in this argument. I describe the origins of the Susan B. Anthony List, 
a prominent pro-life political lobbying group, brought about by fellow Quaker, Rachel 
MacNair. In tracing this history, it became clear that the historical use of 
commemoration, defined in more detail in Chapter Two, and more specifically the 
memorialization of Anthony through institutions like the SBA List and the pro-life Susan 
B. Anthony Birthplace Museum, sustained Anthony as pro-life in the legacy of pro-life 
feminism for members of that group. Indeed, the actualization of Anthony as a pro-life 
heroine, through various institutions, contributes a strong 
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sense of historical justification for the pro-life feminist identity as a more 
authentic brand of feminism (Oaks, 2009). 
 
Chapter Three then asks how today’s community of pro-life feminists maintain 
and evolve that group identity, particularly through their use of digital technology. I ask 
this question under an assumption that the persistence of a paradoxical identity group 
like the pro-life feminists is due not only to a manipulation of popular memory, but to a 
sense of community where otherwise controversial ideas and norms are confirmed by 
one another in a discursive sphere facilitated by digital safe spaces. This chapter bridges 
research on digital communities, online safe spaces, and networked counterpublics to 
determine the strength of various sites to facilitate this affirmation and cultivation of a 
group identity, and goes one step further to ask if those discursive spheres can constitute 
a networked counterpublic. The latter question particularly refers to each site’s capacity 
for political influence on the broader public. I determine my results through an 
experimental methodology I call here “Cross Platform Critical Discourse Analysis” 
(CPCDA), which I developed specifically in order to read digital communities across 
multiple platforms (Facebook groups, websites, Twitter threads, etc.) in the same study. 
Results using CPCDA led to the conclusion that the three sites — The “New Wave 
Feminists” Facebook group, the “Feminists for Life of America” website, and a Twitter 
hashtag thread surrounding the aforementioned 2017 Women’s March on Washington — 
do not individually provide strong frameworks for safe spaces or networked 
counterpublics (of the three, Facebook scored the highest). Instead, the collective use of 
all three sites by a community provided all of the necessary affordances for an online 
safe space and even a networked counterpublic. 
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Like the collective use of online sites of community, the following case studies 
attempt to provide a wide-reaching discursive account of pro-life feminism as an 
identity, movement, and concept. Individually, each chapter combats a particular aspect 
of that inquiry, providing in-depth analyses of the various mechanisms by which pro-life 
feminism evolved and persisted throughout a history that otherwise minimized the 
rhetorical likelihood of such an identity existing, let alone thriving. Together with this 
and the concluding chapter, the three chapters paint a complex picture of an identity 
group that occupies a liminal socio-political space: one with political influence that goes 
relatively unacknowledged by the political 
 
world, and whose mere persistence provides discursive boundaries for both 
feminists and pro-lifers alike. 
 
 
A note on language: 
 
In utilizing the terminology of the “pro-life feminist movement” or the 
“mainstream,” feminist movement, this project is participating in a similar act of 
inclusion and exclusion to that which is being analyzed. There are inherent 
epistemological concerns when homogenizing a diverse ideological group for the 
sake of economizing page counts. For that matter, much critique is levied against both 
the umbrella terms of pro-life and pro-choice. The rhetorical recursion of naming 
these groups obfuscates the main dividing issue of “abortion,” while simultaneously 
producing group identities to be adopted or else. While the use of “life” to mean anti-
abortion had been employed early on as an association to inalienable constitutional 
rights (Williams, 2016), the term was weaponized in Anti-abortion groups mobilized 
around the decision of Roe v. Wade to reactively introduce the Human Life 
Amendment, concretizing their claim to “life” as a notion. Abortion rights activists 
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from then on were able to frame their cause in moralistic terms: abortion rights = anti 
life. The term pro-choice was then hastily chosen in response, forever crystalizing the 
incommensurable frames of pro-life and pro-choice—two terms that are lexically 
incompatible, creating from the start a debate occurring in two different 
conversations (Greenhouse and Siegel, 2010). For that matter, the term “pro-choice” 
arguably ignores the limitations on classes of women for whom “choice” is not the 
major impediment, erasing all other gendered inequalities that contribute to 
reproductive health issues. Splinters of the pro-choice movement have therefore 
begun to espouse the term “reproductive justice” to account for the intersectional 
lives of particularly women of color in the pro-choice constituency (Smith, 2005). 
 
With all this in mind, this project aims to ascribe names that groups or 
individuals would themselves employ broadly: “Pro-life feminists” in this regard are 
those people and groups who seek social justice and progress for women and retain an 
anti-abortion stance as a core political and philosophical tenet. Though pro-life in 
name, backers of anti-abortion measures hold strong feminist beliefs about both 
women’s reproductive health, as well as on issues of welfare and education. For this 
reason, I will be referring to this movement as “pro-life feminism” from here out, and 
with it implying the compound political subtleties therein. Within the timeline in 
question (Roe v. Wade onward), “mainstream feminism” refers to the people and 
groups which fight for women’s equality and justice, including liberal freedoms 
through legislative and institutional means — a major platform of which is the right 
to abortion on demand. This broadly paints a diverse group with one brush, but 
conceptually refers to those people and groups at the forefront of institutional policies 
of leading feminist groups such as NOW, and the constituencies that support them. 
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While this notion might invoke the term “liberal feminism,”6 in reference to a 
rights-based political philosophy often maligned in contemporary discourse 
surrounding intersectional and black feminist thought, the zeitgeist I am attempting 
to portray reaches more broadly. Similarly, “popular feminism” might seem an 
equally appropriate classification, as Banet-Weiser defines it, existing in and through 
discourse in popular culture (2018). While her delineation of popular feminism 
involves the assumption that struggles over power and meaning occur therein, it does 
not necessarily include the mechanisms of the state and constitutional democracy as 
one of its major actors. 
 
I employ the term “mainstream feminism” then to enfold definitions of 
liberal and popular feminism into a broader arena where the participants, thought 
leaders, and cultural productions interplay with constitutional and juridical power 
structures. With this designation, I am collapsing a number of complex political 
intersections in the women’s and feminist movement. For instance, the “women’s 
movement,” “women’s lib,” and “feminist movement” are arguably discrete non-
contemporaneous social movements, replete with intellectualizations, 
institutionalizations, popular recognition, etc. For the sake of expedience, I will 
generally refer to these collective movements as the “feminist project,” even 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Gilbert and Sewpaul succinctly describe the problems with as well as inclination to use the 
term and argue that since rights-based feminist ideals often get mapped onto anachronistic 
contexts, “women are not seen in the context of their social milieu, and how they affect, 
and are affected by those around them when making the abortion decision” (2024, p. 89) 
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though the term “feminist” and its contemporary implications were not heavily used 
 
in the first and early second waves. 
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II: CHAPTER ONE: PRO-LIFE PUSSYHATS? MEDIA PERCEPTION AND THE 
BOUNDARIES OF FEMINIST DISSENT IN THE 2017 WOMEN’S MARCH ON 
WASHINGTON 
 
 
 
A complicated history of interdependent forces has led to the division of 
women into camps of feminist and anti-feminist, and later “pro-choice” and “pro-
life.” The association of pro-life or pro-choice politics naturally aligning with the 
right or the left is on closer examination, a historical construct produced through a 
constellation of rhetorical, organizational, and legal events. In this chapter I examine 
two of these decisive moments in the battle over the pro-life/pro-choice binary: First, 
a brief review of the National Women’s Conference of 1977, where the outright 
exclusion of “pro-family” participants from conference organizing drew an early 
boundary between feminists and anti-feminists with the implication that the latter is 
ultimately anti-woman. Second, the 2017 Women’s March on Washington where 
self-described pro-life feminists were publicly accepted as march organizers and later 
removed amid controversy. 
 
The remainder of this chapter examines the consequent galvanizing effects 
on women’s activism – paying particular attention to exclusionary decisions of the 
mainstream movement and how those decisions shape the definition of present-day 
feminism. This includes a critical discourse analysis of coverage of the Women’s 
March on Washington7 as it pertains to anti-Trump, conservative, and pro-life 
feminist women who did or did not participate in the event. According to march 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Heretofore referred to as Women’s March 
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organizer Mrinalini Chakraborty, “the Women’s March was a turning point in the 
current sociopolitical climate, a reset button of sorts” (Tambe, 2017). In particular, 
it examines partisan media coverage of the event and the fallout from the New 
Wave Feminists, a pro-life feminist group, being removed from the march’s 
organization coalition following threats of protest by pro-choice participants. 
 
Though the National Women’s Conference of 1977 is considered a definitive 
moment that helped separate feminism and anti-feminism into distinct social 
movements. Indeed, historians have contended that the conference and its affiliated 
events receive too-little attention in relation to its impact on women’s history in the 
US. In the same vein, little work has been done on the public reception of these 
events, and how their presentation in the media shapes non-activist sentiments about 
these political philosophies. While media perception and audience studies on the 1977 
conference would be challenging at best, there exists an open opportunity to read the 
influence of media representation on public perceptions of social movements in the 
case of the 2017 Women’s March. This chapter will emphasize the impact of media 
coverage in transformative events particularly as it serves as the avenues via which 
the decisions of influential social movements are disseminated to the general 
population. To that end it not only analyzes the discourse within the political confines 
of the Women’s March but maps the framing of the march by partisan news outlets 
which act as windows to the political activist world for a large portion of U.S. 
citizens. 
 
 
IWY Conferences: State Definitions of “Pro-Woman” Politics 
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The United States National Women’s Conference of 1977 (IWY)8 was the 
result of President Ford and later President Carter’s orders for a commission on the 
status and future agenda for women in the US. It came after nearly a decade of 
political struggle over the definitions of womanhood, ostensibly “won” by the 
women’s liberation movement, where prominent feminists like Betty Friedan sought 
to expose the problematic position of women as second-class citizens, and 
conservative women like Phyllis Schlafly fought to retain the social acceptability of 
traditional gender roles. This battle played out in every social arena. From grassroots 
activist campaigns to Supreme Court cases, feminists sought to obtain equal 
treatment in employment and higher education while anti-feminists worked to retain 
protectionist laws threatened by the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. 
 
By the mid-seventies, anti-feminists were all but moved to the margins in the 
federal debate over women’s roles in society, illustrated in one instance by the IWY 
Conference; President Ford signed Executive Order 11832 in 1975 establishing the 
National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year (NCOIWY), 
and in 1977 Carter enlarged and replaced the commission with 42 new members 
including Representative Bella Abzug, the initial sponsor of the bill, and noted 
feminist and civil rights activist. Carter’s update also called to allocate funds for an 
IWY conference in the US, following the United Nation’s International Women’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Heretofore referred to as the IWY conferences in keeping with other researchers due to the 
conferences’ early connection to the UN sponsored International Women’s Year of 1975 
(Spruill, 46) 
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Year (and later decade) Conference first held in 1975 in Mexico City.9 Thereafter, the 
1975 congress commissioned a (five-million dollar) federally funded conference that 
would ultimately result in the highly contested 1977 National Plan of Action. 
 
Two-thousand delegates, chosen from 150,000 participants in state 
committees’ elections convened in Houston, Texas to participate in meetings, panels, 
and presentations based on topics voted on at the local level, including economic 
discrimination, political representation, health issues, childcare, violence against 
women, and so on. State delegations also adopted a number of additional progressive 
debate topics including reproductive freedom, lesbianism, minority women, 
prostitution, women with disabilities, and women in the military. The public 
plenaries drew over 10,000 attendees, stacked with progressive feminist organizers 
and high-profile presenters including First Ladies Rosalynn Carter, Betty Ford, and 
Lady Bird Johnson as well as many prominent civil rights figures like Coretta Scott 
King. Absent from the roster of presenters and organizers were any conservative pro-
family or anti-feminist women, spurring a reactionary campaign that would further 
politicize the conference.10 
 
The IWY quickly became a lightning rod for anti-feminist groups, and 
because the conference was held in Houston, Spruill (2018) argues that the event 
helped to unite Southern anti-feminists, creating a voting bloc influential enough to 
 
 
9 UN sponsored conferences for the “The Decade for Women” also included Copenhagen 
 
(1980), Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995). 
 
10 Notably, the state committee meetings became a rhetorical battle ground between feminists 
and anti-feminists surrounding issues like the ERA and Roe v. Wade, for more on specific 
case studies see Kempker (2018) or Sontag Brady (2005) 
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push the GOP to support “pro-family” platforms, such as opposing Roe v. Wade or 
 
the ERA. Scholars have also noted that this backlash helped to mobilize and train 
 
conservative women in grassroots activism and political organization “so much so 
 
that participation in the IWY amounted to a ‘crash course’ in the practicalities of 
 
political organization” (Kempker, 2018 p. 117). The National Pro Family Coalition, 
 
including groups like the National Right to Life Committee, the Daughters of the 
 
American Revolution, and the Mormon Church, rallied in Houston against the 
 
National Women’s Conference. Housed nearby in the Houston Astrodome, the pro- 
 
family rally drew the public eye with an attendance of 15-20 thousand (varying 
 
reports) to protest the members and platforms of the National Women’s Conference 
 
(and subsequently big government and homosexuality) (Klemesrud, 1977; Klatch, 
 
1988). Pro-family and conservative leaders like Phyllis Schlafly claimed to be 
 
excluded from conference organization through conspiratorial measures: “Due to the 
 
tactics used by the IWY at the various state conferences, including total control of the 
 
delegate election machinery and steamroller parliamentary tactics, there were only 
 
about 20 percent pro-family delegates among the some 2,000 IWY delegates” 
 
(Schlafly, 1977). This outrage was only one of countless occasions Schlafly would 
 
endeavour to rhetorically pit the GOP and pro-lifers against the modern feminist 
 
movement. 
 
Spruill (2018) uses the National Women’s Conference to center the rhetorical 
and organizational conflict of the “culture wars” that began in the 1960s and continues 
today. She contends that as overt racism became less socially acceptable, the feminist 
movement (into which many civil rights activists funnelled) became a dog whistle to 
anti-civil rights communities looking for a target to openly oppose. Additionally, she 
notes that anti-communist sentiment was easily applied to women’s 
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lib: “many viewed feminism as just the latest manifestation of efforts by saboteurs 
within the USA, a plot by secular humanists or communists or both, unwittingly or 
deliberately undermining America by turning it away from God…” (p. 44). In 
excluding non-feminist organizers, the conference became a particularly politicized 
issue for the women on the right, as well as a public stage on which to articulate the 
scope and aims of the conservative women’s movement. 
 
Erin Kempker (2012) writes extensively on conservatism and anti-feminism in 
US history, and in the case of Indiana in particular, the IWY’s connection to the 
politics of the ERA created microcosms of the national debate, “ERA ratification had 
the ironic effect of fostering a burgeoning conservative movement while dividing the 
liberal coalition of feminists in NOW, women’s rights activists in the League of 
Women’s Voters, and liberationists active in urban collectives” (p. 150). 
 
For years to come, conservative activists like Schlafly would be able to claim 
martyrdom for overcoming the odds when being left out of the conversation about 
the state of womanhood in America. Scholars and activists alike have argued that the 
IWY and affiliated conferences were a turning point in the women’s movement 
(Kempker, 2012) (Schlafly herself referred to the event as the ‘Midway’ of the battle 
between the Pro Family movement and Women’s Lib), as media outlets spotlighted 
the event and the sensationalist anti-feminist rally close by: “The conference's high 
public profile was generated by its official governmental status, $5 million in federal 
funds, rhetorical support from the executive and judicial branches, the ERA's 
proximity to ratification, the wide range of controversial social issues under 
consideration, and the mandated participation of women at local and state levels” 
(Sklar and Dublin, 2004). As such, pro-life feminists like the now-active FFL further 
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struggled to straddle the line separating feminists and anti-feminists who oppose 
abortion. 
 
Not since 1970 and the founding of the Women’s Equity Action League 
(WEAL) has the feminist position on abortion been internally contested. Even then, 
The split of WEAL from NOW was not rooted in any sort of personal or religious 
opposition to abortion – the members of WEAL regarded NOW’s foregrounding of 
the abortion platform as a poor political move that would draw all attention and side-
line platforms and projects already in motion.11 By the 1980s, WEAL included 
reproductive health in their list of legal concerns. 
 
One could argue that even in this case, the feminist movement’s position on 
abortion was not up for debate. Since the (at that time) controversial platform of 
“abortion on-demand,” the issue has performed the role of feminist border patrol – 
demarcating for the public who can be considered for or against women. On a rhetorical 
level, abortion rights have become synonymous with feminism and therefore by being 
against abortion, a person is considered to be anti-woman. The “pro-family” politics since 
the 1960s, from protectionist clauses to prayer in school, become wrapped up with 
abortion politics in the same manner as dominant feminist ideologies. In other words, the 
two sides of the abortion debate are now the exemplary of a political divide driven by 
moral imperatives. While it was not always the case, traditionalist and conservative 
politics are now collapsed behind a single-issue – an 
 
 
 
 
 
11 There also appeared a clear cultural divide between the Ohio-based members of WEAL, 
and the coastal feminists like Betty Friedan who tended to dominate the organization 
(WEAL Records, Schlesinger Library) 
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issue that is often the force behind large voting blocs in the United States. With the 
ousting of pro-life feminists, the constellation of progressive and feminist political 
concerns become collapsed behind the same issue. 
 
The 2017 Women’s March on Washington 
 
 
Teresa Shook, a retired lawyer living in Hawaii, created the “Million 
Women’s March” Facebook event after the election of Donald Trump on Nov. 8, 
2016. She was a member of the secret Facebook group “Pantsuit Nation,”12 the 
members of which were distraught with the electoral upset that night, and developed 
the idea of the march through discussion in the group. Shook invited about 40 of her 
friends to march on Washington on January 17, 2017 the day after Donald Trump’s 
presidential inauguration. The event went viral overnight and boasted more than 
10,000 virtual RSVPs, drawing the attention of other similar efforts cropping up 
around the United States. 
 
The simultaneous organization efforts of fashion designer-turned-activist 
Bob Bland combined with the potential event’s surging popularity moved the protest 
planning forward. Bland took the helm from Shook, and began planning the march 
 
 
 
12 “Pantsuit Nation” is a private Facebook group created in 2016 as a cultural reference to 
Hillary Clinton’s ubiquitous pantsuit outfits during the 2016 election cycle. The group was 
invitation only, with “a commitment to creating a troll-free space in which Clinton 
supporters could enthusiastically support their candidate” (pantsuitnation.org/mission). It 
has since evolved into a national organization with chapters in 41 states and the District of 
Columbia. 
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alongside three seasoned organizers and activists: Tamika Mallory, Linda Sarsour, 
and Carmen Perez. The name was quickly changed to the Women’s March on 
Washington after significant backlash over the appropriation of the title for the 1997 
Million Women’s March — a historical mass demonstration for and predominantly by 
black women in the US. From the outset, the march was mired in critique by a 
number of identity groups and organizations — the original Facebook organizers were 
almost entirely white women, and when Mallory, Sarsour, and Perez (all women of 
color) were brought on, critics accused march organizers of deploying them as tokens 
shielding an always already white liberal feminist event (Huber, 2016). For instance, 
the affiliated follow-up event, “International Women’s Strike,” also referred to as “A 
Day without a Woman,” which called for an international general strike by women, 
garnered quick criticism as a form of protest only accessible to women privileged 
with of a flexible work environment, childcare, and to those who could afford to lose 
a day of work (Kenney, 2017; Shaw, 2017). 
 
In addition to branding issues, a significant number of state-level organizers 
stepped down early on for a variety of reasons, but primarily over issues of transparency, 
diversity, and liability. According to the vocal activist and one time state leader of the 
Pennsylvania’s Women’s March chapter, Rosie Campos, the onus of fundraising and 
organizing being pushed to the state and local level by the national organizers put 
inexperienced, unincorporated groups at risk for legal liability. Citing a legal 
encyclopedia, she asserts that national leadership must have known about the issues that 
autonomous local organizations would face with fundraising efforts: “Without nonprofit 
status, sponsorship or nonprofit liability insurance coverage, state-level organizers can be 
held responsible should a civil lawsuit be brought against the state ‘organization.’” 
(2016). When local-level organizers began to realize and point 
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out these issues, many were met with either frustration and criticism, or outright 
censorship by national leadership. Due to the fragile nature of an “all-inclusive” event 
like the Women’s March, any signs of dissent were quickly met with accusations of 
divisiveness that could dismantle the efforts of the march organizers, and ultimately 
the progress of women’s rights writ large. 
 
In their collected volume Feminist Nightmares: Women at Odds Feminism 
and the Problem of Sisterhood (1994), Susan Ostrov Weisser and Jennifer Fleischner 
trace accusations of this nature and determine two ways in which feminists react to 
the proposition that women experience ‘feminisms’ differently depending on their 
race, sex and gender identity, and class. They argue that both reactions, (1) outreach 
and accommodation of all differing viewpoints, and (2) denunciation of critique as 
divisive “serve to glamorize the critic or to idealize unity, while preserving the 
problems in the real world untouched” (4). Instead, they appeal for a feminist analysis 
of women at odds with other women, as avoiding the conversation opens up a gap for 
critics who are “unsympathetic to feminism” to fill, examples of which we will see 
later in this chapter in the form of right-wing and conservative critique. 
 
Fear of threatening the overall unity of the movement might have had a 
chilling effect on some members taking issue with march leadership, but many 
remained outspoken despite having comments deleted or being removed from 
secret or private Facebook groups. Multiple women of color complained about such 
responses to their issues taken with the early naming and top-down organization of 
the march (Huber, 2016). 
 
In the section below, I detail a series of political conflicts that arose within and 
around the 2017 Women’s March, most of which are critiques from various identity 
groups whose problems with the march’s leadership, organization, and rhetoric 
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represent large struggles within the broadly-stated “feminist project.” Internal conflict 
within social movements has always been constitutive of its identity and broader 
limitations, and below I make the argument that abortion politics exist outside of that 
deliberative political space where other identity-based issues can be contested. The 
topics within and beyond the discursive borders of the feminist project are 
subsequently readable in their respective media spaces: issues of deliberation within 
acceptable boundaries are self-affirming in their fields of discourse, as is evident 
below. Those issues that fall outside of the purview, in this case abortion politics, 
tend to appear in politically conservative publications, where the movement’s 
discursive limitations are not relevant to the ways in which the right approaches the 
topic. This idea is exemplified in the case of the New Wave Feminists’ appearance in 
the progressive publication The Atlantic – a venue deemed unacceptable for a public 
deliberation on pro-life feminism. 
 
 
Stories of Dissent in the Women’s March on Washington 
 
The event ostensibly began and was built on social media, where criticism 
defined the march from the beginning as white, middle-class, and inconsiderate of 
intersectional experiences. After the initial name change from the “Million Woman 
March” to the “Women’s March on Washington,” critics swiftly pointed out that 
adding “on Washington” merely shifted appropriation from the Million Woman 
March to the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (where Martin Luther 
King Jr. gave his historic “I Have a Dream” speech). The march’s naming was 
merely the tip of the iceberg for the issues many had with the composition, 
organization, and coverage of the event. 
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In regard to issues of race, one of the most frequent critiques about march 
organization was the rampant censorship of dissent. Kramer et al (2017) compare 
these issues (and other factors, such as the pink pussy hats) to Foucault’s politics of 
purity, claiming that the actions of white women organizers produce a “pure” body as 
it is defined by the impurities evident in the bodies of the rhetorically and 
organizationally excluded. They describe acts of censorship imposed on the 
Vancouver Women’s March Facebook event page. Event pages are typically 
managed and mediated by one or more people with special permissions to edit 
content. When women complained (publicly, by posting directly on the march’s event 
page) that the march’s organizers failed to reach out to local activists and 
organizations for marginalized groups, such as Black Lives Matter (BLM) 
Vancouver, the page administrators deleted the complaints (713). 
 
Similar acts of silencing on indigenous people and people of color occurred 
in Louisiana, where Brittany Oliver and Candace Huber eventually resigned as 
march administrators when their issues with march rhetoric were met with anger, 
deleted posts, and eviction from private event groups on social media. In this case, 
their public resignation garnered many complaints from members of the march, 
accusing the two women of color of dividing the movement and overreacting (Huber, 
2016; Oliver, 2016). 
 
This line of critique is par for the course in the history of issues concerning 
intersectional oppression being side-lined for “women’s rights” writ large. Not only 
along racial lines, the erasure and sidestepping of dissent within the women’s movement 
has historically impacted the civil liberties and movement goals of LGBTQIA people 
(see: the Lavender menace) as well as the issues fought for by groups involved in labor 
rights issues. In the case of the women’s march, the frequent 
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attempt to sidestep an already highly visible movement like Black Lives Matter 
resulted in even more dissent and in some cases the dissolution of entire marches. 
 
Portland, Oregon’s march was poorly attended after its endorsement was 
rescinded by the NAACP of Portland when march organizers refused to make Black 
Lives Matter issues part of the event’s platforms for fear of making the march “too 
political” (Monahan, 2017). The march’s organizers were asked to step down and 
leadership was replaced just two weeks before the scheduled march with Margaret 
Jacobsen, a prominent local writer/activist with Black Lives Matter as well as other 
organizations in the Portland area. Some marches, started and organized by white 
women however, were shaken up when leadership publicly opted to step down to make 
room for a more diverse organizing body (Campos, 2016). 
 
Critique continued after the march as well, problematizing the media’s (as 
well as the organizations’ outward-facing statements) frequent praise of the march 
for its “peaceful” nature, and repeatedly pointing out that the largest protest in US 
history boasted zero arrests. Critics argue that the overall whiteness of the marches 
contributed to the lack of tension with police (Wortham, 2017; Richardson, 2017), 
and that characterizing the Women’s March as “peaceful” subsequently marked other 
contemporary protest movements as disruptive and violent — a particularly 
problematic characterization when put into context of black activism historically 
being rhetorically and physically policed by white culture’s definition of acceptable 
forms of protest (Marston, 2017). 
 
Third, activists and women of color expressed grief and frustration over the 
sudden willingness of hundreds of thousands of women to exuberantly take to the streets 
while black women in particular have been organizing and attending events protesting 
injustice consistently throughout US history (Rose-Redwood, 2017). These 
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grievances were made poignantly clear in a handful of highly-circulated photographs 
of protest signs with statements like “Don’t Forget: White Women Voted for Trump” 
(exit polls confirmed that 53% of white women voted for Trump) (TNO, 2017), or 
“I’ll see you nice white ladies at the next #BlackLivesMatter march, right?” These 
signs and accompanying social media posts drew attention to the disdain for calls to 
action for a predominantly white event when so many of their calls for outrage over 
racism have gone unanswered — especially calls to protest police violence against 
marginalized communities over the past decade. Brew and Dundes (2018) deftly 
point out that the “galvanizing” effect of Trump’s hot-mic “Grab them by the pussy” 
statement was massively disproportional to mainstream reactions to Trump’s repeated 
attacks on people of color (Dwyer, 2017). 
 
Many who marched, as well as those who chose not to, criticized the rhetoric of 
the march as not only white-dominant, but cisgender. In response to Trump’s comments 
on sexual assault, a number of women at the march carried signs and wore costumes, 
hats, and t-shirts featuring female genitalia. In particular, the knit pink “pussyhats” that 
became an icon for the event sparked some critique from within and outside of the trans 
community for implying that womanhood is intrinsically tied to having a vagina. This 
“genital-based feminism” can be alienating at best to trans women, and at worst can 
support the rhetoric of Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminism (TERF) - a subset of 
radical feminists who believe that trans women are in actuality men on an effeminate 
end of the gender spectrum. While some vocal members of the trans community were 
generally unperturbed by the pink hats upon closer examination, (Brighter, 2018), Took 
(2017) makes the claim that the naturalization of the connection between female 
genitalia and womanhood instead creates a platform and a pathway for TERF activists to 
espouse a more extremist and 
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bigoted viewpoint. Protecting trans women is included in the March’s “Unity 
Principles,” though as Greer (2017) recalls, only three of 60 presenters at the D.C. 
event represented the trans community. Many trans people claimed feeling unsafe 
and/or uncomfortable at the event and therefore felt excluded or opted not to 
attend marches for a variety of gender-based concerns (such as the fear of arrest 
and misgendered jailing practices) (Solis, 2017). 
 
Women’s March leadership was also faced with calls of anti-Semitism from 
early on from other organizers for not explicitly including “Jewish women” in their 
list of women to march on behalf of (a list that has now been updated to include 
Jewish women), spurring an argument amongst the organizing board over notions of 
precarity and urgency among various marginalized communities. One member of 
the organizing body, Vanessa Wruble, left amid controversy and formed a new 
organization called March On, which made fighting anti-semitism a more central 
platform and supported a simultaneous Women’s March in NYC through the 
Women’s March Alliance (Stockman, 2018). 
 
In addition to this early problem, march leader Tamika Mallory, was revealed to 
have ties to Nation of Islam (NOI) firebrand Louis Farrakhan, a noted anti-Semite.13 
After this revelation, Mallory refused to immediately denounce Farrakhan and the NOI 
leading to a public Facebook post by the original march creator, Teresa Shook, asking 
the leadership of two past Women’s Marches (2017 and 2018) to step down for this and 
other reasons: “In opposition to our Unity Principles, they have 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Controversy arose around Mallory’s Instagram account where a photo of her with the 
reverend was captioned “GOAT,” implying Farrakhan to be the “Greatest Of All Time.” 
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allowed anti-Semitism, anti- LBGTQIA sentiment and hateful, racist rhetoric to 
become a part of the platform by their refusal to separate themselves from groups 
that espouse these racist, hateful beliefs” (Shook, Nov 19, 2018). What’s more, the 
original march contracted security firms that staff NOI paramilitary members, often 
referred to as the Fruits of Islam (FOI) — though March leadership claimed that they 
were unaware of the company’s affiliations, and that a “large number” of security 
firms hire NOI members, and so it was possible (Stockman, 2018). 
 
The Women’s March’s “race problem,” “trans problem,” and “Jewish 
problem” exemplify inevitable cracks in any big-tent social movement. Some of these 
issues have plagued the feminist movement since its inception, while some are unique 
to present day socio-political context. The splintering off of certain social groups from 
a mass organization of women not only defines new social movements adjacent to 
feminism, it simultaneously changes the makeup and parameters of the contemporary 
feminist project. As Cassie Brighter, trans writer and educator on gender diversity, 
points out in her opinion piece on the Women’s March: 
 
In the seventies, racially-insensitive Second-Wave feminists forced Black 
 
women to make a hard decision: Are you a Woman-first, or are you Black- 
 
first, and then a Woman? Many chose Black-first, and poured their energies 
 
into the Civil Rights movement instead, leaving feminism to White women. 
 
Today’s trans women are faced with a similar hard choice. And because of the 
 
massive amount of discrimination and rejection we face, many of us choose 
 
Trans first. 
 
These dissents are typically spurred internally, and become divisive through 
unofficial channels, often slowly and amorphously. The barring of pro-life feminist 
organizers from the Women’s March, however, was a top-down organizational 
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decision reminiscent of the 1977 National Women’s Conference’s overt exclusion of 
“pro-family” women in the event’s organization. And while the overall splinter 
away from the feminist movement takes similar shapes, in the particular context of 
the Women’s March on Washington, the defining lines of the institution of feminism 
are drawn very deliberately. 
 
What appears different between these varied identity groups is their 
relationship to particular historical issues within the confines of feminism. At this 
point in feminist history, the infighting detailed above has spurred an internal 
dialogue that has lead to organizational navel-gazing and on occasion, an 
uncomfortable unseating of an overriding mission. Jennifer Nash’s groundbreaking 
work examines institutionalized feminism (in the form of Women’s and Gender 
Studies departments) as a neoliberal process where the recent embrace of black 
feminism (read: intersectionality) is made to play a corrective role: “its way of 
naming and labeling (even if not performing) a correct, ethical, and virtuous 
feminism.” There is indeed conflict, but conflict permitted in the purview of feminist 
discourse – it is safe conflict – reproducing a series of conflicts and resolutions that 
do not radically change the project of feminism but conveniently provides it with a 
direction and a goal. Nash argues that Women’s Studies’ uptake of intersectionality 
appropriates the concept and turns it into “a term that is obsessively signalled by the 
field as precisely what is required to remedy feminist histories of racism and 
exclusion. In other words, intersectionality is imagined as the flip side of ‘white 
feminism,’ the kind of ethical, inclusive, and complex feminism required for 
feminists to revive — and to complete — their political project” (Nash, 2019 p.13). 
Abortion politics however have not created the same internal unease within feminism, 
broadly defined. 
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The New Wave Feminists and the Women’s March Controversy 
 
The New Wave Feminists (NWF) is a self-described pro-life feminist group 
established in 2004. One of the group’s original leaders, Destiny Herndon-De la 
Rosa, tells the story of being a pregnant teen and choosing to keep her baby despite 
all of the hardships she would surely face because of it. She later founded the group 
with Kristen Walker Hatten, whom she ultimately distanced herself from due to white 
supremacist beliefs Hatten had later developed (Valens, 2018). It started with a blog 
about pro-life feminist issues — a blog clad in hot pink and black, graffiti-esque 
fonts, and a tiled Rosie the Riveter background, highlighting the ‘feminist’ position a 
bit more than the ‘pro-life’ one. The blogspot site evokes a blend of 90’s Riot Grrrl 
aesthetics and contains 136 posts covering a wide range of issues, often opinion 
pieces of ripped-from-the-headlines woman or life-related news. Destiny, the main 
writer for the blog (at least since the NWF had been scrubbed clean of all-things 
Hatten) punctuates frank opinions with levity and a sense of the time. This is the 
common format for her musings, either in blog-form or video-blog, and more than 
often on the group’s Facebook page, which now boasts over 46 thousand followers. 
When asked about reckoning feminist ideologies with the pro-life position, Destiny’s 
general response is that the two notions are highly compatible, if not intrinsic to one 
another: “If you believe that abortion ends the life of another human being and half 
the time that human being is female, then you believe that this is a human rights issue. 
So, just like I can be a feminist and be opposed to murder, rape, and anything else that 
would violate another human being’s existence, I am a feminist who is opposed to 
abortion” (Herndon, in Johnston, 2017). 
 
According to numerous sources, the NWF signed on early in the process to 
partner with and help organize the march, and as of January 15, 2017, The New Wave 
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Feminists were publicly listed as partners to the march. Partnerships with the 
Women’s March imply a dedication to organizing and recruiting efforts at local 
levels, as well as a public display of affiliation between the March and the group in 
question. This public affiliation is why many pro-life organizations opted out of 
partnering, though members of various pro-life groups were nevertheless reported to 
have attended. The other deterrent for pro-life participation was the march’s taking on 
of Planned Parenthood as a co-sponsor (later called “premier partner”) of the march, 
along with the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), Pro-Choice 
America, and EMILY’S List — all organizations categorically opposing the pro-life 
agenda.14 
 
On January 17th, 2019, prominent long-form journalism site The Atlantic 
published an article on the NWF’s partnership with the march, portending the 
controversy with the subheading: “Is there room in the movement for people who 
morally object to abortion?” Journalist Emily Green aimed to highlight the diversity 
of the march’s participants, perhaps to highlight the diversity of membership in the 
anti-Trump camp, and quotes Women’s March top organizer Bob Bland’s decision 
to include pro-life groups like the NWF: “Intersectional feminism is the future of 
feminism and of this movement [...] We must not just talk about feminism as one 
issue, like access to reproductive care” (Bland, in Green, 2017). 
 
Following this piece, a number of participating marchers, as well as prominent 
public feminist figures reached out to the organizers via social media to object to the 
inclusion of any pro-life/anti-choice groups in the march. Most often cited are Jessica 
 
 
 
 
14 Other sponsors include the AFT, ACLU, Human Rights Campaign, and Moveon.org 
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Valenti, a feminist author, journalist, and founder of Feministing.com, and popular 
feminist writer Roxane Gay, who tweeted their disagreement that same day, both 
engaging in long twitter threads on the topic, arguing that pro-life perspectives are 
not intersectional and that feminism is not a catchall for political activities of women. 
Within 90 minutes of Gay’s initial tweet (now with 11k “likes”), the Women’s March 
removed the NWF from their list of partners and released the following statement: 
 
The Women’s March’s platform is pro-choice and that has been our stance 
from day one. We want to assure all of our partners, as well as participants, 
that we are pro-choice as clearly stated in our Unity Principles. We look 
forward to marching on behalf of individuals who share the view that 
women deserve the right to make their own reproductive decisions. The anti-
choice organization in question is not a partner of the Women’s March on 
Washington. We apologize for this error. (@womensmarch, 2017) 
 
The Unity Principles in reference above have always included reproductive rights 
as against “any federal, state or local rollbacks, cuts or restrictions on our ability to 
access quality reproductive healthcare services” (“Mission and Principles”). 
 
In the following week, two other pro-life organizations were pointed out by 
marchers over twitter and subsequently removed by march organizers (Chretien, 
2017). Both of these groups, however, were admitted as a partner after the 
controversy surrounding New Wave Feminists.15 That said, these groups as well as 
 
 
 
15 Abby Johnson is the creator and head of “And Then There Were None,” a pro-life women’s 
 
group dedicated to converting abortion clinicians into pro-life activists. At this date, the major 
film “Unplanned,” about the life of Abby Johnson leaving her management position 
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many other pro-life contingencies went through with their established plans to 
attend the march in spite of the march’s public decree of its pro-abortion stance 
(McArtor, 2017; Murphy, 2017; Guidos, 2017). This implies that the Women’s 
March’s stance on abortion did not in essence pit pro-life feminist groups against 
pro-choice groups, but instead drew an official line in the sand where one was once 
intuited but never publicly enforced. 
 
If the NWF and other pro-life groups were removed as partners but still 
attended without pushback, what relevance does this moment hold in the broader 
story of the feminist project? In 1977 and long-after, few scholars considered the 
National Women’s Conference a highly relevant, let alone pivotal moment in the 
conservative women’s movement. With today’s technological affordances, we can in 
real-time observe the field of discourse surrounding the event: from overt 
declarations made by prominent feminist figures on twitter, “Intersectional feminism 
does not include a pro-life agenda. That’s not how it works! The right to choose is a 
fundamental part of feminism” (Gay, 2017) to the subtle phrasing of local news 
stations in Texas, “Late Monday afternoon, the protest’s organizers appeared to 
retreat from its earlier embrace of the group” (Alfaro, 2017, emphasis mine). 
 
 
Media Coverage of the Women’s March Controversy 
 
Similar to the National Women’s Conference of 1977, the media’s spotlight on 
the event may be the most relevant actor in the causal effects of division and 
 
 
 
 
at Planned Parenthood after witnessing an abortion, was in the works to be released in the 
 
coming year or two. 
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galvanization.16 Prior to the event in 2017, the New Wave Feminists and pro-life 
feminism more broadly received very little media attention and publicity. The 
sensationally public nature of the NWF’s removal from the march changed that 
drastically. According to Former Feminists for Life of America17 president, Rachel 
MacNair, “I mean, a week apart you had the march for women and the march for 
life, and we were a set of organizations that attended both. And we got press that was 
interested in the fact that we were attending both.”18 
 
Herndon-De La Rosa seized the opportunity to promote pro-life feminist 
philosophies, accepting interviews from anyone who requested one: 
 
I probably did like 200 hundred interviews in a 2 week period. Like I said, my 
phone would ring, I would pick up and answer it, and like…I think this is like, 
somebody’s HOA newsletter that they’re interviewing me for…in the 
meantime like the New York Times is leaving me voicemails…and I have to 
call them back and stuff. But, I just…I thought this is a once in a lifetime 
 
 
 
 
16 Though outside of the scope of this project, research on intersectional influences on media 
reception by “non-activist” women is key to positing on audience participation. For work 
targeting audience reception of specifically abortion-related media, see Press and Cole 
(1999). 
 
17 The Feminists for Life of America, created in 1972 by pro-life defectors from the Ohio 
chapter of NOW, has since become the umbrella organization for all things pro-life 
feminism. For an excellent account of the FFL’s contemporary role and outreach 
activities see Oaks (2009). 
 
18 MacNair, Rachel (Former president of Feminists for Life of America). In discussion with 
the author. June 22 2018. 
 
 
68 
 
thing, I’m not gonna sleep and eat for two weeks, and I’m just gonna answer 
everybody and get this message out as much as I can.19 
 
In fact, Herndon-De La Rosa explained that she had a vested interest in talking to pro-
choice audiences because she believes the consistent life ethic philosophy20 “can 
challenge pretty much everybody” and ideally bring more feminists over to the pro-
life side of the abortion argument. The platform led most importantly to the 
acknowledgement of her unique political position, if not legitimizing their cause, at 
least confirming their existence and status within the abortion debate: 
 
a lot of people were telling me like ‘oh yeah we saw that on the news, we were 
talking about that at the dinner table’ so I’m like, this literally started a national 
conversation, so then now by the time I tell someone I’m a pro-life feminist, 
they’re like ‘oh okay’ you know, they were already kind of familiar with it. So 
 
 
 
 
19 Herndon-De La Rosa, Destiny (Founder, “New Wave Feminists”). In discussion with the 
author. June 23, 2018. 
 
20 The Consistent Life Ethic is the philosophy of most pro-life feminists, spread in the 1980s 
as a place for pro-life progressives and Catholic Democrats to continue protesting war, 
nuclear proliferation, the death penalty and euthanasia, and violence — including against 
the unborn — after peace activist efforts during Vietnam. Subscribers to the Consistent 
Life Ethic work as outreach and educators for their mission statement: “We are committed 
to the protection of life, which is threatened in today's world by war, abortion, poverty, 
racism, the death penalty and euthanasia. We believe that these issues are linked under a 
'consistent ethic of life'. We challenge those working on all or some of these issues to 
maintain a cooperative spirit of peace, reconciliation, and respect in protecting the 
unprotected” (consistentlifenetwork.org/mission) 
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even if they disagree with it, there was a starting point. Prior to this, 
there wasn’t really a starting point. 
 
The story caught on across a range of media platforms, from twitter firestorms 
to the New York Times. This was in part due to the incendiary nature of the 
accusation that the women’s movement, otherwise considered a highly inclusive big 
tent within US social movements, may only be inclusive to a point. For anti-feminist 
media, the story reinforced the notion of the “intolerant left,” leaving open a potential 
gap in the left’s moral high-ground often attributed to its inclusivity: 
 
The Women's March claims to be for anyone "who believes women's rights 
are human rights." And yet...anything less than complete agreement about 
abortion and the group doesn't even want you participating in the rally. 
Nevermind if you're with the group on any or all of its myriad other 
principles—identify as pro-choice (but against sex-worker rights) or the cool 
girls don't want to sit with you. (Brown, 2017) 
 
In a frame analysis of four prominent right-wing news sites, this critique and other 
trends appeared following the controversy with the NWF. Journalists, op-ed writers, 
and podcast interviewers tended to emphasize ethical inconsistencies, critique 
political expediency of exclusionary tactics, and attach those critiques as intrinsic 
characteristics of the Women’s March. The purpose of a frame analysis is rooted in 
the idea that certain subtextual aspects of a story are made “more salient,” according 
to Entman (1993), “in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described” (p. 52). This means that framing is a way in which to direct the 
connotative decoding of texts by the audience while simultaneously presenting the 
content of the piece. Gamson (1987) developed a constructionist model of frame 
 
70 
 
analysis that includes media and public as “part of the same cultural system” 
(Baylor, 1996, p.1), implying that both the producers and the consumers of media 
generate and reify frames. In this vein, frames construct a discursive reality within 
which audiences can classify their interpretations of texts based on their experiences; 
Goffman (1974) refers to these systems of meaning-organization as the “schemata of 
interpretation.” With that in mind, the below analysis is intended to provide not only 
a snapshot of the public’s understanding of the events that took place at the 
Women’s March, but also an examination of the field of conservative reportage 
when the topic in question provides an opportunity to criticize the left. 
 
One of the ethical inconsistencies that conservative and right-wing media sites 
refer to is the conundrum of inclusivity mentioned above. Pro-life feminists seem to 
be the only outlying feminist group at the Women’s March after all of the dissenting 
identity groups are accounted for, though this is not the only issue taken with the 
march’s ethical consistencies. Because march organizers and prominent political 
activist Angela Davis21 aimed to make Palestinian statehood a major platform of the 
debate, critics decried the exclusion of the NWF’s as a double standard, or that the 
feminist movement “showed their hand,” presumably as radical and anti-Semitic. 
Oppositional media grabbed onto as many ethical inconsistencies about the March as 
they could, linking offhand the exclusionary nature of the women’s march to pro-
lifers while criticizing the march for featuring Donna Hylton, a convicted murderer 
and torturer who turned a new leaf after her conviction: “Organizers of the march, 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Herself a controversial figure, Davis was prominent member of the Black Panther party 
who participated in acts of violence but has turned to radical academic activism 
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who banned pro-life women from participating, did not return The Daily Caller’s 
request for comment regarding Hylton’s participation as a featured speaker” (Hasson, 
2017). 
 
In terms of political expediency, two major points emerged throughout the 
conservative media literature. First, that had the controversy not taken place, many 
more women would have felt comfortable and welcomed attending the march. 
 
This march doesn’t have to be an opportunity to stereotype and separate. This 
doesn’t have to be an opportunity to call “pro-life” women “anti-choice.” That 
doesn’t capture the spirit, the heart of what we’re about. And to use such 
rhetoric is to only make this event another opportunity to divide into “us 
versus them,” to adopt the mean-hearted exclusionism that Trump has 
wholeheartedly embraced. (Olmstead, 2017) 
 
Second, multiple sources criticized the political move of excluding pro-life women 
from the march: “Intersectionality caused them to fail the broad inclusivity test - you 
know, how those things end up shaking out is entertaining” (Gillespie, 2017). This 
critique is built on the implication that the Achilles heel of the left is identity politics’ 
tendency to atomize, and that according to polls by pro-life organizations like the 
Susan B Anthony List or the Knights of Columbus, the majority of women are in 
favor of abortion regulation after 20 weeks of pregnancy: “When the rise of Donald 
Trump may be shattering the bonds that have tied so many pro-life women to the 
Republican Party, why not do everything possible to encourage these women to 
make a complete break and join the opposition?” (Linker, 2017). To Ben Domenech 
of The Federalist, the notion of turning away an ideology that “over 65% of women” 
subscribe to, is incomprehensible when viewed through the lens of representational 
politics (Domenech, 2017). 
 
72 
 
Finally, the NWF themselves were absorbed into the conservative narrative. 
Due to Herndon-De La Rosa’s open-door interview policy, she often landed in 
positions where she and her story about the march were weaponized against 
feminists and the left more broadly. In our interview she recalls her experience 
talking to The Daily Caller: 
 
we were talking about um, you know, the systemic issues that lead to abortion 
 
– and you can’t just talk about ‘oh there’s more black babies aborted, you have to 
look at the fact that maternal-infant mortality rate among black communities and 
among black women and look at all these different thing that lead this to being 
viewed as a necessary evil in those communities – so we were talking all 
 
about this to daily caller…of course they cut almost all of that, yeah and just 
had us talking about the women’s march. Cause, conservatives they want us 
to bash liberals – that’s it! 
 
In another on-air interview with Fox News host Tucker Carlson, Herndon-De La 
Rosa gives into Carlson’s goading about the exclusivity of the feminist club, but soon 
after is cut off and ignored when footage cuts to the stage on which Donald and 
Melania Trump were about to dance for the inaugural ball. 
 
She also notes that following her interviews, the video comments would be 
scathing anti-feminist trolling, confirming for her that the conservative side of the 
media has a more-closed echo chamber than on the left: 
 
you could tell people hadn’t even watched the video. They saw the word feminist 
that was it and it was like ‘pft-do you have to be fat to be a feminist? Do you 
have to have stupid hair to be a feminist?’ Like, every single comment was just 
so…and I’m like… ‘would you listen to what we were even saying?’ It was 
incredibly frustrating to me. So I find that they’re almost more stuck in 
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this like, you know, particular worldview than liberal feminists because I 
mean, feminism at its core is about listening to women’s voices – even the 
ones you disagree with! And you at least, you know, owe them the respect of 
considering their opinion…so…I find that [liberal feminists are] much more 
open to it. 
 
She also points out during our interview that regardless of all of the press attention 
the NWF was receiving at the time, they were never asked to speak with a pro-life 
group or publication. Herndon-De La Rosa believes that this is likely due to funding 
concerns — as pro-life organizations are usually donor-driven and religious — and 
that the NWF are too controversial to risk upsetting potential and returning donors. 
 
Coverage of the pro-life feminists’ rejection from the Women’s March 
spurred exponentially more media coverage than they had previously enjoyed. 
Neutral to liberal sites and news agencies took to the topic as a navel-gaze of the state 
of feminism — teasing out the implications of this defining event and how they relate 
to broader popular conceptions of feminism. Social movement literature refers to the 
unintended consequence of sympathy for the opposition as “backfire,” more 
colloquially referred to as the “Streisand Effect.” This theory is typically applied to 
instances of censorship where the media is involved and reveals that censorship, but 
applies to the March within this literature, the “perception of something unjust” in 
combination with the “communication to receptive audiences” can turn public 
opinion to favor the perceived transgressed. According to Jansen and Martin (2015), 
“media coverage is crucial to triggering backfire. The value orientations of media 
practitioners and Internet activists make them potential allies in struggles against 
censorship, but they need to be approached strategically, ideally by respected third- 
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party individuals or groups.” Additionally, the notion of a “transformative event” 
can mean an entirely new historical trajectory for the group(s) in question. 
 
In the case of the National Women’s Conference, the transformative event 
structured future relationships between feminist and non-feminist women. In the case 
of the Women’s March, pro-life feminists received recognition, publicity, and a 
recruiting platform. According to multiple sources, many who were planning to 
attend the Women’s March on Washington cancelled their plans after hearing about 
the NWF’s removal. For some, the plans were broken in solidarity and to make a 
political statement within the abortion debate. For others, particularly people of faith 
and pro-life people, the controversy signalled an unwelcomeness at best and at worst 
an outright prohibition from the event (Domenech, 2017). 
 
Prior to this event, pro-life feminists like Herndon De La Rosa are quoted as 
feeling involved in the feminist project, rarely connecting with otherwise 
conservative news agencies. The involuntary and public exclusion from that project in 
2017 had pushed many straddling the line of the two worlds further to the right, or 
into a defensive position. In the words of Rachel MacNair, “The basic thing is that we 
were on an all hands on deck situation, and they were slapping away some of the 
hands. And that was the first time the media kind of caught that there was a problem 
here.” In this transformative event, the group New Wave Feminists alone doubled 
their membership size within two months (from approx. 20k to 40k). 
 
Since the inaugural March in January 2017, organizers have faced continuous 
backlash and infighting regarding race and religion in particular. Leaders in the Jewish 
community have rallied against the March’s organizers over accusations of anti-
Semitism. As of 2019, many marches around the U.S. have either distanced themselves 
from Women’s March Inc. (the current organizational title for the original 
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movement) or dissolved their movement entirely for reasons listed above. Complaints 
were particularly directed at organizer Tamika Mallory’s reticence to condemn Louis 
Farrakhan, along with rumors of anti-Semitic remarks made in early organizational 
meetings by a disgruntled organizing board member. The charge of anti-Semitism was 
the major reason stated for the altogether dissolution of the Women’s Marches in both 
New Orleans, and the state of Washington, while backlash from the controversy has 
hindered fundraising across the country, causing Chicago to cancel its 2019 march (Hill, 
2018; Oster, 2019). Fears of the March becoming representative of radical anti-Semitism 
spurred the exodus of over 200 original partners as of 2019 including founding partners 
NARAL, EMILY’s List, and the AFLCIO. The NAACP along with SEIU, the Human 
Rights Campaign, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and allegedly, the Democratic 
National Committee, all pulled their public affiliation with the march by its third 
instantiation in January of 2019 (Crowe, 2019; Serges, 2019; Silva, 2019). 
 
Issues of identity politics have continued to erode the numbers of participants 
in the march over the years. Perhaps the most elucidating example was the 
cancellation of the 2019 march in Humboldt County, California where organizers 
cancelled the third annual march due to a lack of diversity in the organizing body. 
Because the county is 74% ‘non-Hispanic white,’ according to the Census Bureau, 
many who planned to march pleaded with organizers not to cancel the event. The 
organizers felt that they “failed to have the type of collaboration needed to be 
inclusive of some of the most underrepresented voices in our community, namely, 
women of color and people who are gender non-conforming” (Brice-Saddler, 2019). 
The perception of political accommodationism conveyed by these events and by the 
media coverage and critique of them has clearly played a key role in the disbanding 
of the Women’s March over time, both rhetorically and numerically. 
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Conclusion 
 
This case study does not in itself purport causality between exclusionary 
politics and partisan political success, but instead reaffirms that even before Roe, the 
legislative issue of reproductive rights has acted as the dividing wall between modern 
and mainstream feminisms. In crucial “big tent” feminist moments – the empowering 
success and momentum of the women’s liberation movement and establishment of 
NOW, the affirming acknowledgement of the International Women’s Year and 
National Women’s Conference, and the powerful enormity of the Women’s March 
on Washington – the subject of abortion has been the recurrent signifier of what is 
and what is not considered feminist. Even amid the numerous identitarian dissents, 
the Women’s March movement’s conviction on abortion politics decisively 
reproduces the modern feminist movement as one defined by the political 
constructions of “pro-life” versus “pro-choice.” 
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III: CHAPTER TWO: REMEMBERING FEMINISM: THE CONTESTED LEGACY 
OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY 
 
 
 
What the Foremothers would have wanted 
 
As mentioned in this project’s introduction, pro-life feminism has from its 
 
early institutionalization lay claim to “feminist foremothers” as early as Mary 
 
Wollstonecraft, citing various proclamations and publications made by many 
 
suffragettes. In the publication of multiple texts, a dedicated section of the FFL 
 
website, and a recurring article in the FFL’s biannual magazine, The American 
 
Feminist, FFL’s community and its founder, Rachel MacNair, have built a body 
 
of citable content claiming (often on shaky grounds) that were the suffragettes alive 
 
today, they would stand against abortion rights. These arguments have since been 
 
taken up as a major legitimating factor in the entire pro-life feminist movement by 
 
underwriting feminist arguments against abortion like social justice and economic 
 
parity. 
 
 In this chapter I look at the case of Susan B. Anthony’s legacy, struggled over in 
the abortion debate, as just one of many cases of foremother appropriation by The FFL 
along with other pro-life feminists. As one of the most popular public feminist historical 
figures, Anthony’s legacy commands respect in most feminist circles, regardless of their 
stance on abortion. This is in part because she founded the National Woman Suffrage 
Association (NWSA) which served as the major unifying body behind the fight for and 
success in obtaining the vote for women. Like other feminist foremothers, her record of 
abolitionist work preceding her suffrage endeavors arguably impacted the early women’s 
rights movement and laid the foundation for the 
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civil rights-adjacent egalitarianism of the feminist project. As one of the few widely 
identifiable foremother visages, Anthony’s image has become a signifier for the 
feminist project of the “original” sort. The short-lived Susan. B Anthony silver 
dollar iconized Anthony’s Quaker style of hair and dress to later be easily invoked in 
the popular US sketch comedy show Saturday Night Live.  
 
The January, 2017 sketch pokes fun at the empty glorification of the feminist 
founder when five female friends take a tour of the Official (Rochester, NY) Susan B. 
Anthony Museum & House, raise the ghost of Anthony, and then promptly ignore her 
feminist aphorisms while trying to call a cab back to the city (Lopez, 2018). The 
sketch received praise for ending the scene with Anthony reminding the young 
women that “abortion is murder!” While multiple pro-life articles and blog posts 
came out applauding the truth-telling ghost of Anthony, only a brief counter-tweet 
from Deborah Hughes, the president of the Susan B. Anthony Museum & House, 
took issue with the quote, stating simply that Anthony and her cohort never took a 
stance on abortion. This asymmetrical response is common in the debate over 
feminism and abortion — where those presently on the side of abortion rights feel 
little need to defend their position or even acknowledge the views of pro-life 
feminists, who until recently have held very little of the public’s attention. 
 
This is in part because Susan B. Anthony’s legacy has historically lived safely 
in the house of the more mainstream pro-choice feminism, with little concern for its 
uptake by pro-lifers (it also might be to avoid giving a platform to pro-life feminists). 
That said, the pro-life claim to many suffragettes, and Susan B. Anthony in particular, 
has recently seen a broader and more public reach. In 2017, The official Susan B. 
Anthony Museum & House in Rochester, NY organized a week-long event 
celebrating the centennial of women’s suffrage in New York State, concluding with a 
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“Suffragist City Parade.” Prominent pro-life feminist group Feminists Choosing Life 
of New York appeared in the parade unexpectedly, dressed as suffragettes and 
carrying a banner that read “Celebrating 100 Years of Pro-Life Feminism: Susan B. 
Anthony,” their purple sashes declaring: “Pro-Life and Pro-Woman” (Carroll, Kray, 
and Mandell, 2018). Furthermore, the massive annual “March for Life” in 
Washington D.C., which varying reports estimate has drawn anywhere from 20,000 
to 650,000 participants since 1974, and now doubly serves as a counter-protest to the 
anti-Trump “Women’s March on Washington,” which occurs on the same weekend, 
is themed “Life Empowers: Pro-Life is Pro-Woman” in celebration of the centennial 
of the 19th Amendment. In a promotional video for the 2020 march, a lone woman 
performs a slam poetry piece reciting the current talking points of the pro-life 
feminist community: 30 million females have been aborted, the abortion industry 
targets marginalized and vulnerable women, and a quote by Alice Paul and Susan B. 
Anthony calling abortion “the ultimate exploitation of women.” This attribution is 
half-accurate, as Alice Paul, author of the 19th amendment, was more frequently 
recorded making reference to the topic of abortion, while Susan B. Anthony made 
little public mention of the issue.    
 
Little past scholarship has addressed the debate over Anthony’s stance on 
abortion. In fact, almost no academic work is dedicated solely to this debate — discourse 
over the issue has primarily occurred in popular press, addressed below. Instead, 
conversations surrounding pro-life feminism more broadly at times refer to the 
phenomenon of pro-life feminists’ claims to feminist foremothers. Two legal scholars 
have in particular broached the topic of the struggle for historical authority in regard to 
pro-life feminism. Thomas’s (2012) “Misappropriating Women’s History in the Law and 
Politics of Abortion” engages with pro-life feminist claims to Elizabeth 
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Cady Stanton; reading through the controversial texts by the suffragette, she utilizes 
the claim over Stanton (and briefly mentions similar tendencies for Anthony) as a 
frame through which to discuss the legal implications of such an assertion. By 
discrediting the idea that Stanton would be pro-life, at least with the evidence 
available, Thomas is arguing for a careful handling of pro-life feminism’s role in 
legal discourse around abortion. Ziegler (2013) similarly addresses the issue in one 
section of her essay “Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of 
Modern Pro-Life Feminism,” wherein her focus is geared more toward the pro-life 
feminist organizations participating in the public debate over feminist foremothers. 
She also concludes that pro-life feminist rhetoric will be highly influential in the 
ensuing abortion debates, and points to Sarah Palin as emblematic of the risks of 
these types of historical readings — namely the idea that abortion is bad for women’s 
progress. Similar to the legal scholars’ works, this study aims to link the political 
implications of a contested history to material outcomes and implications. 
Conversely, it reads this debate as an interrogation of popular memory’s role in 
today’s perception of feminism and the women’s movement. It is narrower in its 
scope for data, with a focus on Anthony, but broader in its attempt to paint a more 
complete picture of how the public remembers feminism and anti-abortionism. 
 
In what follows, I identify other feminist foremothers for whom the argument 
of pro-life presentism would be much more viable; I also consider the major 
arguments for and against Susan B. Anthony’s pro-life stance on abortion politics and 
find that the latter far outweigh the former. And yet, pro-life feminist associations and 
claims to the feminist foremothers have since at least the 1980’s been cornerstones to 
the pro-life feminist philosophy. Using Susan B. Anthony’s legacy as a case in point, 
I draw on studies in popular and collective memory to answer the following 
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questions: First, why do pro-life feminists emphasize their political claim to Susan B. 
Anthony, for whom they can only make tenuous arguments about a pro-life political 
stance? And second, how does a large group of pro-life feminists maintain its 
commitment to this controversial version of history in the face of the mainstream 
narrative? By exploring three categories of popular memory through sites of struggle 
over Anthony’s legacy, I argue that a multi-pronged approach to historical 
appropriation has emboldened and sustained the folk image of Anthony as an early 
pro-life feminist.  Through collective remembering, institutional commemoration, and 
the memorialization of Anthony’s birthplace, I show how a matrix of memory 
practices has held Anthony up as a pro-life folk hero despite increasing public 
pushback from pro-choice feminists and historians.  
 
 
Collective and Popular Memory 
 
Anthony’s legacy is in this case contingent on both the how and the why a given 
population remembers her. How remembrance functions is two-fold: First, what is 
Anthony’s characterization? What aspects of her life and work are made most salient in 
the collective historical consciousness? Second, the process of remembering can imbue 
that legacy with legitimacy or authenticity, and can even construct and (re)constitute an 
entirely unique memory of a person or event. We need look no further than the embattled 
confederate statues of the South to witness the power of commemorative formations to 
sustain particular historical outlooks. Conversely, 
 
the why of Anthony’s legacy is what is at stake in this chapter — what Zelizer (1995) 
refers to as “retrospective nominalization,” a renaming of a notion of the past where 
“at the same time as the use of the old secures and solidifies the new, the new helps 
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assign and reassign meaning to the old” (p. 222). Below I outline the tactics by which 
Anthony has been taken up by a minority perspective for a strategic purpose. 
 
Since scholars began critiquing structural power imbalance in social 
institutions, interest in collective memory has largely been concerned with reading 
popular histories “from the margins” (Weedon and Jordan, 2011) — and therein more 
or less interested in upheaving dominant historical narratives which bury the histories 
and experiences of the marginalized and oppressed. For this reason, its framework is 
useful for analyzing fringe historical perspectives like those of the pro-life feminist 
community. This “deprofessionalization” of history began with the likes of E.P. 
Thompson and the Birmingham school, aiming to complicate written history with 
narratives not recorded by the elites. Since then, a preoccupation with oral history and 
popular history has evolved into its own area of study (Tosh, 1999 p. 16). It has since 
then diverged into myriad branches of “memory” studies within various disciplines: 
social memory, collective memory, community memory, popular memory — all of 
which orbit around Maurice Halbwachs’s Durkheimian proposition that memory is a 
socially constructed object like anything else, and in particular an act of “constituting 
the past within the present” (1992).  
 
Memory studies is premised on the idea that objective remembering is not 
possible — that simply the act of remembering information puts it through a filter 
shaped with one’s experiences, principles, socioeconomic context, etc. and that condition 
applies to historians as well. In these terms, social memory emerges at the point of 
articulation between subjective memory (mainly experience) and objective memory 
(mainly knowledge). Objective memory, then, represents shared common 
understandings about the world, and more pertinent to this case, a given community’s 
history: “Objective memory is simply the better vehicle for the conveyance of 
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information; it is the aspect of our memory most easily available to others” (p. 7). If 
we consider these propositions in the framework of semiotics, “objectivity,” that is 
the data itself prior to interpretation, acts at the signified level, while subjectivity 
determines the signifiers, and the point of articulation, the sign, creates the basis of 
the plane of shared meaning about collective memories and identities.  
 
Tosh (1999), regards “social memory” as especially susceptible to 
manipulation in the form of value-laden distortions (nostalgia or progress, ex.) for a 
directed purpose to serve those in power (Olick and Robbins, 1998). That said, for 
memory scholars and historical anthropologists like Fentress and Wickham, “the 
issue of whether or not a given memory is true is interesting only insofar as it sheds 
light on how memory itself works” (p. xi). The polyvalent nature of memory is then a 
primary concern for memory scholars, however superseded by the structure of 
memory. They argue that different communities (defined broadly) remember 
respective histories in a variable format: “however much a novel or schoolteacher’s 
story can affect the content of a memory of an event held by an individual or even a 
social group, it will have much less effect on which sorts of events social groups will 
characteristically choose to commemorate, which are linked to deeper patterns of 
identity” (Fentress and Wickham, 1992 p. 96, emphasis original).  
 
Zelizer in particular emphasizes the role of “nonsequential temporal 
patterning” in the field of memory studies: “collective memory is predicated upon a 
dissociation between the act of remembering and the linear sequencing of time...Time 
becomes a social construction, the target of strategic rearrangement” (p. 222). 
 
The dechronologizing of time implies that people’s memories of static events are not 
themselves static, and instead transform common history to serve their contemporary 
perceptions about how the social world functions. She argues that although the 
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passage of time is often a challenge to sustaining communities, due to the inevitable 
evolution of society and identities of members, collective memory allows for a 
given community to construct a common framework which acts as a historical 
referent for the group’s identity. For pro-life feminists, this requires a continually 
reinforced assumption about the feminist foremothers, produced and exemplified 
through organizational and promotional materials.  
 
 
Commemorations 
 
These common frameworks are often (though not solely) referenced through 
social and cultural institutions which collapse swaths of time to “boiling points” or 
events which then stand in for an entire historical moment or zeitgeist. In memory 
studies these institutions are typically referred to as commemorations. The most 
common type of commemoration appearing in memory studies is the material object 
used to mark or signify something deemed worth remembering. These can take the 
form of museums, war memorials, library archives, and ultimately anything nameable 
(highways, university buildings, awards, etc.). In this case, the Susan B. Anthony 
List, a pro-life lobbying group, acts as a commemorative site through which the 
symbol and myth of a pro-life SBA can actively promulgate. Commemorations are 
used and arguably necessary to “stabilize” or “anchor” collective memory, which is 
otherwise constantly evolving with the passage of time. It functions for community 
identity in that it creates shared memory reference points regardless of membership, 
 
as Zelizer points out: “one does not need to have participated in a war in order 
to celebrate Veteran’s Day” (p. 219).   
 
To the Popular Memory Group, a “sense of the past” is the combined 
individual remembering experience combined with public representations of memory, 
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such as those institutions mentioned above. When commemorations are linked to or 
produced by the state, such as a national heritage designation (Popular Memory 
Group, 1982), they become public history, and therein a part of what they deem the 
public “historical apparatus” or “the field of public representations of history” (p. 
207). In the structure of patterning, national memories “make up the substructure of 
national historical consciousness,” according to Fentress and Wickham. In the realm 
of remembering, national memories, and national commemorations in particular, 
tend to be described more often as invented, constructed, or otherwise manipulated 
for the aims of building and securing a historical past which best upholds present day 
political aims: “They are linear in their conception of time, and indeed teleological: 
very explicitly, all of them lead up to and legitimize the present situation...intended 
to define that community; but this definition will include a legitimation of its 
structures of political and economic dominance, by which the elite justifies itself as 
an elite” (p. 134). 
 
 
Birthplace Memorials 
 
Within memory studies on commemorations there are specialized areas for 
various institutions and types of commemorative forms, including an area of study for 
heritage sites and noteworthy places of birth and death. In his edited volume, Born in 
the U.S.A., Seth C. Bruggeman compiles a collection of research on birthplace 
memorials of (broadly defined) famous Americans, from living presidents to 
bluegrass musicians. The text opens with a review of a history of thought on the 
proliferation and popularity of birthplace memorials beginning before but surging 
after the civil war. In it, he makes a fascinating argument for the beginnings of 
birthplace commemoration in the United States as tied back to European 
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enlightenment thinking in combination with Spencer’s Social Darwinism, wherein a 
person’s origin was very much tied to their adult character and consequently, their 
success in life. The example of George Washington’s Mount Vernon birthplace 
memorial implicates national identity in the conversation on origin and child rearing. 
At a historic moment when manuals and magazines for homemaking and “domestic 
literacy” were integral in the daily lives of American families, birthplace museums 
became a perfect narratological site for the depiction of an ideal domestic space to 
“encourag[e] the politically powerless wives of upwardly mobile white men to make 
their patriotic contribution by cultivating republican virtue in children” (p. 7).22 
 
The overriding theory on the popularity of birthplace memorials is tied to a 
rapidly changing social landscape in the early 20th century. White fears about national 
identity during a surge of immigration, alongside the industrial revolution saw a 
marked rise in birthplace memorials and museums, as well as literature in the same 
vein. At the same time, the U.S. also saw a renewed preoccupation with origin and 
citizenship in the form of birth certificates and federal databases. Bruggeman traces the 
ups and downs of birthplace memorials through the latter half of the 20th century, and 
notes the rushed inclusion of birthplaces of women and people of color 
 
 
 
 
22 Notably, these depictions typically whitewash the stories of “great men” by 
implying an absence of domestic help in the form of slaves and servants, and 
therein external (and non-white) influence on their early development.) “In other 
words, because we are so impressed by the timelessness of these places, it is easy 
to forget (or, not to care) that each one was born of the fear that its story about 
the past might be eclipsed by a competing narrative” (Bruggeman, 2012). 
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to the list of National Heritage Sites to offset the very white and male predominance 
thus far. Susan B. Anthony’s birthplace is mentioned here for its emergence in 
2010, but notably it is not included in the National Registry of Historic Places 
(NRHP), though the Susan B. Anthony Museum & House in Rochester, as well as a 
second childhood home nearby are included on the list.  
 
“Sites of memory,” explains Winter (2010) offer a unique opportunity for 
“dominated groups to contest their subordinate status in public”[...] “alternative 
interpretation of the political meaning of sites of memory emphasizes the multivocal 
character of remembrance and the potential for new groups with new causes to 
appropriate older sites of memory” (pp. 316-17). With this definition, one might 
consider Susan B. Anthony’s imago to be a site of memory in itself, let alone the 
birthplace museum, for the pro-life feminist movement. In the following section, I 
outline the aforementioned sites of memory, knowledges, and proclamations about 
Susan B. Anthony that are currently under contestation between opposing groups of 
feminists (and some non-feminists) on each side of the abortion question. 
 
 
Susan B. Anthony 
 
Susan B. Anthony is by far the most frequently cited foremother by pro-life 
feminists, even when the case for other foremothers’ pro-life stance is easier to make. 
For instance, famed suffragette and first female candidate for the US presidency, 
Victoria Woodhull, along with her sister, Tennessee Claflin, wrote multiple essays 
specifically on “The Slaughter of the Innocents” (1874) where she explicitly equates 
murder and abortion: 
 
We are aware that many women attempt to excuse themselves for 
procuring abortions, upon the ground that it is not murder. But the fact 
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of resort to so weak an argument only shows the more palpably that 
they fully realize the enormity of the crime. Is it not equally destroying 
the would-be future oak, to crush the sprout before it pushes its head 
above the sod, as it is to cut down the sapling, or cut down the tree?  
 
Or even more compelling are quotes from Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. 
Anthony’s co-editor and compatriot for women’s suffrage and the NWSA, who 
introduced Anthony to the struggle for women’s rights. As a mother of seven 
children, Stanton was a strong advocate for the value of motherhood and womanhood 
more generally, and spoke about the topic far more than Anthony. In a piece in The 
Revolution, Stanton makes a case for the relationship between women’s ability to 
work and earn to the quality of family life. She draws a direct connection between 
women’s economic precarity and unhappy marriages and abortion: “Let woman assert 
herself in all her native purity, dignity, and strength, and end this wholesale suffering 
and murder of helpless children” (Stanton, Jan 29, 1868). Later that year she used the 
platform of The Revolution to decry the rising number of abortions in rural Maine: 
“there were four hundred murders annually produced by abortion in that county 
alone....There must be a remedy for such a crying evil as this” (Stanton, March 12, 
1868).  
 
Notably, much of Stanton’s writings and legal recourse on the matter 
revolved around tales of infanticide, the killing of post-born babies; she historically 
fought against death penalties for women who killed their children to avoid the social 
and economic damnations inevitable for the woman and child alike. Her work was 
generally more concerned with notions of voluntary versus involuntary motherhood, 
and more specifically with eliminating the marital clause that enabled unfettered 
‘access’ to a man’s wife (marital rape), than it did with the political admonishment of 
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ante-natal infanticide, or “feticide” (Gordon, 1997; DuBois, 1992). That said, 
multiple passages exist that imply Stanton’s unease with the idea of abortions, and her 
celebration for womanhood and motherhood in general. 
 
 
“She will rue the day she forces nature” 
 
The most frequently cited argument for Anthony’s pro-life stance (MacNair, 
Derr & Naranjo-Huebl, 1995; Kennedy, 1997) is Stanton and Anthony’s refusal to 
print ads for patent medicines known to be “covert abortifacients” in their suffrage 
newspaper, The Revolution. The Revolution was considered the official newsletter 
for the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), providing a forum for 
debate as well as a platform for issue papers and statements from the likes of 
Anthony and Stanton.  
 
The weekly paper was created in 1868 and ran for three years before it was 
sold off after accruing $10,000 in debt, which Anthony paid off entirely from 
speaking fees in the following years. Notably, the reasons cited for the paper’s high 
cost of production were expensive equipment, higher than average pay for female 
employees, and a refusal to print ads for all alcohol and morphine-laden patent 
medicines (all of which she deemed immoral) — in addition to the aforementioned 
covert-abortifacients mentioned in pro-life feminists literature (The Revolution, 
1868-1872).  
 
This ‘covert-abortifacient’ reference is not the only argument for Anthony’s 
pro-life stance, however. Pro-life Feminists have cited numerous occasions where in 
excerpts from The Revolution, Anthony references the acts of “infanticide” or “ante-
natal feticide.” Members of the pro-life feminist movement occasionally cite a 
reference to abortion in Anthony’s journals, wherein Anthony’s sister-in-law takes an 
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above-mentioned abortifacient, after which Anthony notes on her appearance:  
“Sister Annie better — but looks very slim — she will rue the day she forces nature” 
(Gordon, 1997). The notion of “forcing nature” in particular helps to illustrate the 
issue of presentism.  
 
FFL-based book Prolife Feminism: Yesterday and Today (1995) cites an 
exchange between Anthony and a friend on her decision not to have children of her 
own, “but sweeter even [...] has it been to me to help bring about a better state of 
things for mothers generally, so that their unborn little ones could not be willed away 
from them.” The quote is followed by an essay published in The Revolution entitled 
“Marriage and Maternity,” an editorial in response to an earlier issue of the paper 
containing an excerpt calling for the banning of abortion altogether. The article 
speaks to abortion in similar terms as present day pro-life feminists, where making 
the act illegal “...seems to be only mowing off the top of the noxious weed, while the 
root remains. We want prevention, not merely punishment. We must reach the root of 
the evil, and destroy it” (p. 60, emphasis in text). This article, cited in Prolife 
Feminism as written by Anthony, has become a point of debate which perfectly 
captures the conflict of history and memory that this project wrestles with.  
 
“Marriage and Maternity” has been a crucial point of contention between 
contemporary pro-life and pro-choice feminists, as the original article was signed “-
A,” interpreted by the pro-life side to be Anthony’s initial. Some historians 
unaffiliated with the FFL have argued against this authorship, claiming that Anthony 
did not sign letters or editorials in this manner, or that the style of writing does not 
match Anthony’s other works. This debate has carried over into popular press 
editorials and opinion pieces in Time, Slate, and The Washington Post, to name just 
those with the widest circulations. Aside from the occasional investigative-journalism 
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research piece, these articles act as platforms for one side or the other to pitch their 
interpretation of Anthony’s stance on a partisan debate that had not yet come to be.23 
 
On the opposing side of that debate are most often Lynn Sherr, a feminist 
journalist who published Failure Is Impossible: Susan B. Anthony in Her Own 
Words (1995), and Rutgers historian Ann D. Gordon, who published the six-volume 
series Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. These 
scholars repeatedly argue against the textual instances that pro-life feminists claim as 
anti-abortion sentiments in works by Anthony and other feminist foremothers. Aside 
 
 
 
 
23 While scholarship on pro-life feminism has been minimal, mainstream press and 
internet publications have been engaging in this debate for over a decade: “No, 
Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton Were Not Antiabortionists” (Sherr 
and Gordon, 2015); “Setting the Record Straight on Susan B. Anthony;” “Like 
Sarah Palin, Early Feminists Were Pro-Life" (Dannenfelser, 2010); “Sarah Palin is 
No Susan B. Anthony” (Gordon and Sherr, 2010); “Susan B. Anthony would never 
have joined the Women’s March on Washington” (Crossed and Anthony, 2017); 
“Theme for March for Life 2020 Relies on Questionable Women's History, 
Incorrectly Claiming Early Feminist Leaders as Pro-Life" (Thomas, 2019); “The 
Battle Over Susan B. Anthony” (Graham, 2017); “Was Susan B. Anthony 'Pro-
Life?’” (Feeney, 2012); “What Would Susan B. Anthony Say?” (Schenwar, 2010); 
“The Suffragists Who Opposed Birth Control” (Khazan, 2019); “Susan B. 
Anthony, against abortion?” (Clark-Florey, 2006); “Susan B. Anthony’s Abortion 
Position Spurs Scuffle” (Stevens, 2006); “Desperately Seeking Susan” (Schiff, 
2006) 
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from a refutation of the methods and conclusions of the pro-life feminists, their claim 
is often one of historical neutrality: In a 2006 article on womensenews.org, the two 
are quoted: “I don’t know what her position on abortion is, and for [pro-life feminists] 
to pretend that they do is simply flat-out wrong” (Sherr); and “She never voiced an 
opinion about the sanctity of fetal life, and she never voiced an opinion about using 
the power of the state to require that pregnancies be brought to term” (Gordon). In a 
rebuttal in the same article, FFL author Mary Krane Derr and the FFL’s current 
president, Serrin Foster, make the case for Anthony’s anti-abortionist position as 
implicit in her publishing of The Revolution, which frequently hosted articles with an 
anti-abortion stance: "You know where people stand by how things are written in 
their publications. There is nothing good that is ever said about abortion" (Foster). 
 
 
Susan B. Anthony House 
 
This slew of media attention on the matter came in response to the 
controversial 2006 purchase of Susan B. Anthony’s birthplace in Adams, 
Massachusetts by pro-life feminist Carol Crossed. The purchase was made largely for 
the purpose of highlighting and curating a narrative about pro-life interpretations of 
Anthony’s history, and Crossed’s purchase of the house was urged on by FFL 
headquarters (“Susan B. Anthony Was Born Here”) The FFL’s former VP, Sally 
Winn, soon became the director of the Anthony house, continuing the pro-life 
feminist maintenance of the property. Crossed was a collector of suffragette ephemera 
and found the Anthony birthplace house (which was in need of TLC) an ideal project 
for her, already an owner of a federal-style house and familiar with the maintenance 
of such an estate. Presently, an entire wall of the museum-eque “legacy” room 
(originally the dining room) of the SBA house is dedicated to the notion of SBA’s 
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pro-life stance, with a quote spanning the length of the wall: “When the office of 
maternity shall be held sacred … then, and not till then, will this earth see a new 
order of men and women, prone to good rather evil.” 
 
The legacy room wall is one of two “Traveling Walls” available for lease by 
the museum, which “replicate historical photos and information on display in the 
Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum” with suggested uses for display at schools, 
libraries, events, town halls, and historical societies. “Winning the Vote! - The Susan 
B. Anthony Amendment” and “Opposing Restellism” are the two themes each wall 
presents, respectively — including quotes, photographs, and timelines that outline 
and support both themes. “Restellism” is the primary term that the birthplace museum 
employs to convey Susan B. Anthony’s pro-life stance. The term is derived from 
Madame Restell, a pseudonym for Ann Trow Lohman, who notoriously provided 
abortions in mid-19th century New York. Lohman was charged for the deaths of 
women who had died after having abortions, and played a considerable role in the 
eventual illegalization of abortion. The birthplace museum is here following suit with 
the pro-life feminist penchant for the term ‘Restellism’ over ‘abortion,’ utilizing 
historical language and lending further credence to their claims to and about Susan B. 
Anthony.  
 
Madame Restell’s legacy is another one claimed by pro-life feminist history; by 
emphasizing the term ‘Restellism,’ the group is highlighting only the criminalized 
portion of Lohman’s “career” as a “women’s physician.” Where Lohman typically 
worked within the legal confines of fetal termination (before the ‘quickening’) with the 
sale of her patent medicines and surgical and medicinal procedures, the changing moral 
authority of America enacted through Comstock laws of 1873, alongside the 
professionalization of medicine, had newly criminalized pre-quickening abortions— 
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whence “Restellism” became a synonym for abortion. Therefore, the birthplace 
museum’s repeated use of the term to describe Anthony’s stance on abortion equates a 
specific part of Lohman’s (and abortion’s) history with Susan B. Anthony’s place in 
history. 
 
Both birth and deathplace memorials collapse history into a plaque, a house, 
a bench, etc.; however, birthplace commemorations tend to carry more metaphorical 
weight, even today. They act as a virtual reality experience for the visitor, imbuing a 
sense of authority and authenticity to the story being told, beyond any museum 
exhibit’s capacity. The SBA birthplace museum aims to do just that. Although most 
of the original belongings had been sold or placed in various archives (or are 
displayed in the Rochester house), Carol Crossed and the curators of the birthplace 
museum continuously add “authentic period pieces” to recreate what they interpret to 
be a replication of Anthony’s birthplace and early childhood home (the Anthony 
family moved to New York when SBA was seven).  
 
The material stake in the claim for Anthony became a point of contention 
between her birthplace, and the official “Susan B. Anthony Museum & House” in 
Rochester, NY, which until 2006 was considered the only official “Susan B. Anthony 
House” in existence. The Rochester house is where Anthony lived most of her life and 
where she passed away in 1906. It is also where the headquarters of the National 
Woman’s Suffrage Association (NWSA) were located. The National Historic 
Landmark Museum has since then been forced to confront pro-life claims to 
Anthony’s life against the new Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum where Anthony 
was born. This blog excerpt from the official Susan B. Anthony Museum & House’s 
website, written by the museum’s CEO Deborah Hughes, is featured on the front page 
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with the title “We’re not THAT Susan B. Anthony” and reveals just how 
problematic these conflicting versions of history can be:    
 
Four years ago, a very angry father left a message on my voice 
mail.  He called me names I had never been called. For this pastor-
turned-museum-director, it was my first experience at being the object 
of vitriol from a complete stranger. His tone and language were evidence 
of deep rage, and he was certain that I was the appropriate target. After 
all, I was the director of the “Susan B. Anthony” House. 
 
This young father’s rancor was triggered by a phone call. It was 
the height of election season. His six year old daughter answered their 
home phone and was treated to a robo-call message that apparently 
described late-term abortion in graphic detail.  The child was confused 
and frightened by the “murder” she had heard described. Her father was 
shocked to hear what his daughter had been exposed on their home 
phone.  Appalled and enraged, he checked the caller ID, and it clearly 
stated “Susan B Anthony” had called.  He googled the name, and the 
Susan B. Anthony House popped up on his screen (we are proud to have 
earned that status).  He dialed the number and ended up in my voice mail 
box. And he let me have it. 
 
Fortunately, we were able to return his call and explain that we are 
not that Susan B. Anthony.  This Susan B. Anthony did not sponsor that 
robo-call.  This Susan B. Anthony did not endorse Rick Santorum for 
president (but we did have several people call us to cancel their support of 
our organization when they heard the announcement and one who told us 
Santorum was not conservative enough for their 
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taste). This Susan B. Anthony has not promised $10 million to the Mitt 
Romney campaign (but the calls and emails we received today about that 
announcement triggered this blog post). 
 
In fact, the Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum was ultimately uninvolved in the 
robocall, though Hughes claims earlier in the article that a number of other 
Anthony museums are confused with the official one. With no overt correlation to 
the Birthplace Museum, the Susan B. Anthony List subscribes to the same line of 
historical logic in their representation of Anthony as a champion for pro-life 
philosophies.  
 
 
Commemoration through Institutions 
 
Popular memory persists through the birthplace museum, but the legislative 
impact of the Susan B. Anthony List (SBA List) is material and often long-lasting. 
Rachel MacNair founded the SBA List in 1992 as a pro-life feminist response to the 
success of EMILY’s List. MacNair, a progressive, vegan Quaker, began the group as 
proudly bipartisan, donating “several thousand dollars” to campaigns for pro-life women 
running for office on both sides of the aisle. The name and affiliation with Anthony was 
her idea, inspired after watching an episode of “60 Minutes” focused on EMILY’s List: 
“I’m sittin there goin ‘Oh we need a pro-life version of that.’ And I contemplated, and I 
soaked in a hot bathtub and I just thought...Susan B. Anthony List 
— that’s it” (Interview with MacNair, 2018). In fact, it appears as though MacNair 
 
may be the catalyst for Susan B. Anthony’s affiliation with pro-life politics. The 
association with feminist foremothers arose with MacNair’s uptaking of the presidency 
of the Feminists for Life of America (FFL) in 1984, and the subsequent publication of 
the group’s periodical, “The American Feminist,” along with the first 
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published collection of pro-life feminist essays entitled Prolife Feminism: Yesterday 
and Today (Derr, Naranjo-Huebl and MacNair, 1995). Prior to these instances, 
neither Anthony nor the other suffragettes appear to have been invoked by pro-life 
groups, progressive or otherwise.   
 
MacNair has since publicly admonished the Susan B. Anthony List, citing her 
embarrassment for having tied Anthony’s name to a group that became explicitly 
conservative. The list’s goals shifted dramatically after MacNair’s departure in the 
mid-nineties — the list wanted to move to D.C. to grow more influence in the capital, 
while MacNair preferred to stay in her hometown of Kansas City. After the move, the 
group decided to start sponsoring male pro-life candidates for the first time, which 
ultimately solidified the conservative shift (Sheppard, 2012). In an interview, 
MacNair expressed embarrassment for her role in creating the SBA List and her 
historical affiliation with it: “They were supporting men who were running against 
pro-abortion women, ...it was just one long embarrassment after another.” The SBA 
list has only since grown and its PAC has spent more money on political campaigns in 
the last twenty years than the National Organization for Women’s (NOW) PAC has in 
every election cycle (Poulson, 2009).  
 
Subsequently, the SBA List is a major actor in the US Legislative lobbying 
arena - pouring millions into the 2016 election cycle through direct donation to pro-
life candidates and their affiliated Super PACs and institutes (Susan B. Anthony List 
- Summary). They are also frequent contributors of amicus briefs to U.S. Supreme 
Court cases regarding abortion restrictions. Their current project, “Comprehensive 
Campaign to Re-elect President Trump and Safeguard Pro-life Majority” is a main 
focus for their 2020 agenda, which is now budgeted at $52 million. For MacNair, the 
SBA List’s ardent support for the Trump administration and more specifically its 
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immigration policies toward families with children at the southern border, is 
inexcusable and incommensurable with the original group’s mission: “it was stated 
on PBS Newshour that the Susan B. Anthony List was taking no position on the 
family separation issue at the border...okay, so it’s not a feminist organization then. 
It’s simply not, it is a single-issue group and it has no business using the name of 
Susan B. Anthony. Because Susan B. Anthony would have been all over this issue” 
(Interview with MacNair, 2018). In return, the SBA List has scrubbed any mention of 
MacNair from their website (Whitehead, 2011). The list’s leader since MacNair’s 
departure, Marjorie Dannenfelser, re-wrote the history of the list’s origins, stating in a 
2010 promotional video:  
 
The Susan B. Anthony list was started when I and a group of other pro-life 
women on Capitol Hill noticed in 1992 that the media had dubbed that year 
‘the year of the woman,’ and we were left out. We were not being 
represented at all. So, a diverse group of women, different faiths, different 
political persuasions, all came together and decided it’s time to put that to an 
end (Dannenfelser, 2010). 
 
The perversion of MacNair’s vision for the SBA List is not unlike the 
accusations from the pro-choice community of the pro-life feminist appropriations of 
suffragette history. Repeatedly through pro-life political history (as in all political 
organizations’ histories, presumably), the contemporary memory of abortion politics 
is black-boxed, creating the illusion of a consistent moral philosophy driving the pro-
life or pro-choice movements. As we have seen, politicians and political groups once 
in favor of abortion rights (Nixon, Reagan, the GOP) frequently shift positions for 
political expediency — weighing the overall impact of an election against wavering 
beliefs on personal politics. The same goes for motivations of allegedly pro-woman 
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groups like the Susan B. Anthony List, who ultimately chose political power over 
philosophical consistency. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Why, then, the need to construct Anthony as a pro-life champion? Could it be 
attributable to the role of fellow feminist, peace activist and Quaker Rachel 
MacNair’s role in promoting the association of SBA’s legacy with pro-life 
philosophies? The emphasis on Anthony is no doubt due in part to her name 
recognition as one of the founders of the suffrage movement, both to feminists of all 
varieties as well as to the broader public. With early claims to Anthony’s abortion 
beliefs come other positive associations rooted in civil rights success and progressive 
social movements, both of which are paramount to the present-day claims to pro-life 
feminism. Anthony began her activism in the abolition movement, developing a close 
confidant in Frederick Douglass (though later fighting against the 14th amendment 
because it preceded the vote for women). 
 
Thomas (2019) believes the attraction to SBA by the pro-life feminists is two-
fold. On one hand, many people do not know the particulars of the history of feminism, 
and particularly the issue of abortion. First-wave feminism is therefore an easy history to 
challenge or outright appropriate. On the other hand, she argues that the fascination with 
(re)writing feminist foremothers as pro-life “bolster[s] the claim that abortion is not in 
the best interests of women.” This second point is reinforced by a majority of the 
contemporary pro-life feminist argument against abortion, as prominently displayed on 
promotional material for the Feminists for Life of America: “Women deserve better than 
abortion: Abortion is a reflection that we have not met the needs of women.” Some of 
the most compelling arguments made by popular pro- 
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life feminist group, the New Wave Feminists, are concerned with the idea that 
abortion bypasses the needs of society to accommodate the female condition — that it 
acts as a band-aid of sorts on the other social ills that befall women, such as the lack 
of affordable childcare.  
 
Thomas’s point shines a light on another possibility for SBA’s uptake in the 
pro-life feminist community. Anthony, as a founding member of the NWSA as an 
original suffragette, as well as one of the most prominent “voices” in first-wave 
feminism, represents an authentic feminist ideals. Much like hardline US 
constitutionalists, or Old Testament devotees, this preoccupation with origin assumes 
that there is a presumed purity and subsequent exactness to the “true” feminist 
project. Foucault, in discussing Nietzche (1980) critiques faith in the origin as “the 
moment of their greatest perfections, when they emerged dazzling from the hands of 
a creator or in the shadowless light of a first morning” (p. 79). Anthony’s position in 
history, alongside her infallible character, sets her and her legacy up as the “divine 
birth” of feminism — a prophet of sorts whose dedication to the pursuit of women’s 
rights is made apparent by her stern image and the absence of any distraction in the 
earthly pleasures of love or family. Any purity of character and identity in the 
idealized memory of women’s suffrage was always already built into the memory of 
Susan B. Anthony, while her position on abortion remained up for grabs. This makes 
her an excellent vessel for a stake in the origin of feminism by the pro-life feminist 
community. 
 
As such, her legacy has provided numerous channels for pro-life feminists to 
claim, produce and maintain Anthony as a pro-life icon, not only within their own ranks, 
but to the broader public through institutional reach. The commemorative nature of the 
Susan B. Anthony List, arguably the most active public representation of 
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Anthony in current popular culture, collapses the complexities of the feminist figure’s 
political stances into a single-issue purpose. It not only creates a simplistic caricature 
of Anthony by associating her image’s profile with the group, it uses the legitimacy 
of a pro-woman stance to push for and fund anti-abortion legislation. Meanwhile, The 
Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum creates an embodied simulacrum of Anthony’s 
developmental years, producing an experiential conveyance of her “origin” story — 
one that paints her as philosophically pro-life from the start. Finally, the continued 
discursive push in participatory politics, through marches, op-eds, and demonstrations 
suspends Anthony’s otherwise undocumented position on abortion as a site of 
struggle over the meaning of what it truly means to be a feminist.  
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IV: CHAPTER THREE: THE DIGITAL LIFE OF PRO-LIFE 
FEMINISM 
 
 
 
 
 
“I consider myself a feminist. But #believeallwomen? 
 
Yeah that's gonna be a hard no from me. You know why? As a woman, I know women. 
Sadly, some of the most vindictive, manipulative, dishonest humans that I've met are 
women. 
 
There's a reason why we have BOTH heads & hearts. Let's use both!!” 
 
 
 
 
On September 19, 2020, New Wave Feminists founder, Destiny Herndon-De La 
Rosa, published an op-ed on DallasNews.com, and then shared the post with her NWF 
Facebook Page in hopes of encouraging discussion on the topic of now conservative 
Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s congressional judiciary hearing regarding the 
sexual assault allegations of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford. The piece was relatively non-
controversial and ultimately concluded that women should not be believed 
unconditionally about any sexual assault allegation. The Facebook post garnered 320 
comments from followers of the NWF page and 52 shares, which presumably spurred 
countless other comment threads on the topic. The above quote is just one of the middling 
responses to the article from one of the pro-life feminists who participate on the 
Facebook page. While not all comments were as problematic as the one above, the vast 
majority were affirmative, echoing the centrist tone of the piece. 
 
Reactions to this story in particular illustrate the narrow line pro-life feminists 
must walk — an otherwise fairly radical group like the NWF and Herndon-De La 
Rosa, when faced with a very public challenge to an already counterintuitive notion 
like pro-life feminism, are able to quickly and broadly spread ideological messaging 
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through the affirmational networks in their digital community. Pro-life feminists were 
presented with a complex issue with this case; on the one hand, the confirmation of Brett 
Kavanaugh was sure to further pro-life agendas at the federal judicial level. On the other 
hand, Blasey-Ford’s testimony about being sexually assaulted by Kavanaugh in their teen 
years was compelling as a feminist issue to tackle — both in the need to prevent assault 
against women and in the case of believing women who come forward about it. 
Responses like the above underscore a misogyny inherent in much pro-life rhetoric, 
wherein anti-woman sentiment is easily resorted-to in defense of the unborn child. 
Complicated rhetorical issues like this often force groups on the border 
 
to “show their hand” when it comes to prioritizing one aspect of a group’s identity 
over another, and in this instance, pro-lifeism publicly trumped feminist ideologies. 
 
Like the complicated case of pro-life feminist exclusion from the Women’s 
March on Washington, NWF’s reaction to this moment when feminism and a pro-
life stance were pitted against each other in the figure of Kavanaugh can help 
illustrate processes of group identity formation. These are the moments during which 
ideological boundaries are drawn for social movements and groups. Especially in 
developing and growing movements, such as pro-life feminism, these boundaries 
serve multiple purposes such as creating an out-group from which the in-group can 
identify against. The capacity for identity cultivation and reinforcement, along with a 
number of other qualifiers, are constituent of theorized digital communities and the 
networked counterpublics they may become. In this chapter, I analyze the nature of 
the digital life of pro-life feminists by casting a wide net around three different 
sites/platforms that represent a broad participatory definition of the group. 
 
 
Review of Literature 
 
 
 
104 
Digital Communities and Networked Counterpublics 
 
The concept of community has only been an object of scholarly inquiry since 
the early 20th century. Hillery (1955) famously developed 94 definitions of what a 
community could be, while numerous scholars in the 1970s sought to define 
community in new ways. However, the presupposition of a physically shared 
location remained central to all of these theoretical positions. 
 
It wasn’t until the 1980s that theorists began to think critically about 
community. Williams (1983) viewed community as an elastic construct that changes 
and accounts for shifting boundaries and definitions. Cohen (1985) encouraged 
scholars to interrogate communities from a symbolic perspective in which the 
meaning of a community should override research interests looking to dissect the 
structure of a given grouping. The first scholarship on cyber communities is indebted 
to these formulations (Fernback, 1998). 
 
With the move from structural-functional to virtual, discourse on cyber 
communities became more commonplace, especially with the rise of networked 
personal computers in U.S. households. The emergence of theories on cyber 
communities grew parallel to research on social networks, though at the time this 
area focused largely on correlative relationships between digital social networks and 
physical social organizations and less on the discrete nature of online social 
networking (Garton, Haythornthwaite, & Wellman, 1997). 
 
Rheingold’s The Virtual Community (1993) is a seminal work in the 
development of cyber community discourse. In it he discusses the implications of virtual 
worlds to physical worlds and lays down a definition for virtual communities as “social 
aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public 
discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of 
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personal relationships in cyberspace” (p. 5). While the work of scholars such as 
Rheingold remains foundational to the discussion on online communities, most 
theoretical work (including that of Rheingold’s) on virtual communities was still 
bound by the rhetorical parameters used when talking about physical 
communities (Fernback, 1998). 
 
With the emergence of popularized usage of social networking and social 
media, social scientists and theorists began to ask questions about what sort of 
communities were being established and whether these communities fit into extant 
definitions. A number of scholars turned to Anderson (1983) for guidance in 
understanding these virtual communities (Brabazon, 2001). Anderson’s imagined 
communities in this sense refers to perceptions of nationhood by self-included citizens 
who do not have personal contact or knowledge of other members of the group. The 
term has also been used to account for nationalist sentiments among diasporic groups, 
as well as to refer to social groupings by interests or community of interests (Henri & 
Pudelko, 2007). 
 
Some virtual community scholars have adopted Anderson’s notion by 
emphasizing both the constitution and effect of an imagined community on identity 
(Paech, 2012). In this sense, “communities are dependent upon the instability and 
dynamic nature of identity” (p. 101), where the maintenance of a community relies on 
the projection of symbols of belonging by its members, and the identities of those 
members are simultaneously constructed through the interpellative process of that 
belonging. Murthy (2012) engages the German concept bildung to apply the notion of 
a construction of self to the act of regular identity projection through microblogging. 
He asserts that, not unlike the dual constitution of Anderson’s identity and 
community, the utility of social media relies upon frequent updating by its users, 
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while those users are simultaneously “inventing the self” through those updates (p. 
 
1062). 
 
McMillan and Chavis’s (1986) development of the definition of a “sense of 
community” (SoC) operationalizes feelings of belonging to a group, McMillan and 
Chavis defined four required categories of experience for a user to feel a sense of 
community: (1) “the right to belong,” membership (p. 9); (2) the potential for influence; 
(3) reinforcement of behavior through communal support, or integration and fulfillment 
of needs; and (4) shared emotional connection. Gruzd, Wellman, and Takhteyev (2011) 
combined the theory of SoC with Anderson’s imagined communities and added Jones’s 
(1997) virtual settlement to the mix to discern whether Twitter can facilitate an imagined 
community. Jones theorized that a “virtual settlement” is prerequisite to an online 
community, and like McMillan and Chavis, compiled four conditions of one: (1) 
interactivity; (2) more than two communicators; 
 
(3) common-public-place; and (4) sustained membership over time. By testing one of 
the authors’ social networks on Twitter, they concluded that Twitter meets all 8 
criteria of a virtual settlement possessing a sense of community. They also note the 
similarities of Twitter to Anderson’s imagined community: the presence of a common 
language (folksonomy) and linguistic conventions (hashtags, @, via, RT, etc.), as 
well as a “homogenous time,” where Twitter facilitates a “continued imagined 
consciousness” through contemporaneous activity that exists in a certain window of 
temporal relevance (p. 1303). This project points to the multitude of communities 
(and definitions thereof) observable in the digital realm, and the authors concluded 
that Twitter in particular acts as a double community – collective and personal. 
 
The literature on communities and their move to the internet is fairly limited, 
but perhaps can be considered under a broader terminology, where Habermas’s Public 
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Sphere is taken up (almost entirely from a critical perspective) as a potentially 
persistent gathering place for groups with shared interests. In his seminal work, The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), Habermas discusses the 
emergence of the public sphere as it relates to power, technology, and the state. 
According to Habermas, the liberal public sphere emerged as a result of a number 
of factors which, taken together, led to the public as an apparatus where individual 
citizens conferred on subjects of public/greater interest in an unrestricted fashion. 
 
In Habermas’s conception, the public sphere would be an equalizing field, where 
rank and class were “bracketed” upon entrance, and all voices were considered equal. 
The public body required transparent access to government documentation (which 
was a technological possibility for the first time) in order to check the power of the 
governing bodies which were thought to take cues and issues of state concern from 
the deliberations of said public. The public sphere was to be a discursive battleground 
upon which issues were fought over through liberal political papers as an open, 
democratic ideal. It is this incremental discursive articulation where matters of public 
interest would theoretically have the opportunity to be brought to head within the 
dialogic public. 
 
Contrary to this position, a number of critical scholars have taken aim at 
Habermas’s theories. Nancy Fraser (1990) takes issue with a number of the above 
distinctions of the bourgeois public sphere: the bracketing of class and rank, for 
example, first only includes propertied white men, and secondly is idealistic and 
impossible considering the sorts of cultural capital necessary (education, carriage, 
access) to participate in the public sphere. Aside from these specific critiques, Fraser’s 
major conflict with Habermas’s model is the assumption of the mono-public as the only 
democratic deliberative model. For Fraser there are now and have always 
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been a multitude of publics where different sorts of issues and different sorts of 
demographics group together — communities, of a sort. Explaining the need for multiple 
publics, or “subaltern counterpublics,” Fraser brings up the issue of domestic abuse as 
one that was once relegated to the private realm and therefore not considered an issue of 
the greater public’s interest. She asserts that a concerned counterpublic maintained a 
“discursive interaction” with the larger public on this issue, finally bringing it out of 
private homes and private institutions, and into the space of the judicial. The notion of 
counterpublics has since been invoked in countless projects as a way to talk about the 
political efficacy of “issue publics” like social movements, counterculture, and, often in 
the same breath, communities (Dahlgren, 2013). 
With the emergence of web 2.0, Habermas’s work became an obvious 
 
framework for media scholars to examine the democratic and social nature of the 
 
internet (Benkler, 2006; Dean, 2003; Castells, 2004). One of the most cited concepts 
 
in this regard is dana boyds’s (2010) “networked publics,” which takes up the general 
 
concepts of the liberal public sphere as reimagined by Michael Warner (i.e. an 
 
imagined public produced around a media object), but argues that the affordances that 
 
the digital platform provides produce a qualitatively new type of public. These 
 
affordances, made possible by the unique-to-digital “bits” of information, are 
 
comprised of (1)“Persistence: online expressions are automatically recorded and 
 
archived;” (2) “Replicability: content made out of bits can be duplicated;” (3) 
 
“Scalability: the potential visibility of content in networked publics is great;” and (4) 
 
“Searchability: content in the networked publics can be accessed through search” 
 
(boyd, 2010, emphasis hers). 
 
Though almost never explicitly, networked counterpublics in particular are 
frequently discussed through the language of communities, where the important 
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conditions for building and sustaining a community, such as the aforementioned 
membership, interactivity, shared public place (etc.) are essential to the existence of 
a public. boyd’s definition of a networked public as “the imagined collective that 
emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, and practice” (p. 1) 
mapped onto to Gruzd, Wellman, and Takhteyev’s (2011) model provides a strong 
base for theorizing on the digital community. Taking this progression to its logical 
next step, Renninger (2014) applies the notion of a counterpublic (Fraser, 1990, 
Warner, 2002) to boyd’s networked public to analyze a networked counterpublic of 
those who identify as asexual. He argues that networked counterpublics can act as a 
space to “work out ideas related to identity, community, and relationships, and an 
opportunity to develop tactics to assert or adapt identities to configure oneself” (p. 
1516, emphasis his). Renninger’s study on networked counterpublics provides an 
excellent fulcrum between the otherwise disparate conversations on publics and 
communities. This chapter aims to bridge this gap further, and in doing so build a 
framework through which to understand counterpublics online that also act as 
identity-strengthening communities and “safe spaces.” 
 
 
Safe Spaces 
 
Another online arena that gets entangled in the definitions of community and 
counterpublics is the “safe space.” Safe spaces online were initially considered such 
for the anonymity they provided — communities of strangers using avatars and 
screennames could go unnoticed by the real world as well as the rest of the internet by 
participating in a “separatist model of counterpublic communication, or an issue-
focused anonymous group” (Renninger, 2014). Where safe spaces of the past (both 
material and virtual) involved isolationist efforts of active concealment (Polletta, 
 
110 
 
1999), the new safe space persists in broad daylight, so to speak. What is “unsafe” 
online, in this sense of the word, is the silencing or harassing effects of antagonists 
(often referred to as trolls - see Phillips, 2010). In the case of the sites in this study, 
their lack of popularity in the global online community effectively protects their 
space from unwanted attention. 
 
The new safe space is that which is in essence too marginal to pay mind to, 
and therein garner the potentially negative attention of trolls or antagonists. These 
safe spaces then can create an echo chamber of sorts within which group norms, 
ideas, and opinions can “thicken.” Occasionally referred to in the same breath as a 
‘third space,’ or a space in the border or margins of dominant discursive spheres, 
scholars assert a number of affordances these spaces provide for not just the 
cultivation of social movements through “sites of resistance” (Pennington, 2018), 
but for the production of community and identity for its users. 
 
Some have written that a safe community provided through the affordances of the 
web can be a place to communicate personal narratives, build a shared community 
history, and more or less “be heard” when the mainstream world is less attentive of 
marginalized groups’ experiences. In her analysis of Black communities online, Love 
(2019) argues that online spaces allow for “Black women and girls to (re) generate their 
ideas of intellectual community work of Black women and girls, and also define what 
activism, education, and excellence mean for Black communities” (p. 59). Similarly, 
Echchaibi (2013) addresses the Muslim feminist blogosphere as one not preoccupied 
with the task of subverting the meta narratives on women and gender in Islam, but 
instead focuses on the effect of small communities online where Muslim women “assert 
their public visibility and engage in a critical interpretation and performance of their 
religious identities” (p. 853). He asserts, instead, that pockets of 
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online communities of Muslim feminists open up critical spaces that can slowly 
challenge and shift mental categorization, a process Echchaibi refers to as ‘cultural 
thickening.’ 
 
These shared discursive spaces (Keller, 2016) then not only carve out a space 
for historically underrepresented identity groups, but allow for those communities to 
develop their own lexical rules, group memory, as well as many other theoretical 
requisites for “communities” online. Clark-Parsons (2018) addresses the “discursive 
boundary-making” of safe spaces on-line and in doing so constructs an analytic with 
which to think through the three dimensions of community boundary-making in an 
online context: “(1) what and whom the group provides safety from, (2) who the group 
provides safety for, and (3) what the group provides the safety to do” (p. 2133, emphasis 
in text). Within this framework, we can apply a broad heuristic to online communities 
which enjoy the privacy afforded by small grassroots organizations. Clark-Parson’s 
analytic underscores the communitarian nature of subaltern counterpublics as both a 
place for a group identity’s incubation and cultivation, as well as a standpoint from 
which to define a social movement. 
 
The following study assumes the community-cultivating affordances of the safe 
space online, while considering the safety and political capacity of three online spaces 
where pro-life feminists congregate on the web. Digital communities that are also safe 
spaces act as a foundational structure from which members can develop group identities, 
shared discursive boundaries, and ultimately produce an issue public (much like those 
Fraser speaks of having impacted social norms and institutions). By collecting data 
about three different sites used by pro-life feminists, I then apply various qualifications 
described above to discern the “community-ness” of the sites, including their status as a 
safe space. Through analyzing these sites, I then conclude 
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that, together, these sites do act as a networked counterpublic, but individually 
are found wanting in areas of either safety or community-ness.24 
 
 
Method 
 
Research has had to respond to the rapid evolution of social media platforms 
and technologies. There of course exists a tired debate around approaching digital 
media as something qualitatively new vs. another exponential step in the lineage of 
Media writ large. That said, most developers of digital research methods as well as 
digital humanities practitioners are increasingly developing adaptive methods for 
observing, recording, and analyzing interactive media in particular. Rogers (2013) 
summarizes the multitude of recent methodological assertions made by media 
theorists in his discussion on “media specificity,” and it becomes clear from his 
“follow the medium” conclusion that we are not to determine fixed qualitative (or 
even quantitative) methods for researching the web anytime soon. Instead, scholars 
have proposed adaptive and cumulative approaches to studying a decidedly new 
type of media content. 
 
For instance, in human geography studies, similar complications arise in 
attempting to read behavior, movement, and performative content on social media sites. 
In response to the ‘digital turn’ in the field, Leszczynski (2018) invokes triangulation as 
a substantiation of multi-method use in qualitative research methods 
 
 
 
 
24 It should also be noted that the conditions necessary to maintain a safe space might 
inadvertently break down the very components that lead to, which begs the question 
of ontological or political relevance to one benefit over the other. 
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in particular. Roughly defined as “the use of multiple methods [in] an attempt to 
secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question,” triangulation 
carries with it a litany of critiques and remediations over the last half-century, as can 
be surmised by the temporal span of Denzin’s citations (Denzin, 1970, 2012). That 
said, the general concept of adaptive and medium-specific methodology is useful in 
studying data comprised of “by-products of mundane digital praxes enacted with 
and through engagements with digital platforms” (Leszczynski, p. 476). 
 
While considerable research exists on digital communities and/or digital 
counterpublics online, it typically focuses-in on one group on one platform, leading 
to ‘medium-specificity’ methodology that either already exists (ex. Twitter hashtag 
community evaluation described above), or at least approaches that can be built upon 
to serve specific hermeneutical needs. Goggins and Pedakovic (2014) address the 
need for standardized metrics of research across multiple online platforms (Twitter, 
Facebook, and Github) using Big Social Data (BSD), but the topic of qualitative 
cross-platform research remains uninvestigated. Additionally, neither 
methodologically nor conceptually are digital communities thought of as cross-
platform entities, though logic tells us that they often will be. This is very likely due 
to the complication of muddling up methodology from platform to platform, and 
triangulating approaches to digital (and any qualitative) research is already difficult 
enough to reckon with. Applying a multi-modal approach to analyzing digital 
communities, which in and of themselves are definitional composites, then 
exponentially multiplies the challenge of that reckoning. 
 
With this in mind, I found it necessary to develop a tailored approach to 
qualitative research on digital communities across multiple platforms. This gives me 
a reproducible format for this particular branch of research, which is then easily 
 
114 
 
adaptable to different communities, who are inevitably using different social media 
platforms and often in different ways. To this end, I take a systematic and heuristic 
approach to exploring each site (and in this case, platform), asking of each the very 
same questions, and then organizing the answers (along with the questions) along a 
few thematic lines.25 
 
This approach was developed at roughly the same time as Light et. al’s (2016) 
iteration of the “walkthrough method,” a singular methodical approach to analyzing 
software applications (apps) that is theoretically couched in a combination of science 
and technologies studies (STS) and cultural studies’ sensibilities, “establishing an 
app’s environment of expected use by identifying and describing its vision, operating 
model and modes of governance. It then deploys a walkthrough technique to 
systematically and forensically step through the various stages of app [usage]” (p. 
881). The two methods are considerably different: Cross-Platform Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CPCDA) involves a sort of backwards approach, where empirical (and 
some interpretive) data are collected and then thematically organized. There is a 
nominal query of governance, mission, and operating model, where all elements are 
treated as equally-informative data points to review in later analysis. The walkthrough 
method, by contrast, discursively analyzes an app’s mission and functionality in order 
 
 
 
 
 
25 Some of these questions are obviously imperfect inquiries when applied to certain 
platforms, for example, asking if a Twitter thread has content for sale or freely available. 
While this seems at the outset as a waste of time, I have found that difficulty in answering 
certain questions on one platform or another is quite elucidating in thinking through the 
affordances and limitations of a given site’s structure and design. 
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to compare an app’s intended usage to its actual usage then physically tested by the 
researcher. 
 
That said, they are similar in a number of methodological logics. Both 
understand that the governance (mediation, in CPCDA) of a site or app greatly 
impacts both the functionality and user behavior. They both consider the mission and 
funding of a site or app as relevant to its creation and persistence; and they both 
underscore the concession of platform studies in general — that the “physical” 
allowances of a site or app not only confine, but direct its users’ behaviors and uses. 
The similarities in methods point to an obvious need in digital research to ground 
qualitative media analysis — both methods are attempts to smooth over a 
methodological incommensurability of applying the same mode of analysis to vastly 
variant platforms. “Where generalizability is about scaling up, transferability is about 
moving between—tracing connections between field sites rather than generalizing or 
making universal claims.” (Lingel, 2017) 
 
 
Process 
 
I begin my analysis by comprising a list of approximately 25 questions 
regarding the content, political economy, interconnectivity, and demographic uses of 
the space. Following data collection, I then organize my findings into non-discrete 
categories. These frequently include (but are not limited to) political economy, 
infrastructure, content, interactivity, users, and social media. The questions are 
intentionally left out of the categorization process for a few reasons: First, building the 
questions around the categories leads the inquiry to fit into a pre-existing model, which 
is expressly the antithesis of the exploratory CPCDA approach. Second, variable sites 
require variable categories; a rigidity in questions and end categories 
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does not fit the aim of flexibility and adaptivity needed in digital research. Finally, 
though many questions seem to have an obvious categorical leaning, for instance, 
“is anything for sale?” appears to inarguably fit into a political economy category, 
the inquiry can direct the researcher to a “merch” page that is shared with another 
seemingly unrelated group (as you will see in the coming analysis) or structural 
affordance that may contribute important information to a different category, such 
as content, or users if it directs the researcher to a different site altogether. 
 
Infrastructure and Political Economy as a section looks at the layout, 
presentation and functionality of each site from a structural standpoint. This category 
in particular resembles Light et al’s walkthrough approach in its assumption of 
ignorance to a platform. By that I mean that the researcher, who is presumably 
internet-fluent, needs to de-familiarize themselves with the intuitive functions of a 
platform. In making the object strange, this section of inquiry reveals affordances and 
restrictions of a given site. Are there multiple avenues leading to “Donate” pages? 
Are comment threads highly visible and compelling to engage with? These types of 
questions help to understand the foundation on which online communities have a 
capacity to operate. They fall within an epistemology of networks, Massanari (2015) 
defines it succinctly as “‘platform politics’ to mean the assemblage of design, 
policies, and norms that encourage certain kinds of cultures and behaviors to coalesce 
on platforms while implicitly discouraging others” (p. 336). With these affordances in 
mind, this section serves doubly to describe the political economic interests of the 
site. This data includes funding and advertising information, whether the affiliated 
organization has 501c(3) status, as well as any relevant financial information that can 
be gleaned from the analysis. In exploring these two arenas together, we can view 
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digital communities as more or less grassroots, more or less encouraged, and 
therein more or less politically salient. 
 
This study additionally led to a content category, which is primarily concerned 
with the general use of the site. It pertains to the type of content that is produced – 
what is it, and who produces it? Understanding whether or not a site contains mostly 
user-generated content contributes to assumptions about the “community” nature of 
the various sites. Some sites contain only user-generated content, such as tweets in a 
hashtag thread, while other sites produce cohesive and curated material for entirely 
different purposes. This category and those to follow are inevitably influenced, and 
sometimes dictated by the first category. The content category is useful for discerning 
the elements that do or do not qualify the site as a virtual community. When users can 
create their own content, or comment on content they did not create, a sense of 
belonging and reciprocation of that sense is possible. User-created content can also be 
conceptualized as a “reflexive circulation of discourse” central to producing and 
sustaining a public (Lindtner et al, 2011). Reflexive acknowledgement of in-group 
status is tantamount to developing a group identity. 
 
The users and interactivity section further develops the line of inquiry from the 
content section. Using data obtained from various analytics utilities, I use this section 
to report the demographic information of who is using these sites, and the potential 
affordances for interactivity therein. This not only includes numerical data about usage 
and popularity, but also the qualitative intention of each space. Determining who is 
using the site, and how they are allowed to use it provides a glimpse not only into a 
digital community’s makeup and size, but also the outcomes of those “platform 
politics” revealed earlier. Some sites provide this information readily, such as the 
number of “likes” on a Facebook page. However, some 
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demographic information requires third-party software like Alexa.com. One can pull 
demographic data through the Twitter API, but only for the previous 7-30 days 
depending on your level of access. Because this analysis is of a hashtag thread more 
than a year ago, a paid developer account is required to retrieve the information that 
Twitter has stored regardless. Interactivity refers to a site’s capacity to cultivate social 
interaction, as well as the type and volume of those interactions on a given platform. 
For Facebook, this looks like comments, posts, and “reactions,” a Facebook specific 
set of emotive responses beyond a simple “like” button. For Twitter, this includes 
retweets and replies in particular. Again, according to the models used by Gruzd, 
Wellman, and Takhteyev (2011) defined above, interactivity and acknowledgement 
of membership are key factors in determining candidates for a community. 
 
Finally, the social media and public messaging section of my analysis looks 
firstly at the nature of interconnectedness through social media in each site, as well 
as the prominent uses and effectiveness of those uses of various social media 
platforms. Questions asked within this section include those about interlinking social 
media platforms, other media sites that are linked, and any real-world organizations 
that the sites might associate with. While not all sites examined with CPCDA can be 
considered social media sites or even “web 2.0” (an internet that allows users to 
actively produce their own content and engage in socialization with others in real 
time), their use of social media interconnectivity defines their role in the network of a 
community online. The aim of this section of inquiry is to both construct a perceived 
network as well as observe the new type of community formation (and the qualitative 
implications therein) that emerges with the use of social media. 
 
Similarly, this section pertains to outward-facing definitions on the sites. Public 
messaging refers to the type of content that is not necessarily intended to foster 
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community building, but instead is used as either a recruitment tactic, an 
organizational norm, like a mission statement, or messaging intended explicitly for 
public relations. While not directly related to the aforementioned qualifications of a 
networked digital community, a description of a site’s outward messaging provides 
important information about group identity and purpose. Was this site intended to be a 
node in a networked community? What are its stated core values? Is it trying to recruit 
or proselytize for political aims, or is it a spontaneous collecting of like-minded 
individuals creating a shared discursive space? These sorts of questions, along with 
inquiry on social media, coalesce to inform on the intentionality of a site and that 
intentionality’s relationship to community status or even social movement tactics. 
 
 
Sites 
 
In an ideal study, Twitter threads would be captured in real time, or within a 
few days, as tweets can be deleted or made private after the fact, and employing 
Twitter’s API to pull tweet data can be costly. Capturing a community moment in 
all its ephemerality and spontaneity, however, is a guess at best, and often the 
assumption of a community conversation will lead to a scattered and diluted 
collection of tweets by in and out-group members, or the topic will comprised 
primarily of bots and hashtag spider bait (which means: always be collecting!). That 
said, for this study I am accessing an older thread using date-to-date parameters and 
multiple hashtag inquiries. 
 
I chose to follow the pro-life feminist community on Twitter surrounding 
the 2017 Women’s March on Washington, analyzed in great detail in Chapter Two. 
The Women’s March on Washington was organized as a show of female solidarity 
and protest against the inauguration of Donald Trump. Early in the planning process 
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between November and January, popular pro-life feminist group, New Wave 
Feminists (NWF), joined the call for march organizers, and were later removed after 
a public backlash both on social media sites and popular press covering the subject. 
According to the group’s leader and founder, Destiny Herndon-De La Rosa, their 
Facebook group, discussed below, began small until “everything happened with the 
women’s march and we doubled in size and went up to like 42,000.” 
 
My second and related site is the New Wave Feminists’ Facebook Page. 
Facebook “Groups” and “Pages” are home to some of the most obvious visible 
community markers. With spaces and opportunities to contribute, tag one another, 
and discuss on various “posts,” which act as threads of their own sort, Facebook 
Groups in particular outlines an ideal model for online community participation. 
Groups contain individuals with self-identifying profiles voluntarily opting into a 
community of presumably like-minded people. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Facebook 
Group infrastructure does not encourage bipartisan spaces for debate or discussion — 
instead, the structure of friendship networks alongside the increasingly private nature 
of interest groups coalesce to streamline a process of echo-chambering on the 
platform. 
 
Finally, I look to the maintained but static website of the Feminists for Life 
of America: feministsforlife.org. As will be explained below, the inclusion of a static 
website amongst social media sites (meaning sites that include public visitor 
interactivity) can provide not only a receptacle for larger content pieces that are not 
suitable for social media platforms, but also a curation of values, mission statements, 
group finances, and access to non SMS-specific affordances. Organizationally-
maintained domains are rich sites of information that can undergird the analysis of 
looser, or more ephemeral networks found on social media. I believe that websites 
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should be included in appropriate contexts to ground group identities to real-
world events and organizations. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
Pro-life Feminist Twitter 
 
As a catalyst moment for the pro-life feminist online community, the Twitter 
conversation surrounding the march provides a dense analysis site which arguably 
acted as groundwork for the current online community of pro-life feminists. To limit 
my results, I set the parameter for the month of January, 2017, and searched for a 
specific combination of hashtags: #WomensMarch, and either #feminist or 
#prolifefeminist, and either #prolife or #prolifefeminist. The complex parameters 
ensure that certain tweets containing the wrong combination of hashtags don’t fall 
through the cracks, so that a tweet including “#WomensMarch #prolife #feminist” 
would be considered in equal measure to “#WomensMarch #prolifefeminist,” and 
any number of combinations therein. The dates account for the admittance of the 
New Wave Feminists as march organizers which has been placed at various times 
from “early January” to January 15 at the latest. 
 
 
Infrastructure and Political Economy 
 
Twitter’s infrastructure is somewhat limited in comparison to the other sites listed 
here. That said, there are some unique forms of governance that allow for quick, 
spontaneous debates, protests, or conversations that could contribute to community 
formation. Twitter does not verify identities of user accounts, so they can be created, 
used, and deleted or removed at any time. This feature proves especially useful for protest 
organization in nations with repressive governments, but can also open the 
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door for trolls and bots. Additionally, tweets can be deleted at any time, though it 
is possible to find archived and cached versions of tweets if the contents and user 
information is known. 
 
Twitter’s functionality is fairly straightforward for anyone familiar with 
micro-blogging. A logged-in user’s homepage displays an updating feed of tweets 
and advertisements beneath a text prompt box where users can write tweets, add 
image objects like gifs, post polls for their followers, or set a schedule for the tweet’s 
eventual publishing. The home page toggles from a sidebar on the left to a search 
page, an inbox, a notifications page, saved twitter lists, and a number of analytic 
options. Twitter allows users to post, reply, retweet, and “like” others’ tweets, all of 
which can be viewed publicly unless said user has privacy settings to dictate 
otherwise. Finally, Twitter is free to use and does not sell purchasable goods (aside 
from developer access to data and business analytics), and instead employs targeted 
and paid advertising which sometimes appears native, but is always stamped with a 
“promoted” icon. 
 
 
Content 
 
Twitter threads consist entirely of user-generated content. By user-generated 
content, I am referring to the message itself, not necessarily the content within. In fact, 
most of the media content circulated on social media sites like Twitter and Facebook are 
retweets, shares, or just a coopting of content found elsewhere on the internet. In the 
case of this thread, the posted content takes three general forms: First, in the same vein 
as pro-choice coverage of the women’s march, the thread includes a number of posts 
with handmade signs from both the women’s march and the “March for Life,” which 
occurs every year on the following weekend. One sign read, “Hey 
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Trump: Torture is NOT Pro-Life!” The second type of content was links to op-eds 
and personal blogs on one side of the debate or the other, such as a pro-life think 
tank’s piece: “Why True Feminism Means Skipping the Women’s March on 
Washington.” Finally, the third most common type of content took the form of meme-
cards (which were also prominent on the Facebook page), displaying quotes or adages 
meant to be impactful without any context. One was shared multiple times and read 
“It’s the saddest thing in the world to watch thousands of women march for the right 
to kill their own children #womensmarch,” superimposed over CNN coverage of the 
march in D.C. 
 
Not all content in this thread contained media and instead (true to Twitter’s 
original form) consists of users chiming in on the case of the New Wave Feminists’ 
removal from the organizing body: “It's sad to hear that I wouldn't have been 
welcome at the #WomensMarch today because I am #ProLife. #prolifefeminist 
#allvoicesheard” (@SarahMichelleRC). Due to the publicness of the women’s march 
and the fallout from the NWF’s removal, users outside of the pro-life feminist 
community also joined the conversation to express similar sentiments, or else to troll 
the conversation with antifeminist and #MAGA vitriol. Typically, these are 
members of the broader pro-life community who were already unlikely to attend the 
Women’s March. 
 
 
Users and Interactivity 
 
As discussed above, many of the participants in this thread are self-described 
pro-life feminists. Some others are solely pro-lifers, some are simply anti-feminist, 
and some may very well be bots or trolls, as Twitter notably does not require any 
sort of identity authentication like Facebook. That said, the users with the most 
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substantive tweets, including those with the highest numbers of comments and 
retweets, are seemingly real people with real personal information on their profiles, 
like Sister Julia Walsh who retweeted an open letter from catholic feminists: “I am 
one of the signers of this letter. I am a #Catholic #ProLife #Feminist and tomorrow I 
am going to participate in the #WomensMarch.” The low percentage of 
unidentifiable users in this thread implies that there is potentially a network already 
in place that members of this thread were drawn from. 
 
Though some might consider Twitter threads to be the most interactive of all 
social media platforms, the structure of the site lends less to community conversations 
than, say, Facebook. Unlike Facebook, Twitter users must manually click an icon to view 
replies and hashtag threads as they are not visible by default. That said, unlike Facebook, 
Twitter users can engage in a conversation with any other Twitter user, as there are no 
“groups” or “pages” that require an invitation or opting-in. 
 
 
Social Media and Public Messaging 
 
The enmeshed use of social media on Twitter is fairly limited, as Twitter’s 
designers have little to gain by making it easy for users to jump to Facebook or 
Instagram. Tweets can be shared elsewhere in the same way that any site with a url 
can be shared, but there is no direct button to easily share Twitter content to other 
social media accounts. On a user’s profile page, there are spaces to share a 
personal website (which incidentally could just be a Facebook page or profile), but 
nothing built-in to explicitly connect to other social media platforms. 
 
Finally, a hashtag thread conveys little in the way of intentional public 
messaging. Instead, the public-facing messaging is intertwined with user-created 
content at the individual level. Aside from paid advertising, Twitter merely acts as a 
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platform for an individual’s stance or an entity’s agenda. There are a few groups 
participating in this thread in particular, such as “Rehumanize International” and 
“March for Life UK,” whose image can be impacted by what their Twitter 
account participates in, but otherwise the arena of public messaging on Twitter is 
relatively chaotic. 
 
 
New Wave Feminists Facebook Page 
 
Choosing a representative site for the New Wave Feminists (NWF), a major 
focus in this project, proved difficult as the group is actively engaged on multiple 
platforms, and unlike the FFL, offer different and adapted content and engagement on 
each platform. The group has a blog with original content, a static website, a highly 
active Instagram account, a relatively active Twitter account, and now a paid 
Pantheon account for more direct engagement with dedicated group members. I chose 
to look at the group’s Facebook page for a few reasons: The page is the first space 
that the NWF used to connect with members, and thus represents a core community 
space for the group. Second, a great deal of original content, most of which has been 
commented on, has been produced on their Facebook page, allowing for a closer look 
into the community workings. Finally, Facebook is arguably a main hub for most 
social media communities — the lack of anonymity combined with the privacy of in-
group status with invitation-only groups and pages creates a unique “groundedness” 
(Rogers, 2013), while the platform’s affordances, like high-functionality commenting, 
replying, tagging, emoting, etc. provide the greatest allowance for user engagement. 
 
 
Infrastructure and Political Economy 
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All Facebook “Pages” are developed with the same base functionality — a 
“Home” page, and about ten tabs for other sorting purposes, such as “Events” or 
“Shop.” Page admins can then choose which tabs to use and can add personalized 
tabs. The NWF page has the standard tabs (“About,” “Photos,” etc.) as well as a 
“Groups” tab and an “Email Signup” tab. While once a combined functionality, the 
“Community” activity and “Posts” tabs are separate zones now; instead of “followers” 
posting in the same area as admin, user posts are relegated to the Community tab, 
which does not appear by default when navigating to the page. Therefore, the main 
page, as well as the posts that appear in general feeds are only those posted by the 
page’s admins (in this case, Herndon-De La Rosa). That said, any followers are 
capable of commenting on or reacting to any of the posts, though Herndon-De La 
Rosa moderates the page and can and sometimes does delete comments. 
 
While Facebook pages are free to make, and come with a surprising amount of 
free analytic data, admins can pay to have their pages advertised more frequently or 
prominently on Facebook feeds. While there are no ad dollars to be made on 
individual Facebook Pages (targeted advertising for other products does not appear on 
Facebook Pages), there are a few mechanisms on Facebook pages for making money. 
A group can sell a product directly through the page, though the NWF does not do so. 
There is also a “shop” button directly on the page that can lead to any URL of the 
admin’s choice. For the NWF, it leads to their home website’s merchandise page, 
where donations can be made and branded t-shirts, tote-bags, and stickers can be 
bought. NWF is listed as a 501c(3), and Herndon-De La Rosa notes in a post 
promoting her new paid Pantheon page that she earns $15,600 per year by running the 
NWF. 
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Content 
 
Content on this page is by and large created by Destiny, the founder and 
admin of the page. Posts include three sorts of content — sometimes original posts, 
sometimes they are promotional or calls to action, and sometimes they are “shared” 
third-party content — all of which include comprehensive original commentary by 
Destiny. Original posts typically consist of Destiny vlogging or writing a long post 
regarding a current issue related to feminism/pro-life feminism or her personal 
thoughts and experience, which often share personal details about her life (stories 
about her children, her recent foray into sobriety, her search for a paying job, etc.) 
along with conversation-provoking questions that are then answered and engaged 
with by community members. Promotional posts and calls to action are regularly 
created, either pointing “followers” to purchasable or free content to use in the pro-
life feminist movement, or more often calls for donations or participants for 
charitable causes. For example, the NWF is based in Dallas, TX, and has been 
actively engaged with immigration issues during the Trump presidency. They often 
hold widespread donation campaigns for women and children affected by or interned 
due to immigration policies. Finally, Destiny often shares third-party content 
(sometimes from other progressive pro-life groups, such as “Secular Pro-Life”), often 
in the form of op-eds, videos, and meme-cards which she then writes extensive 
commentary on in the post. 
 
While the most visible content is that posted by Herndon-De La Rosa, a 
“Community” section allows for posts by “followers,” which presumably have to be 
approved by admins. These include similar third-party shared content, typically with 
commentary alongside it, which is intended to spark conversation or opinions on the 
topic. Often, incendiary material is shared multiple times through the mechanism of 
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“tagging” the New Wave Feminist page. The most frequent repost appears to be a 
shared post originally by Destiny, calling for donations to purchase items on a baby 
registry to support a woman who was convinced not to abort her baby by Destiny. 
 
 
Users and Interactivity 
 
According to the NWF’s Facebook “Community” tab, the page has 50,642 
“follows,” meaning Facebook users who receive regular updates about the page on 
their home feeds, and 48,897 “likes,” implying that some number of likers do not 
receive updates unless they seek out the page. Little information is available about 
the demographics of the page followers, as Facebook data is notoriously difficult to 
obtain. Although user posts are relegated to a sub-page, followers can comment on, 
tag, and “react” (love, like, dislike, saddened, surprised, and amused by) to all posted 
content, allowing for much discussion between followers, as well as non-followers 
who can comment on posts, often leading to debates and arguments. This is a fine 
example of size and safe-spaces on social media, as Herndon-De La Rosa explained 
in an interview: 
 
…just [be]cause someone leaves a comment, that doesn’t mean that they 
follow us at all. No, and all it takes is one person being like ‘Trump 2020!’ 
and then like, that gets blasted into their algorithm and then all those people 
come and so we’re at the point now where I’m …I will hide a lot of the 
comments, honestly, because I want it to be... I want there to be thoughtful 
conversation, not just like weird GOP trolling type stuff happening in our 
comments. 
 
That said, Facebook’s decision to move user posts to the “Community” tab has 
noticeably curbed community-specific interaction and activity. With this update, user 
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and community discussion more often occurs on the homepage in the comments 
to Destiny’s varied posts. 
 
 
Social Media and Public Messaging 
 
The New Wave Feminists as a group are active on most popular social media 
sites, as discussed above. However, most sites only link back to the core website and 
not to one another. This approach is likely to increase flow to donations and 
merchandise purchases, as the bio for the Twitter handle for the NWF links directly 
to the “Support” page on NewWaveFeminists.com. Therefore, while the group is 
active on multiple platforms, especially Facebook and Instagram, they are not 
actually highly interconnected. 
 
In terms of public messaging, the NWF’s Facebook page does not appear 
heavily curated. One signifier that is telling of a group’s concern with brand image is 
the “Pages Liked by This Page” widget, which can be interpreted as groups or causes 
that the page in question publicly supports. For the NWF, those pages include both 
progressive pro-life groups, like The Guiding Star Project — a pro-life women’s 
clinic intended to unseat Planned Parenthood — as well as Feministing.com, a 
fervently pro-choice feminist blog whose founder, Jessica Valenti, was one of the 
loudest voices calling for the NWF’s removal at the Women’s March on 
Washington. This projection as decidedly pro-life and decidedly feminist (the group 
also follows the Women’s March) is also reflected in the types of content made 
public as well as the admin and core community members’ handling of regressive 
rhetoric in the comments section. Finally, the explicit public facing messaging on the 
page’s “About” tab states: 
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New Wave Feminists are here to take feminism back from those who have 
corrupted it. Sometime before we were born our womanhood was traded for 
a handful of birth control pills, the “privilege” to pose for playboy, and the 
“right” to abort our children. We embrace the early American feminism of 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. Also, we’re way funny and 
have super rad hair. (NWF, “About”) 
 
 
FeministsForLife.org 
 
Feministsforlife.org is the main static website for the Feminists For Life of 
America (FFL or FFLA), an organization founded in 1972 by Cathy Callaghan and 
Pat Goltz in protest of the pro-abortion stance of the National Organization for 
Women (NOW) from their Ohio chapter. From the outset, the organization has 
claimed that protecting the unborn is a core duty of an authentic feminist for a few 
reasons. One reason is the fact that more females are aborted worldwide than 
males. Another is the notion that abortion became a substitute for true equality 
between the sexes — that the only way women could compete in the world with 
men was by denying a natural function of the human body. 
 
According to internet archiving project The Wayback Machine, the earliest 
visit recorded to www.feministsforlife.org was in 1996, when the site appeared 
similar to most non-professionally developed websites of the time: A single page 
with a plain white background and text formatted in the center of the page with bullet 
points explaining the mission and current goals of the group (Along with the visitor 
counter that is common in early websites). While the current incarnation of the site is 
an anonymously designed Wordpress template, the original site designer is listed as 
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Coleen MacKay — presumably a tech-savvy member of the group working pro-
bono. 
This early, bare-bones appearance is unrecognizable to today’s website, which 
is now a templated WordPress thoughtfully curated by professional web designers. 
Maintaining a cool color-scheme throughout with vibrant ads and high-end stock 
photography, the site is no longer a basic repository for pertinent information, but 
clearly a marketing mechanism in its own right. Much of the site is dedicated to 
proving the necessity of an organization like the FFL, such as the front page’s widgets 
directing visitors to pages like “Successes.” The other aim for the site provides 
content and materials for recruitment and visibility activism through pages like “Pro-
life Answers to Pro-Choice Questions” or “Revolutionize Your Campus,” where those 
already convinced by the cause can download free content and order a free 
“Revolution on Campus Kit,” which includes posters, brochures, and the like, so 
members can table on college campuses with the resources and direction provided. 
With that in mind, the role of a bespoke website in an online cross-platform 
community is often one of resources — either for recruitment or confirmation of a 
group identity and purpose. 
Infrastructure and Political Economy 
Similar to many Wordpress templates, the site has a home landing page, and a 
navigation bar at the top of the page with tabs and dropdown menus for other pages 
and child pages. Main tabs include “About,” a dropdown menu including child pages 
for “Accomplishments,” “FAQ,” “Speakers,” and a page each for “Contact Us” and 
“Newsletter Signup;” A “News” tab links to a page of what are essentially blog posts 
promoting the FFL’s activities, or responding to current issues in the news. Most of 
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the latter posts are written by Serrin M. Foster, the organization’s president for over 
20 years running. The “Herstory” tab drops down to include “Feminist Foremothers,” 
“Women Who Mourn: Reflections by Women who have had abortions” and “We 
Remember,” which includes links to both a memorium of prominant pro-life feminists 
as well as a bulleted list of women who have died in relation to abortion 
complications. A “Resources'' tab contains that information spotlighted on the 
homepage, including those mentioned above and links to both books and journals 
produced by the FFL as well as to their child-site “WomenDeserveBetter.com,” which 
is an extensive repository of resources (read: instructional blogs) for mothers, 
expecting women, and women who have aborted/miscarried.26 
 
This brings us to the second half of this category concerned with financial 
aspects of the site. Because this is a core web presence for the FFL, there are multiple 
avenues for income through the site. First is the donation page, which allows for annual 
subscriptions as well as membership in “Giving Circles” (with feminist foremothers 
titling tiers of recurring donation amounts - the Susan B. Anthony Circle is for $10,000 
donated monthly, yearly, or quarterly). Second, their magazine, once designated a 
journal, can be purchased issue to issue for $12. The FFLA also sells a limited amount of 
merchandise under the copyrighted term “Covetable Stuff,” consisting of typical 
merchandise like bumper stickers, calendars, and the like. 
 
 
26 Notably, WomenDeserveBetter.com does not sport the same high quality web design as the 
FFL’s, but is instead a basic black-and-white blog site with an extensive collection of 
articles, covering issues from “11 Tips for Homeschooling Temporarily,” in response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, to “How to Lease a Car.” Finally, the navigation bar ends with a 
circled “GIVE” button which takes the visitor to a donation page 
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Finally, the list of expert speakers compiled under the “About” section concludes 
with an option to inquire about rates and schedules, implying that part of the FFL’s 
income is derived from speaking fees. The site does not support any advertisements 
aside from its own, and is listed as a 501 (c)3, so presumably all income is in the form 
of selling merchandise, memberships, and donations. 
 
 
Content 
 
As the static site in this networked community, the content was as expected — 
curated and in-depth with regard to archivability and searchability. The overall tone of 
content in the site is calmly impassioned - while there is no tangible sense of urgency, 
it is clear that the site is aimed to convey the FFL as a movement and not solely a non-
profit organization. Unlike the other sites in this study, the FFL’s site has no user-
generated content. That said, there is quite a bit of original content, much of it created 
by Serrin Foster herself, or FFL board chair Kara Sorenson, available to watch, read, 
or download free-of-charge. First, there is a page listing initiatives and bills the FFL is 
endorsing and supporting, as well as calls to action for or against the campaigns of 
various members of congress on abortion and family-related issues. Second, there are 
various videos stretching back ten years showcasing FFL speakers (primarily Serrin 
Foster), interviews, and coverage of outreach and protest events that the FFL hosts or 
takes part in, such as the “March for Life.” Finally, as mentioned earlier, there are 
reference resources for the task of recruitment and visibility. This includes 
downloadable ads and brochures, as well as a list of “pro-woman answers to pro-
choice questions,” where primarily Foster gives extensive responses to questions and 
critiques of pro-life feminism, such as “What about all those kids in foster care that 
nobody wants?” 
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Users and Interactivity 
 
Little meta-data is available for the users of FeministForLife.org, as the site 
does not receive enough traffic to ascertain triangulated demographic information. 
That said, free search engine optimization (SEO) analytics can provide some clues. 
 
According to SEMRush, a marketing analysis “toolkit,” FeministsForLife.org 
garners about two to three thousand visits per day, almost all of which are from 
anglophone countries (half of which is the U.S.). A great deal of their traffic links in 
from the Susan B. Anthony List’s website. Otherwise, much of their traffic is 
directed through searches about feminist foremothers — in particular Susan B. 
Anthony, Victoria Woodhull, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Elizabeth Blackwell, the first 
female physician (accredited by the AMA) and Harvard Medical School graduate. 
SEMRush also indicates that FeministsForLife.org does not use branded or targeted 
advertising to draw traffic to their site. 
 
FeministForLife.org is the least interactive of the sites analyzed in this 
project. As it is a static website, it does not allow for user generated content or 
interactions with content produced by the admins. FFL’s website does not even allow 
for commenting on their “blog” type posts by Serrin Foster; instead they lead to 
donation links and buttons to share the post/article on social media. This is likely due 
to the FFLA’s controversial stances which would undoubtedly draw negative 
commentary to their site. 
 
 
Social Media and Public Messaging 
 
Though FeministsForLife.org is the only non-SMS in this study, it is one of 
the more interconnected sites. There are social media widgets at the bottom of the 
FFL homepage for both the organization’s Facebook and Twitter feeds, implying an 
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active engagement with both platforms. However, no original content is being 
produced on those accounts, so they therefore act more as branches leading back to 
the main webpage. The site also links to a YouTube channel featuring most of the 
same videos available on the website, but touts over 70 thousand views. The site’s 
public messaging is not necessarily an effect of, but its main purpose. Every page and 
piece of content featured has been considered through the lens of public messaging 
prior to publication, and some messages are more salient than others. Their mission 
statement is: “Feminists for Life is a renaissance of the original American feminism. 
Like Susan B. Anthony and other early American suffragists, today’s pro-life 
feminists envision a better world in which no woman would be driven by desperation 
to abortion” followed by a bulleted list addressing social inequities that make having 
children an unattractive option like “Campuses and workplaces that support mothers 
in practical ways and do not force them to choose between their education or career 
plans and their children” (“About Us”). Both of these themes call back to first-wave 
feminists and social justice-based pro-lifism, and are main messaging strategies to 
convey the organization’s current slogan “Women Deserve Better.” Additionally, as 
described above, the site contains a curated collection of videos, advertisements, and 
downloadable (read: shareable) content that collectively projects a desired brand and 
messaging. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The ultimate objective of this methodological approach is to heuristically 
tease out underlying similarities and differences between otherwise disparate internet 
platforms. This approach is used here in concert with an inquiry toward the content 
and efficacy of a digital community as both a safe space and/or potential 
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counterpublic. A number of similarities arise when each platform is viewed from its 
category results. In the case of these three sites, each has strengths and weaknesses 
for supporting an online community of pro-life feminists. There are not many 
attributes that all three sites share, aside from engagement in some way with social 
media platforms, as well as their use by pro-life feminists to connect with other pro-
life feminists and to speak to the world beyond that group. That said, a number of the 
digital community requisites can be found in either each site or a combination of 
sites. Using this analysis of candidacy for digital communities, the next question is 
whether a site is a “safe space” as defined by various scholars. Does this community 
provide a unique platform for self-expression and group identity cultivation? Is it safe 
from interveners for members to share personal narratives and build “discursive 
boundaries?” 
 
As determined by Gruzd et al, Twitter hashtag threads can in the right 
circumstances be considered digital communities. Aside from Jones’s fourth 
requirement, “sustained membership over time,” this thread technically meets all 
other criteria in their study. That said, when considering the content and participants 
of this one, as highly varied and opportunistic as a platform for political opinions, it is 
difficult to assume that members of any extant or newly formed community in this 
thread felt the space to be a safe site for identity exploration or self-expression. 
Additionally, because the thread is a result of a multi-hashtag inquiry, it lacks the 
focused intentionality of a discussion thread formed around a new hashtag 
community. 
 
Similarly, the Facebook page for the New Wave Feminists fulfills all the 
above requirements as a digital community; it even satisfies Jones’s fourth criterion 
for sustained membership over time. Because the page is opt-in, a self-selecting group 
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of pro-life feminists can have a consistent platform on which to build discursive 
boundaries. It is not a perfectly safe space, as anyone can become a follower of the 
page, but in general the site provides a relatively unseen space (less so, however, after 
the Women’s March) where a marginal group can reinforce their group identities, 
histories, and convictions. 
 
Finally, the Feminists for Life website does not provide a space for the 
interactivity necessary for it to stand as a digital community on its own. Instead, it 
acts as a repository of resources for and histories of the pro-life feminist community 
writ-large. From a broader perspective, the site also provides a legitimation of the 
concept of pro-life feminism, and acts as a proverbial backbone for the identity 
group’s status. This site also does not fulfill basic candidacy for a ‘safe space,’ as it 
is freely available to anyone and provides no venue for interactivity. 
 
In all, only the former two sites could be individual bases for digital 
communities, and from there only the New Wave Feminists’ Facebook group is 
designed in such a way as to allow for discrete social isolation from the broader 
public, or a “safe space.” Again, this separation is not absolute — nonmembers may 
comment on posts originating from the NWF’s page — but, in general, Facebook’s 
design as a platform encourages a separatist model for issue-based engagement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
If the objective of this study were solely to determine the platform most suited 
for a “safe space,” Facebook would win out in most contexts. The affordances of 
Facebook that provide safe spaces for marginalized groups in the United States are the 
same affordances that contribute to the platform’s divisive, echo-chamber effects on 
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users with socio-political differences. 27 While the goal includes understanding the 
similarities and differences of the affordances and usages of multiple platforms, the 
ultimate goal is to ascertain if the digital community of pro-life feminists has or 
needs safe spaces online. By need, I am referring to the idea that marginalized groups 
form and develop online in a qualitatively different way than on-the-ground 
recruitment and organizing. In this case, the pro-life feminists had an extant network 
connected through phone trees and snail mail — still social technologies, but not the 
kind under scrutiny here. 
 
With this in mind, we can conclude that unlike some marginalized groups, the 
pro-life feminists did not require a safe online space to initially form and incubate as 
a social group. Instead, pro-life feminists utilized the affordances of online networks 
to mature, fundraise, organize, and recruit. Subsequent sects (Facebook groups in this 
instance) of pro-life feminists, “Riot Grrrls for Life,” “Secular Pro-life,” “Athiests for 
Life,” and many others have arguably been a byproduct of both the pro-life feminist 
move to social media in concert with the development of easily-creatable “groups” 
and “pages” on the platform. The existence of these sub-groups performs that 
discursive boundary-making for the broader online community of pro-life feminists, 
working out (in real time) the nuances of what it means to be a pro-life feminist. Each 
time one of these groups peels off from a broader categorization, it points to the 
latter’s deficiency in the qualities for membership, and stretches the scope with which 
pro-life feminism can be viewed. 
 
 
 
 
 
27 Facebook is considered one of the most compliant social media platforms in cooperating 
 
with oppressive governments to censors and surveil citizens. 
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This is a fine illustration of this chapter’s conclusion that, in some cases, 
multiple sites are needed to fulfill extant qualifications for a digital community (and 
subsequently networked counterpublic), such as Twitter’s “potential for influence,” 
or Facebook’s “sustained membership over time.” To speak about networked digital 
communities in the terms of networked counterpublics is to underscore their potential 
for social and political influence on the broader “public.” Herein lies the (somewhat 
arbitrary) distinction between digital communities and networked counterpublics — 
the latter is invoked in discussions on potential for influence as a “subaltern 
counterpublic,” while the former can be better applied to groups that are not currently 
tied to active social movements. 
 
Most pro-life feminists designate the ideology as a movement, and therefore 
this study is concerned with the latter. From the above results, we have concluded that 
on their own merits, these sites may lack the necessary components of a networked 
counterpublic. Combined, however, the three sites establish a strong digital 
community and moreover a potentially effective subaltern counterpublic. Together the 
sites provide major benefits for a growing and otherwise marginal community: They 
have a sustained site of membership (Facebook), a platform to support instantaneous 
communication with other members (Twitter), and a shared history and set of 
resources with which to contextualize a social identity (FFL website). Variations of 
these affordances are present individually, but together the sites form a network full 
of opportunities to develop identity and culture and reinforce the ideology of pro-life 
feminism. 
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V: CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the history of U.S. women’s movements, the strong-willed female 
figurehead has been essential to a project’s identity and the public’s perception and 
memory of it. This is made plain in the recent popular mini-series, Mrs. America, 
which follows prominent moments in the feminist v. antifeminist moment — 
highlighting in particular the role that the cult of personality played in major political 
moves of community leaders like Betty Friedan and Phyllis Schlafly, respectively. 
The pro-life feminist movement is no different in this regard. Rachel MacNair 
perhaps single-handedly lifted pro-life feminism from the depths of obscurity and 
conspiracy theory to a fully institutionalized school of thought with a large number 
of followers. Her Quaker upbringing and outlook was undoubtedly woven into the 
foundation of the Feminists For Life and the “consistent life ethic,” and her shared 
religious identity with Susan B. Anthony likely bolstered her sense of authority over 
the suffragette’s existential outlook. These details seem almost too personal to be 
relevant in the broader history of the feminist movement until one considers the role 
this activist played, and continues to play, in strategically proselytizing this evocative 
history and the subsequent influence of the Susan B. Anthony List, which has already 
spent half a million dollars by mid-year in the 2020 election cycle on supporting pro-
life and Republican candidates (opensecrets.org). With this in mind, this dissertation 
has attempted to read cases micro and macro in relation to the counterintuitive stance 
of pro-life feminism with the outlook that all historical, sociological, and political 
stones be overturned where possible. 
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To begin, I provided background research on not only the emergence of pro- 
 
life feminism, but of abortion as a legible political issue. That is, I traced early 
 
mutations of the definitions of what did and did not qualify as abortion—post- 
 
quickening vs. menstrual regulation, for example—and fleshed out the 
 
institutionalization of women’s health services through the formation of the American 
 
Medical Association. At that moment in time, legal implications of abortion were 
 
addressed only where necessary, and definitions of “therapeutic abortions” broadened 
 
throughout the 1960s on both sides of the U.S. political spectrum. This flow led to an 
 
ebb in the form of anti-feminism, the new right, and reactionary legislative moves like 
 
the Hyde Amendment intended to circumvent the gains made by the women’s 
 
movement, such as Roe v. Wade. 
 
It is these two ideologies, feminist and anti-feminist, that progressive pro-
lifers were forced to choose between. Many became single-issue voters, which sent 
them into the right, as both parties changed tactics and pro-lifism became an identity, 
instead of a nuanced political issue. Those left behind, like Rachel MacNair, worked 
to support pro-life Democrats, while they were still a common entity. For decades, 
pro-life feminists rode on the boundary between what Hannah Arendt considered the 
private sphere of bodily concerns and the public arena for juridical deliberation, 
sustaining a third space through the impossibility of their convictions. This fringe 
identity was supported by a contrived shared history and legitimated through 
institutions and organizations like the FFL or the SBA List. This is elaborated in 
Chapter Two, where I interrogated the historical figure of Susan B. Anthony — an 
unlikely yet enduring mascot for pro-life feminists to deploy in arguments over 
“authentic” feminism. 
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In Chapter One, I focused on the material implications of such an extreme 
departure from mainstream feminism by reading the Women’s March of 2017 as the 
catalyst for a pro-life feminist resurgence. Without question, media coverage and 
engagement provided a legitimizing vehicle for debate around feminism and abortion, 
even if only a small minority wanted to have the conversation. The chapter concluded 
that in the dialogical realm of mainstream activist feminism, pro-life politics are 
incommensurable to the movement. This is not to say pro-life feminism is 
ontologically impossible, but that feminism as a social movement, extending from the 
women’s liberation movement, is in many ways defined by its pro-abortion rights 
stance, making pro-life feminism categorically incongruent to one of the most widely-
perceived formations of public feminism. 
 
In essence, the pro-life feminists lay in wait, training, organizing, 
legitimating, authoring, and so on, until socio-political formations transformed into 
their current trajectory. As with nationalist American populism, pro-life feminism 
became galvanized in the margins of legible politics, and social media and the 
writable web provided both venue and validation for the group, along with countless 
other niche social groupings. Chapter Three analyzed the texture of sociality in online 
communities like that of the pro-life feminists, ultimately arguing that social media in 
particular (as well as other aspects of the writable web, which will be discussed 
below) facilitates the cultivation, growth, and maintenance of fringe viewpoints like 
pro-life feminism. Much like various alt-right and conspiracist groups receiving 
media attention as of late, the web also provides an amplification of a small 
population’s existence, which might otherwise be relegated to a church basement 
gathering. This amplification at first only creates the perception of a larger role in 
public discourse than is realistic, but inevitably the phenomenon contributes to the 
 
143 
 
power those groups are then able to yield in the public sphere. The project ends on the 
topic of digital communities to reflect the forward-moving position of 
counterintuitive or paradoxical political identities. The stalwart insistence of the pro-
life feminists of their own interpretation of political history, along with the moralistic 
drive to protect the “unborn” and the crisis of factual reality the U.S. currently 
wrestles with, implies that pro-life feminists are not going anywhere anytime soon. 
 
A major limitation of a project this broad in scope is the use of language and 
the black-boxing of nuanced historical contexts. For instance, to talk about a 
feminist movement that is at odds with the pro-life feminist movement is already rife 
with complications. Each potential terminology: “mainstream feminism,” 
“white/liberal feminism,” “popular feminism,” “constitutional feminism,” 
“hegemonic feminism,” etc. brings with it a body of literature, debate, and 
genealogy of its own. How does one convey all of the subtleties of history, dissents, 
alliances, presents and futures of an enormous entity like feminism in regard to its 
perception by the general public? Questions like this exemplify the enormity of this 
project, illustrate its draw to a researcher, and underscores the inevitable critiques of 
internal reliability and consistency. 
 
To speak of feminism as an intellectual project can ignore the material efforts 
and consequences of hard-fought, on-the-ground accomplishments, as has been 
criticized in the past. To address it as primarily a social movement denies the reality 
that much of the feminist project has moved into academia, and debates outside of 
the academy are similarly preoccupied. To think about feminism as an era of the 
women’s movement implies that it is a finalized moment bound within a specific 
temporality — to echo Jennifer Nash’s critique of co-opting black feminism—a 
project to be completed and thus moved on from. Feminism as a philosophical genre 
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regarding centralized platforms like identity and bodily autonomy gets even further 
into the weeds, fully submitting feminist ideals to the ivory tower and assuming 
some platonic realm of pure feminism exists and can be aimed for. 
 
It is in this final understanding of feminism which the pro-life feminists find a 
space to insert themselves — regarding feminism as a philosophical endeavor allows for 
deliberation, and the pro-life feminists fill that role by resisting one (albeit major) aspect 
of contemporary popular feminism. They do this almost entirely by exploiting the 
malleability of history. Because Susan B. Anthony said very little at all about abortion as 
a concept, building a case against the idea that she was “pro-life” is both arduous and 
trivial for anyone outside of the pro-life feminist community. Already being written-off, 
the movement faced little resistance while quietly building long-lasting monuments, like 
the SBA List, to bolster their version of history. 
 
With its assumption that the suffragettes were likely anti-abortion, the pro-life 
feminist version of the history of the women’s movement viewed Roe v. Wade and 
NOW’s push for abortion rights as an aberration instead of a core defining principle. 
To many pro-life feminists, the move to focus on abortion-on-demand was a misstep 
for the women’s movement, one that cost women further gains in independence, but 
not one that couldn’t be undone. There are even conspiracies that Larry Lader, one of 
the founders of NARAL, and biographer of Margaret Sanger, convinced friend and 
fellow Vasser alum Betty Friedan to push abortion-on-demand after she read his book 
on the topic. Sue Ellen Browder writes about working for Cosmo in Subverted: How I 
Helped the Sexual Revolution Hijack the Women’s Movement (2015), and the 
insidiously capitalistic undercurrent of sexual liberation, which she considers a wholly 
separate movement from women’s liberation. In this text, notably published by a non-
academic Catholic printing press, Browder claims that Friedan sprung the vote on 
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abortion at the very end of the second annual NOW conference — a sticking point for 
many pro-life feminists who argue that the vote was carried out without an organizational 
consensus, “when, in her characteristic domineering style, with a voice like a foghorn, 
she demanded that NOW take a stand in favor of contraception and for total repeal of all 
abortion laws” (58). This account is not unlike similar complaints from NOW members 
who would ultimately leave the organization in order to form WEAL. The letters 
between Betty Boyer and fellow WEAL and NOW members, found in the organizations’ 
archives, illustrate an instance of dissent over abortion which was not wholly based on 
the usual religious grounds. It is a strong example of the many varied reasons for 
abortion’s opposition at the cusp of its de-criminalization 
— in this case, a combination of personality and cultural clashes between the more 
 
conservative feminists of the Midwest and the progressive elite driving 
NOW’s decisions on the coasts. 
 
According to a series of letters and newsletters circulated among the Ohio 
NOW constituency, the seed for dissent was planted at NOW’s second annual 
national convention in Washington. 100 members were in attendance on November 
19th, 1967 when the motion to liberalize abortion rights in the US Constitution came 
to the floor: “The right of a woman to prevent conception and with proper Medical 
safeguards to terminate her pregnancy shall not be denied or abridged by the United 
States or by any state” (minutes from NOW conference). By deciding on an amended 
version of this motion which prohibits the criminalization of abortions, NOW placed a 
controversial topic at the forefront of publicity surrounding the burgeoning women’s 
movement. As arguably the leading organizational actor in the movement, NOW 
presently headed by Betty Friedan, initiated the first abortion-rights-based schism 
after the hotly debated resolution was passed. 
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Elizabeth (“Betty”) Boyer, a prominent feminist lawyer on the early 
nominating committee for NOW led the case for WEAL in Ohio, where measures for 
establishing an official NOW chapter were underway. Due to the unpopularity among 
Ohio women of the decision to tackle abortion rights at that time, the Ohio chapter 
decided to remain unofficial for the time being. Boyer consequently resigned as 
President of the dwindling chapter, notably maintaining her seat on the nominating 
board of NOW, “knowing that I represent a large segment of the presently-constituted 
membership, and in the hope of tempering what I consider to be its presently ill-
advised course of action” (Letter to National Board Members of NOW, 1-25-68 - 
packet 1). The collective response in Ohio also led to a drastic decision to de-affiliate 
from NOW for an event the constituency had been planning to host, a talk by 
Congresswoman Martha Griffiths. The fear was that the highly politicized decision to 
make abortion rights a central platform of NOW would overshadow all other 
publicity surrounding the event, including the legal and economic focus of Griffiths’s 
talk on “Discriminations Against Women in America”: 
...no one [in Ohio] wanted to sponsor Mrs. Griffiths appearance in the name 
of NOW, although all still very much wanted her to come, the idea being that 
if it were a NOW function, certain Board members would undoubtedly fly 
into town and call a press conference. Our local newspapers would grab at 
the chance to play up the abortion matter, and to play down everything Mrs. 
Griffiths might have to say, which would have real value to us. 
Therefore, after much consultation and with real regret, we evolved 
the enclosed rather unpleasant missive to the NOW board. I presented it 
personally in Pittsburgh, and, oddly, the reception was sympathetic by 
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everyone but Betty Friedan. (Letter to Phineas Indritz, legal counsel to 
Congresswoman Griffiths) 
 
The event ultimately became the fulcrum for the departure from NOW and 
establishment of WEAL. This was exemplified in a letter from Boyer to the Ohio NOW 
members, which served as a simultaneous call to action regarding NOW’s abortion 
platform, a notification of the event sponsorship change to “Nonpartisan Women,” and a 
survey seeking responses to NOW’s abortion decision. The survey was also an attempt to 
take the temperature of the group’s desire to leave NOW: “Many members have 
suggested that it would be more feasible to split away and form an Ohio group, 
incorporated under another name, to proceed along the original lines of NOW” (letter to 
NOW Ohio members from E. Boyer, Dec. 26, 1967). Despite extensive outreach and 
publicity, only 200 out of the 1,000 invited attended the talk 
 
— in a letter to Griffiths, Boyer expressed dismay over the numbers and implied that de-
affiliating the event with NOW may have had a role in the small turnout: “We hear 
 
rumors of political, as well as ‘establishment’ intimidation.” Regardless, the event 
became a perfect organizing locale for the group of women that would become 
WEAL, and a sign-up sheet was passed around to recruit its founding members. 
Despite Boyer’s evident disdain for the present leadership and facilitation of 
 
NOW, she insisted that the new group would work in concert with NOW: 
 
Women interested in such a group do not envision it as competing with, or 
undermining, NOW. Inasmuch as it would comprise women of admittedly 
more temperate and practical views, who would not join NOW as 
presently constituted, more women’s efforts could thus be enlisted. At 
times the two groups could no doubt coordinate efforts, but at others they 
would be necessarily completely disassociated. 
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Connections between the two organizations remained strong, and many women 
became members of both groups over time. Working together, they both contributed 
massive efforts in the passing of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), though 
WEAL went on to focus more on specific judicial matters pertaining to equal 
treatment in the workplace and economic-based equality measures. 
In 1970, WEAL filed its first class-action lawsuit for equal opportunities in 
higher education, invoking Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which enforces 
laws against sexual discriminations in federally-funded institutions. This class-action 
suit historically led to congress adopting Title IX into the Amendments to the 
Federal Education Act in 1972. Relatedly, WEAL pursued another class-action suit 
against universities which until that point had customarily required female 
employees to pay more into social security than their male counterparts under the 
assumption that women lived longer, which could not be statistically supported. The 
case went to the supreme court and WEAL was successful in dealing another major 
blow to sexual inequality in higher education (Castro, 1990). 
In the end, WEAL ultimately succeeded in their aim for “responsible 
rebellion,” defining the conservative wing of the women’s movement and offering a 
space to conservative and older women who wanted to further women’s rights but 
would or could not join more controversial groups such as NOW. The group grew in 
size and scope significantly in the first few years, developing a 501c(3) WEAL Fund 
to finance the now national organization. Following years of successful legislative 
accomplishments, the group eventually fell prey to an oversaturated market of 
501c(3) women’s groups by the early 1980’s and by the late 1980’s dissolved amid a 
declining economy and a widespread anti-feminist sentiment (Records of WEAL, 
1966-1979). 
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Historical accounts like that of WEAL’s inception illustrate that abortion as a 
platform in particular has a nuanced genealogical origin like any other political issue. 
That said, abortion rights fall into a particular space unique to concepts that are 
pushed into the public world from what was previously considered private or 
‘personal’ in nature. That is, making public the private issues often attributed to 
women and the domestic sphere has historically played out in the form of 
counterpublics or issue networks, forcing a discursive breakthrough in the “public 
sphere” or, in most cases in modern U.S. context, the legislative arena. A highly cited 
example is the issue of domestic violence (Fraser, 1990), where the once private 
phenomenon of spousal abuse reached a critical mass of public attention and 
eventually became an issue of public health — one that would be recognized by the 
law and built into public political institutions. 
Discussions on the role of the private sphere in political movements build on 
the premise of various iterations of a “public,” such as the Habermassian public 
sphere and its feasibility in the contemporary socio-technological moment. Sitting 
atop a breadth of work on publics and their respective/constituent privates, Antigone 
provides a useful allegorical discussion on the virtuality of politics situated between 
the home and the state. The Greek drama has been utilized by feminist political 
philosophers to theorize on women’s role, or lack thereof, in democratic republics. 
The blurred boundaries of the home and the state as depicted in Antigone at once 
both undermine and concretize the democratic body of the state. The reality of pro-
life feminism lives in this third space, between the private rights-based existential 
philosophies and religiosities, and the legible political space of public discourse, 
perception, and ultimately legislation. 
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Often in contest with idealized homogenous “publics” of philosophy, the 
public/private distinction is invoked in contemporary terms to highlight the 
institutionalized social restrictions on the private sphere for groups that are not 
included within the public. Scholars like Bonnie Honig, Nancy Fraser, Joan Landes, 
and Seyla Benhabib have approached the notion of publics in their relation to women 
and/or feminism. Notably, most of these scholars are theorizing within the 
parameters of extant work in Habermassian publics, viewing the private as “that 
which is not public.” 
The feminist preoccupation with this distinction in the 1960s and 1970s in 
Western academia coincided with major developments in the women’s liberation 
movement, such as the establishment of NOW in 1966, which sought to secure a 
position for women in the public sphere (read: legislative precedence). The 
public/private debate emerged once again in the 1990s, when the burgeoning digital 
era alongside the integration of identity politics moved many scholars to begin to 
either rethink the formulation of the public/private distinction, or to deconstruct it 
altogether (Landes, 1998). For instance, Goodman (1992) addresses a number of 
problematics in the distinction, primarily with the argument that Habermas’s public 
sphere was formed within the private sphere, and that the creation of a “new 
culture” of private life was constituted by the discursive boundaries set forth by the 
public sphere. 
Lopata (1993) historicizes the notion of the public/private distinction as one of a 
political economic imperative. She argues that the two-sphere model is not only an 
imaginary produced under the auspices of capitalism, but that the proliferation of its 
ideology inherently stratifies society based on gender. Though a number of scholars 
critique not only the usefulness, but the problematic political contribution of the 
151 
 
public/private model (Beckford, 1989; Coontz, 1988, Dobbelaere, 1985; 
Gamarnikow, Morgan, Purvis & Taylorson, 1983; Hanson, 1987; Lohan, 2000), many 
of those listed here find the model to be either a realistic depiction, and/or a helpful 
methodological analytic to work through contemporary feminist issues (Landes, 
2003; Benhabib, 1993). This is exemplified in Gal’s (2002) semiotic breakdown of 
the model as not only a discursive move (“communicative phenomenon”), but as a 
meta-discourse, wherein all discourse is colored by the fluid and dialectical 
indexicality of the public vs. the private. 
 
Benhabib (1993) explicitly wrestles with Arendt’s and Habermas’s 
constructions of the public and private, where Arendt is charged with gendering the 
two spheres, and Habermas creates a problematic formulation where public norms 
(and therein universal morality) are set as distinct from private values. Alternatively, 
Honig (1992) invokes Hannah Arendt’s conception of the private as not merely “that 
which is not public,” but most aspects pertaining to the body. Arendt conceives the 
body as a univocal, mundane site that must be tended to prior to an individuated 
existence in the “good life,” aka, the public, political world. Arendt’s philosophies 
have historically been criticized for their exclusion of women, and potentially anti-
feminist undertones, but Honig finds in Arendt the potential for feminist politics to fit 
concisely within the gap left between the public and the private by the encroaching 
“social.” For Arendt, the social is the bleeding of private issues into the public and 
public issues into the private. This third space is the corner of Arendt’s work that is 
of interest to this project. 
 
As reproductive rights fall squarely into the Arendtian social sphere, there 
lies a framework for the extrapolation of this political space beyond or between the 
state and the body. Honig maintains in this piece that within that space, a Butlerian 
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potential for hegemonic deliberation is possible in the imitable performative actions 
of the private: “Political theory’s task is to aid and enable that practice of 
(re)founding by widening the spaces (of tension, undecidability, and arbitrariness) 
that might be hospitable to new beginnings” (p. 113). If we consider the seemingly 
personal engagements of Betty Boyer or Rachel MacNair within this conception of a 
social sphere, we can develop an ulterior language with which to talk about the 
politics of women’s interpersonal relationships as a contribution to the above 
hegemonic deliberation. That is, the unique politics of women’s relationships enlists a 
deliberative power all its own when thought of as a political vector, and while the 
macro-historical elements detailed throughout this project trace the public and the 
private and the transition between the two, the persistence of an Arendtian social 
sphere, a “third place” may permanently house the philosophical contestation of 
abortion politics. 
 
Judith Butler (2002) (et al)’s theoretical work on the political using Antigone 
as a standpoint may prove useful to this project’s inquisition of a third (or a 
potentially infinite), extrastitial space. In her contrary reading to the usual anti-statist 
takes on the play, Butler argues that Antigone’s ulterior role is not inherently 
contentious, but that she inhabits a liminal space between the family and the state. 
This idea, exemplary in the dynamics between Creon and Antigone, challenges the 
notion that the state and the family are two mutually exclusive entities, and instead 
implies their chiasmic interplay, “She is outside the terms of the polis, but she is, as it 
were, an outside without which the polis could not be” (p. 4). Antigone’s performance 
within the role of sovereignty, as well as the conflicting nature of her kinship 
relationships undermine definitions of the public and the private, and therein 
destabilize the “conceptual distinction” between the two. 
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Antigone’s exclusion from, and constitution and undermining of, the state 
provides a useful model for thinking through the enduring occupation of pro-life 
feminists in a space between the public and private, as their mere existence both 
undermines feminism’s tenets of inclusivity and societal adaptability, and constitutes 
the very movement they are excluded from. As was concluded in Chapter One, the 
2017 Women’s March was a proverbial line drawn in the sand (albeit one that was 
already there by implication) defining what is and what is not considered 
contemporary feminist ideology. The constitutional status of abortion politics, then, 
provides that ever-shifting boundary between the body and the state. 
 
This persistently in-flux boundary was one conclusion within a study that did not 
lend itself to being conclusive from the outset. To recall, the following research 
questions drove my inquiry through a series of interdisciplinary and multi-modal case 
studies: (1) How does this seemingly paradoxical and marginal political group sustain an 
identity and history in the face of competing popular memories of feminism and the 
women’s movement? And (2) What does the persistence, and recent resurgence of this 
group say about the state and definition of the feminist movement today? 
 
Future Directions 
 
There are a few different avenues that seem ripe for further interrogation, 
some of which are direct continuations of this project, while others were inspired by 
it in the process. Certain directions beyond the scope of this project, like further detail 
into affect’s role in pro-life feminist rhetorical tactics, could take the form of long-
form sentiment analyses, or extensive interviewing of members of the pro-life and 
pro-life feminist communities. Ideally, the former would utilize data scraping 
capabilities already in existence or in development in order to quickly record public 
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expressions surrounding some sort of controversy or major event in the realm of 
women’s and/or reproductive rights. One shortfall of this project in that regard was 
the timeliness of data collection. Had Twitter data around the 2017 Women’s March 
been more recently available, a more thorough and complete picture of public 
sentiment around the incident in question would have been possible. This ideal study 
would require both the flexibility to quickly pivot to new data collection on an 
unfolding event, and the amount of CPU power and storage required to pull, save, 
and parse through the massive dataset. 
A second extension on this project’s intentions would be to expand research in 
online communities using different methodological approaches to the one used in this 
project. A formal social network analysis could provide illuminating details on how 
power centers and influence circles function in the world of pro-life feminists, or any 
other fringe social movement or group. Conversely, a discursive or textual analysis of 
one site or social media platform — instead of three like were assessed in this project 
— might provide a clearer sense of a given platform’s affordances, and the 
unique and nuanced ways in which different groups utilize it. 
Finally, I am most interested in a deeper study of philosophical new-media 
implications of the pro-life feminist and marginal/populism through the web in U.S. 
society. This would look like an analysis of the pro-life feminists’ use of online 
platforms to produce certain knowledges and perceptions about feminism, and about pro-
life feminism’s place as a category within it. Aside from the plethora of pro-life feminist 
created and promoted blogs and articles, some of which have been cited previously, 
other avenues for constructing knowledge are less transparent. During my research for 
this project, I came across a handful of instances where crowd-sourced educational 
materials, like Wikipedia, were altered to integrate pro-life feminism into 
155 
the topic of feminism more broadly. For instance, in analyzing back-links from the 
Feminists For Life website, I discovered a site titled “Academic Kids Encyclopedia” 
which listed the FFL under a subheading of “Feminist Organizations.” Academic 
Kids is a curated encyclopedia collection that pulls pages and information from 
Wikipedia to a presumably kid-safe internet environment. Some pages, like the 
“Feminism” entry, are not drawn entirely from Wikipedia, and therefore presumably 
less-scrutinized by the hive mind of wiki editors and bots. It goes without saying 
that introducing the idea of feminism at a young age is a challenging task without 
the added nuance over debates on abortion. 
Similarly, battles over meaning and history, much like my analysis of Susan 
B. Anthony’s Legacy, occur out in the open on Wikipedia, which can serve as a
battleground of sorts for categorization and taxonomy of both simple and complex 
concepts. Indeed, there is even a Wikipedia page dedicated to the “Susan B. Anthony 
abortion dispute,” where both activists on either side of the dispute as well as 
uninvolved editors with no stake in the debate take seriously every word, reference, 
and linguistic implication. The former seeking to impress their understanding of 
“truth,” and the latter intent on imposing as much impartiality as possible in what is 
otherwise an ideologically-loaded conversation. What’s more, it is not always easy 
to tell activist from simple editor, nor are the two roles mutually exclusive.28 
28 While anyone can edit a Wikipedia page, many factors go into whether those edits will 
remain intact for even a short amount of time. Some edits are automatically flagged for 
review by more senior editors (registered Wikipedia members who have contributed 
successfully over time), and some are instantly revoked or corrected by bots designed to 
scan materials instantaneously and streamline the reviewing process. 
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While this behind-the-scenes debate happens contemporaneously on other 
pages within the discursive scope of pro-life feminism, the edit area for the “Anti-
Abortion Feminism” wiki provides ample examples for the ideological deliberation 
that goes into a Wikipedia page. For instance, a user with the IP address 
85.242.239.146 deleted a considerable amount of material they considered slanted 
against pro-life feminism, including discussions on the Susan B. Anthony debate, and 
connections between pro-life feminist groups and more militant pro-life groups like 
the National Right to Life Committee. The anonymous user also added the modifier 
“pro-choice” to references of “feminists” in order to emphasize the idea that pro-life 
feminists should be considered equally in the broader denomination of “feminist.” 
She made these and other edits with the comments: “Deleted weasel words. This 
article needs to be neutral,” and “This article was horribly biased against pro-life 
feminism, imagine the same in a[n] article about their op[p]onents.” (85.242.239.146, 
12 Feb 2011). 
Alternately, editors and/or possible pro-choice advocates made revisions and 
overturned these edits, claiming: “after discussion, [remove] frivolous templates; "I 
personally disagree with the peer-reviewed scholarship and think we should use 
activist nonsense instead" is not an actionable cause for a neutrality tag,” referring to 
a conflict between academic and non-academic scholarship used as citations for entry 
information (Roscelese, 25 Feb 2011). The same user, who is active in women’s 
history spheres on Wikipedia, also argues “no, your attempts to pretend this is a 
mainstream phenomenon are undue, & your attempts to lend WP's authority to the 
claim this is what our foremothers wanted violates WP:NPOV, ” citing Wikipedia’s 
No-Point-Of-View clause as a justification for removing 85.242.239.146’s edits. Here 
we can see a(n) (im)material sublimation of a macro conflict between populism and 
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academia — one that, if studied further, could provide invaluable insight into the 
matrix of knowledge, power, and ideology the U.S. is currently in the process of 
detangling. 
As scholars and social commentators wrestle with an affective “post-truth” 
reality, the writable web provides a pallet for a growing movement of conspiracists 
peddling “alternative facts” (Wehner, 2019). While certain encyclopedic formats 
like Wikipedia self-police to a degree, social media platforms have little incentive to 
pit opposing factions against each other by forcing a politically integrated discursive 
environment. Facebook in particular seems to be at the epicenter of this 
phenomenon for a number of reasons: Facebook’s infrastructure, while providing an 
excellent incubation platform for burgeoning social groups, allows for ideological 
echo chambers which are almost only met with objection by complete strangers with 
a penchant for trolling. Additionally, Facebook’s historic refusal (and later short 
walkback) to fact-check political advertisements, let alone most of the content 
circulated on the site, sets up a growing older population of Facebook users to 
consume, believe, and share information that may be biased interpretations, or 
outright untrue content. This obfuscation of truths and falsehoods then puts the onus 
of clarification on the company in question, a task which it has repeatedly avoided 
taking on. A study that focuses on one social group, ideally through digital 
ethnographic methods, would be an excellent grounding of the assumptions 
underscoring this line of inquiry. 
Final Thoughts 
This project took a multi-pronged approach to answering the previously 
mentioned research questions. Question one is answered through the mechanisms of 
158 
popular memory and commemoration, and via the support system and external 
validation and reassurance drawn from communities of other pro-life feminists, 
specifically those online. This project makes clear that in order to maintain a sense of 
history in the manner of pro-life feminists, there must be a voluntary disregard for 
some professional historical accounts — if not the wholesale rejection of academic 
methods for reading the past. This diverted history is then reinforced through 
simulations of academic work like newsletters posing as journals or multiple books 
published internally and stocked on library shelves. Second, pro-life feminists again 
mimic formal institutions from their unique ideological perspective, from the Susan 
B. Anthony List to the pro-life birthplace memorialization under the same name.
Finally, the strength of seduction in the perception of a moral high ground cannot be 
underestimated, as is evident in hundreds of years of anglo-saxon colonialism. While 
religiosity does not drive all pro-life feminists in the way that it does for non-feminist 
or anti-feminist pro-lifers, the mindset of saviorism has a similar affective effect on 
the extent to which certain narratives and rationales are consumed and digested in the 
pro-life feminist community. 
Question two harkens back to the above discussion on the public and the third 
place. The “third space/place” shows up in a variety of literature as a way to discuss 
boundaries, outsiderness, and change. A prominent arena that benefits from “border 
thinking” are scholars working toward decolonial endeavors, using the border to indicate 
a dialogic locus of “colonial difference” ideal for subaltern resistance and reclamation of 
humanity and subjectivity (Poovey, 1988; Lugones, 2010; Bhahba, 1995; Mignolo, 
2000). In that context as well as the Arendtian formulation, the border between public 
and private tends to be a space where transformation and flux can occur. The implication 
of the third place in the latter sense is that it is in many ways 
159 
an anteroom for the public— a location for private issues to become public and vice 
versa, or for identities to form and solidify. This direction is especially visible in 
post-structuralist confrontations of gender, wherein the notion of ‘queering’ a space 
aims to upend normative boundaries: as gender can “transect” identity categories, 
resulting in a “mutual transformation” of each one (Harper, et al, 1997, p.2). 
The other important aspect of the third space is its imperative to define the 
spheres it sits between. While the pro-life feminists can occupy a liminal space of 
potential, their existence, and moreover their agitation of pro-choice feminists both 
challenges and supplies the discursive boundaries of mainstream feminism today. The 
contemporary pro-life feminist identity, in turn, is to some degree predicated on the 
exclusion from broad definitions of feminist politics. Particularly since the 2017 
Women’s March, the intolerability of the pro-life feminists has provided a martyrdom 
that underscores their movement in no uncertain terms. This begs the final question: 
Can pro-life feminists exist as a sect of pro-choice feminism? Or were pro-life 
feminists always already incommensurable to mainstream feminism? Like many 
beleaguered fringe movements on the right, is the existence of pro-life feminism 
predicated on the experience of ostracism? This is not for this study to determine, but 
opens a new inquiry for future directions, especially in terms of sociological readings 
of social movements and group identity. 
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